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1. Introduction
Africa, the cradle of humankind, is currently the home of about 15 percent of the global popula-
tion. Still struggling with the legacy of colonization, poor public institutions, and low education,
it only accounts for a mere four percent of global economic output. Nonetheless, there is hope
for this very diverse continent with more than 2.000 languages reaching from the Arab-oriented
North, over the Sahara to the Savannah with its numerous peoples and cultures and ending at the
Cape of Good Hope. In the last two decades, Africa became more and more visible on the radar
of international investors as foreign direct investments grew by a factor of ten between 1995 and
2015. The reason for the intensified interest in Africa is that economic growth accelerated consid-
erably during that period of time. Some African nations are currently among the world’s fastest
growing economies (KPMG and Handelsblatt Research Institute (eds.), 2014). One likely reason
for the progress made in that period of time is the intensified and coordinated effort of economic
integration which commenced with the foundation of the African Economic Community (AEC)
in 1994. The aspiration of the African Union (AU), Africa’s counterpart to the European Union,
is to emulate the success of Europe’s economic and political integration to unlock the continent’s
vastly underused resources. The ultimate goal is to create a common market for goods, services,
and production factors that covers the entire African continent as well as its neighboring islands.
That envisaged common market also includes a common currency, achieved by ultimately merg-
ing, yet to create, several regional currency blocks into a single African monetary union by the
end of the next decade.
This study concentrates on the monetary part of the ongoing and planned economic integra-
tion process in Africa. While the benefits of tearing down national boarders that impede trade
and the free movement of production factors are rather straightforward, the benefits of (almost)
irreversibly fixating exchange rates by abolishing national currencies in favor of supra-national
ones do not necessarily outweigh the costs. To be of any benefit, trade between members needs
to be high to profit from the reduction of transaction costs, stemming from the need to convert
1
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national currencies and the risk of unexpected exchange-rate movements. And for the costs to be
small, economic theory demands that the participating economies need to move sufficiently syn-
chronously, or that they have strong mechanism to absorb macroeconomic shocks, such as flexible
wages and prices as well as mobile labor forces. The purpose of this study is to empirically assess
whether and to which degree Africa and its regions match the theoretical requirements for a suc-
cessful monetary union outlined here.
This book is organized as follows. The next chapter gives a detailed overview of the economic
integration plans in Africa, its origins in colonial and early post-colonial time as well as the current
state of economic integration. The following chapter describes the theory of costs and benefits of
monetary unions outlined above. The subsequent chapter is the core of this study. It first describes
the methodology and data, and then provides the results of the empirical analyses assessing the
costs and benefits of African monetary integration. The next chapter compares the central find-
ings with, and elucidates the contribution of this study to the existing literature. The last chapter
concludes and derives policy implications.
2
2. The History of African Economic and
Monetary Integration
This chapter gives an overview over the course and institutions of economic and monetary inte-
gration – with emphasis on the monetary part – of the African continent. The relevant institutions
and their roles are briefly introduced.
2.1. Colonial time
Colonial Africa was partitioned into colonies and ruled by the European colonial powers with
Great Britain and France claiming the major share of the African continent. Part of the colonial
governance was the introduction and maintenance of monetary regimes, including three monetary
unions1 between different colonies (Figure 2.1).
Currency boards2 with parity to the pound sterling were introduced in British West Africa3
in 1912 and in British East Africa4 in 1919. The then newly introduced West and East African
Shilling replaced a plethora of circulating currencies – the pound sterling in British West Africa
and the Indian Rupee in British East Africa, which were complemented by foreign and local cur-
rencies and gold – as legal tender. Other British territories in Africa had either their own colonial
1A monetary union is defined as a geographical area (not necessarily coherent) in which the same currency is the
primary medium of exchange and there are no restrictions to the movement of capital within that area. Hence,
nation states with a single national currency are monetary unions between that nation’s regions. However, monetary
unions are usually defined to consist of at least two (partially) sovereign countries which usually share a common
central bank and common pool of reserves (Harris et al., 2007, 12).
2A currency board is a variant of a fixed exchange rate regime where the domestic currency is fully backed by reserves
of the anchor currency and where the monetary authority guarantees full redeemability of the domestic currency
into the anchor currency at the official (fixed) exchange rate. The advantage of a currency board in comparison to
a simple fixed exchange rate regime or peg is an increased credibility of the exchange rate fixation owing to the
absence of discretionary latitude for the central bank of the country with the currency board as the money supply is
determined by the amount of reserves of the anchor currency (Mishkin, 2004, 492-493).
3British West Africa encompassed the territories of the current nations of Ghana (former Gold Cost), Sierra Leone,
Gambia, and Nigeria.
4British East Africa encompassed the territories of the current nations of Kenya, Tanzania (former Tanganyika) ex-
cluding the Zanzibar islands and Uganda.
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Swaziland
Namibia Botswana
Zimbabwe
Comoros
Malawi
Tanzania
Zambia
Angola
Congo (Dem. Rep.)
Burundi
Rwanda
KenyaCongo
(Rep.)Gabon
Equatorial Guinea
Cameroon
Central
African
Republic
South
Sudan
Ethiopia
Somalia
Djibouti
Sudan
Egypt
Nigeria
Togo
Ghana
Côte
d’Ivoire
Sierra
Leone
Guinea
Mali
Burkina
Faso
Guinea-
Bissau
Gambia
Cape Verde
Mauritania
Morocco
Algeria
Niger
Chad
Libya
Sao Tome
and Principe
Mauritius
Senegal
Benin
Tunisia
Eritrea
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
oz
am
biq
ue
Uganda
Liberia
Western Sahara
East African Currency Board
West African Currency Board
CFA-Franc Zone
Joined respective Monetary Union after Independence
Seychelles
Lesotho
De Facto Southern African Monetary Union
(later Rand/Common Monetary Area)
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Figure 2.1.: Colonial monetary unions.
Note: Map with current borders and country names. Island countries (Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome and
Principe, and Seychelles) only displayed by their major islands.
Source: Own figure, map template by d-maps.com (ed.).
currencies (e.g., Rhodesian pound, Southern Rhodesian pound, South African pound, Egyptian
pound, etc.), which were pegged to the pound sterling, or used either the pound sterling itself or
the Indian Rupee (British Somaliland and British East Africa before the introduction of the cur-
rency board) (Clauson, 1944, 2-25).
The monetary regimes of the French colonies were similar to the ones of the British colonies.
The French franc was imposed on all African territories of the French colonial empire. In the
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second half of the 19th century, various colonial paper currencies (tokens) were introduced, issued
by private chartered banks (e.g., Banque de l’Algérie and Banque de l’Afrique) under the strict
supervision of the French treasury, complementing but not replacing the French franc as legal ten-
der. The colonial currencies were pegged to the French franc at a fixed exchange rate. In 1945
the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)5 franc zone was created, as the African arm of the
worldwide franc zone. The franc zone was defined by common foreign-exchange controls, the
pooling of foreign-exchange reserves, the free convertibility of the colonial currencies, and the
French franc as the anchor currency on a fixed-exchange-rate basis (Banque de France (ed.), 2010,
1-3).
In southern Africa a de facto monetary union existed. In 1921 the Union of South Africa6 es-
tablished its central bank, the South African Reserve Bank. The South African pound became
legal tender and effectively the sole medium of exchange, not only in South Africa but also in
the British colonies of Botswana (former Bechuanaland), Lesotho, and Swaziland (former Basu-
toland) as well as in Namibia (former German South-West Africa and subsequently South-West
Africa under South African rule). South Africa established no capital controls within that area
while all external transactions were effectively subject to South African currency controls (Har-
ris et al., 2007, 5-8).
The remaining colonial powers, i.e., Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, had similar
monetary regimes in place as Great Britain and France. They either used the motherland’s na-
tional currency or issued specific currencies for the circulation within the colony which were often
pegged to the motherland’s currency.
The colonial currencies and currency boards permitted the colonial powers an enhanced control
of the money supply within their overseas territories. Furthermore, it allowed the supply of suf-
ficiently small and large currency denominations to ensure the efficient conduct of domestic and
overseas trade. The fixed exchange rates further facilitated trade with the homeland owing to the
absence of the risk of unexpected changes of the exchange rate (Clauson, 1944, 4-5). However,
colonial currencies were primarily tools to administer and tax the dependent territories in order
5Until independence CFA was the abbreviation for Colonies financière africaine (McCarthy, 2006, 36).
6The Union of South Africa was a unification of former British colonies (Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal
Colony, and Orange River Colony) and the predecessor state of the current Republic of South Africa. The Union of
South Africa gained independence as a dominion within the British Empire in 1910.
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to pursue the motherlands’ colonial agendas. These agendas – ranging from blatant exploitation
over assimilation to association – varied between the colonial powers and changed over time (Mc-
Carthy, 2006, 25-38).
2.2. Independence and early post-colonial time
The primary phase of decolonization of the African continent began in the 1950s and lasted until
the mid-1970s. During that phase, the majority of African states gained independence7. However,
the arbitrarily drawn borders of the former colonies, which disregarded ethnic and cultural affilia-
tions, rendered a liability to the then newborn states. Ethnic and religious conflicts led to a number
of secessions with South Sudan – gaining statehood in 2011 – as the latest example.
When the British possessions in Africa were released into political independence, they also
gained monetary independence. Between 1963 and 1974, the former colonies left the East and
West African currency boards. They were successively dissolved and their circulating notes and
coins withdrawn. New national central banks assumed the responsibility for the conduct of mon-
etary policy and the issuance of the new national currencies that replaced the shillings as legal
tender (de Loynes, 1974, 35-38; Bank of Tanzania (ed.), n.d., n.p.). However, despite gaining
formal independence the majority of former British colonies maintained economic links to Great
Britain and to the other former colonies by joining the Commonwealth of Nations8. Currently
19 African nations – Botswana, Cameroon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia – are members of the Commonwealth (Commonwealth Secretariat
(ed.), 2009, 37-39).
In contrast, the majority of former French possessions did not only keep their economic bonds
but they also preserved their monetary ties to metropolitan France (Figure 2.1). While the CFA
franc zone included all French colonies in Africa initially, after releasing their member colonies
into independence, the newly created African nations of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Madagas-
car, and Guinea (former Guinea-Conakry) left the franc zone to execute their sovereign right of
issuing their own currencies and pursuing independent monetary policies. The remainder of the
7For a comprehensive list of dates of independence see African Union (ed.) (n.d.b, 1-2)
8The Commonwealth of Nations is an association of 53 countries worldwide, most of them former British colonies.
The member states cooperate in legal, technical, economic, and political issues on the basis of unanimity (Com-
monwealth Secretariat (ed.), 2009, 4-36)
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former French colonies continued their CFA membership. The African Nation of Comoros kept
its currency, the Comorian franc, and maintained the fixed exchange rate to the French franc until
1994 when it was depreciated by 33 percent to approximately 77.19 Comorian francs per French
franc. Côte d’Ivoire, Benin (former Dahomey), Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Mali, Mau-
ritania (left CFA franc zone in 1973), Niger, Senegal, and Togo form the West African Monetary
Union (WAMU)9 while Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo,
and Gabon form the Central African Monetary Union (CAMU)10. Both monetary unions have
their own common currencies, the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc.
They were pegged to the French franc until 1999 and since then to the Euro at identical fixed
exchange rates11. The monetary policies of the unions are conducted by their respective multi-
national central banks; the Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) for the
WAMU and the Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique équatoriale et du Cameroun (BCEAEC)
for the CAMU (Banque de France (ed.), 2010, 2-5).
The de-facto monetary union in southern Africa existed until 1974. In 1969, when the Union
of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa, the South African Rand replaced the South
African pound as the common currency. The monetary union therefore was called the Rand Mon-
etary Area (RMA). In 1974, the RMA was made official by treaty after all participating states
except Namibia (at that time under South African rule) gained independence. However, Botswana
left the RMA in 1975. In 1986, the treaty was changed by the Common Monetary Area (CMA)
Agreement. It allowed all participating members to issue own currencies; however they are re-
quired to be fully backed by reserves of the South African Rand. Namibia, after having gained in-
dependence in 1990, joined the CMA in 1992. To the present day, all national currencies maintain
a fixed exchange rate at par to the South African Rand which also remains the de facto common
currency. The Botswana Pula is, to a large extent, also pegged to the South African Rand as it
makes up 60 to 70 percent of Botswana’s currency basket (Harris et al., 2007, 7-12).
9The former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau joined the WAMU in 1997.
10The former Spanish colony of Equatorial-Guinea joined the CAMU in 1985.
11In September 1949 the exchange rate of the CFA francs was fixed at 50 CFA francs per French franc. In January
1994 the CFA francs were depreciated to 100 CFA francs per French franc. With France’s accession to the European
Monetary Union (EMU) the exchange rate to the Euro was automatically set to 655.957 CFA francs per Euro since
the conversion rate of the French franc to the Euro was determined to equal 6.55957 French francs per Euro.
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2.3. The economic and monetary integration process of the African
Union
2.3.1. The beginning: The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the
Organization of African Unity
With the process of widespread decolonization commencing at the end of the 1950s, the degree
of economic and monetary integration of the African continent declined heavily, since the former
integration had been an imposed one. At this stage, when merely eight African nations – Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Tunisia, South Africa, and Sudan – were formally independent
and after more than a decade of resistance by the colonial powers, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) was established as the fifth Regional Economic Commission of
the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The UNECA’s aims are to promote economic
and social development of its member states, foster regional integration by providing advice, and
assistance to its members 12. However, during the first years of its existence, UNECA was pre-
occupied with assisting the new African countries in building the institutional infrastructure while
struggling against the remainders and legacies of colonialism. The speed of formal decolonization
in the early 1960s was rapid. Just between 1960 and 1965, the number of independent African
nations increased by 26. This rapid change turned out to be counterproductive to the UNECA’s
objective of economic integration. The artificially drawn boarders between the old colonies were
fairly permeable during the colonial time, at least between colonies of the same colonizer. The
old colony borders became the state lines of the newborn African nations. These turned out to
be much less permeable than the colonial borders due to the national interests of the new nations.
(Jolly, 2009, 1-2).
However, African leaders recognized the need for economic and political cooperation and in-
tegration. As the process of decolonization was still ongoing, this led to establishment of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 by 23 African countries. The objectives of the
OAU, as declared in Article II of the OAU Charter, were:
• To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
• To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples of Africa;
12Currently, nearly all African nations are members of the UNECA.
8
2.3. The economic and monetary integration process of the African Union
• To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence;
• To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;
• To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
These goals were to be achieved by the cooperation and harmonization of member states’ poli-
cies, particularly in the fields of:
• Political and diplomatic cooperation;
• Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;
• Educational and cultural cooperation;
• Health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation;
• Scientific and technical cooperation;
• Cooperation for defense and security.
(African Union (ed.), 1963, 3).
Simultaneously to the formation of the OAU, UNECA carried on promoting African integration
by working towards the set-up of multinational institutions. These efforts led to the establishment
of the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and the African Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) (Jolly, 2009, 1-2). The Agreement Establishing the ADB was signed in August
1963 by 23 African nations. The purpose and means of the ADB, as defined in Article 1 and 2
of the Agreement Establishing The African Development Bank, is to contribute to the sustainable
economic development and social progress of its African member states by financing public or
private investment projects (African Development Bank (ed.), 2011b, 2). Initially, the ADB relied
solely on resources provided by its African member states since non-African countries were pro-
hibited from admission. As a first step of strengthening the financial base of the ADB, the African
Development Fund (ADF) was established in 1972 by the ADB and 13 non-African members. In
December 1982, ADB membership was opened to non-regional members to account for the grow-
ing need for capital to satisfy the increasing demand for loans. As of December 2011, the ADB
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had 53 regional13 and 24 non-regional members14. The combined subscribed capital of the ADB
and the ADF amounted to about 85 billion US-Dollars at the end of 2011 (African Development
Bank (ed.), 2011a, 3-8).
To foster monetary and financial integration as an essential part of Africa’s economic integra-
tion, the formation of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB) was agreed upon by the
OAU member states in 1965. The goals of the AACB, as listed in article two of its statutes, are to:
• Promote cooperation in the monetary, banking, and financial spheres in the African region;
• Assist in the formulation of guidelines along which agreements among African countries in
the monetary, banking, and financial fields shall be reached;
• Help strengthening all efforts aimed at bringing about and maintaining price stability and
financial stability in the African region;
• Examine the effectiveness of international economic and financial institutions in which
African countries have an interest and suggest ways of possible improvement;
• Envisage, following a well-timed and sequenced convergence process, the advent of a single
currency and a common central bank in Africa.
The AACB, headed by the Assembly of Governors, follows the concept of regionalization as well.
The five regions (central, eastern, southern, northern, and western) are headed by their respective
sub-regional committee which consists of their central bank’s governors. Both bodies hold at least
one ordinary meeting a year with equal voting rights of each member (Association of African
Central Banks (ed.), 2003, 1-14).
2.3.2. The first draft: The Lagos Plan and the Final Act of Lagos
Dissatisfied with the progress of economic and social development, following formal indepen-
dence, the leaders of the OAU member states agreed upon the Lagos Plan and the Final Act of
13Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape-Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
14Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America
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Lagos in April 1980; the first comprehensive action plan for the economic and financial integration
of the African continent. The Lagos Plan and the Final Act of Lagos concluded a series of preced-
ing negotiations and declarations on African integration since the establishment of the OAU. The
declared goals were to achieve self-reliance as well as self-sustaining development and economic
growth through strengthening member states’ economies as well as via a process of economic and
political co-operation and integration. Quantitatively the Lagos Plan aimed at reaching a share
of two percent of the world’s industrial production by OAU member states by the year 2000. To
meet the targets, the Lagos Plan included numerous recommendations for national and multina-
tional policies in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and technology, natural and human
resource development, environment, energy, transport, communications, trade, and finance. In the
field of trade, the Lagos Plan envisaged the increase of intra-African trade through the eventual
implementation of an African common market leading to an African Economic Community AEC.
The African common market was envisaged to be built in a process of (sub-)regional integration
consisting of the successive reductions of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the introduction of
preferential trade areas under the principle of best favored nation treatment complemented by com-
mon standardization, and the establishment of an African Federation of Chambers of Commerce.
Trade integration was intended to be supported by financial and monetary integration. In this re-
spect, the Lagos Plan foresees an enhanced cooperation among member states’ central banks, the
establishment of common regional clearing and payment systems linked together to an African
Payments Union until 1990, the creation of an African Monetary and African Mutual Guarantee
and Solidarity Fund as well as strengthening the financial means of the ADB (United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (ed.), n.d., 4-97).
Besides the proposals for national and intra-African actions, the heads of state and government
agreed to increase cooperation on the international stage. By negotiating collectively, they aimed
at increasing their bargaining power in particular towards the developed nations in order to attain
the transfer of technology and to negotiate more favorable trade conditions. However, the focus
was to achieve national and collective self-reliance and economic independence of African na-
tions while integration into the world economy was regarded as of secondary importance which
reflected the disappointment and distrust towards the developed nations which included their for-
mer colonial oppressors. Then again, economic and political cooperation with other developing
nations was seen as a vital cornerstone of Africa’s economic emergence (United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (ed.), n.d., 16-22,68).
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The Final Act of Lagos set a timetable for the implementation of the Lagos plan. The AEC was
agreed to be set up by the year 2000, implemented in two stages. The first stage, the decade of the
1980s, included the strengthening of existing economic groupings and the establishment of new
ones to cover the entire continent, the promotion of coordination and harmonization among the
groupings, and the strengthening of sectoral integration at a continental level. The second stage,
the decade of the 1990s, incorporated the further deepening of sectoral integration through the har-
monization of economic, financial, and monetary policies (United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (ed.), n.d., 98-100).
2.3.3. The concrete schedule: The Abuja Treaty
Despite its ambitious goals, the Lagos Plan and the Final Act of Lagos remained a collection of
memoranda of understanding and recommendations which lacked concreteness and means of en-
forcing its implementation while the need for further political coordination remained high. How-
ever, in June 1991, OAU leaders established the AEC by adopting the Treaty Establishing the
African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty). The cornerstones of the treaty are the removal of
all tariff and non-tariff internal trade barriers, policy coordination and harmonization, a common
market with free movement of persons (including free residency), goods, services, and capital as
well as the establishment an African Monetary Union (AMU). The AEC is envisaged to be build
through a process of regional integration of member states into five Regional Economic Commu-
nities (RECs): North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. The
REC are planned to be ultimately merged (African Union (ed.), 1991, 7-10).
Article 6 of the treaty foresees to finalize the transition towards the AEC within 34 years, par-
titioned into six stages. The first stage (within five years) consists of setting up RECs where they
do not already exist and strengthening existing ones. The second stage (within eight years) fore-
sees the stabilization of trade barriers and determining the timetable for their gradual removal.
The third stage (within ten years) comprises the establishment of free trade areas15 and customs
union16 on individual REC level. The fourth stage (within two years) aims at the harmonization
15A free trade agreement regulates that goods and services are tradable without tariffs among the participating countries.
However, tariffs towards third countries are not harmonized (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, 239-240).
16A customs union agreement complements a free trade area with a common external tariff which considerably reduces
administrative costs for companies and the official sector since documenting and checking the origin of goods
crossing internal borders becomes obsolete. However, agreeing to a customs union means relinquishing sovereignty
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of tariff and custom systems among the REC in order to establish a continental customs union
with a common external tariff. The fifth stage (within five years) is the partial establishment of a
common market17 on a continental scale by harmonizing, inter alia, monetary, financial and fiscal
policies, and the application of free movement and residence of natural and legal persons (African
Union (ed.), 1991, 10-11).
The sixth and final stage (within five years) is scheduled to finish the development of the African
common market by adding free movement of capital. At the sixth stage, the common market is
planned to be complemented by a Pan-African monetary union (AMU) with a single African
central bank and currency. The AMU is supposed to be achieved by a process of regional inte-
gration and harmonization in which regional monetary zones (where not existent) are built and
subsequently merged. Moreover, the political integration will be strengthened by establishing a
Pan-African Parliament, an African Court of Justice (African Union (ed.), 1991, 11-12, 31-32).
However, the treaty does not provide concrete proposals for the geographical extent of RECs.
Most of the current RECs or their predecessors were already in place when the Abuja Treaty was
signed, some even trace back their origin to the mid-1960s. With the Abuja treaty OAU leaders
set a more concrete timetable for the economic, political, and monetary integration of its member
states. But the original goal of the Lagos Plan, to fully establish the AEC until the year 2000, was
delayed. The new timetable foresees a maximum of 34 to 40 years to finalize all six stages while
the transition from one stage to another is determined by the Assembly of OAU Heads of State
and Government. Since the treaty went into force in 1994, after the required number of member
states ratified the treaty, the full implementation of the AEC shall be concluded between 2028 and
2034 (African Union (ed.), 1991, 12).
2.3.4. A Call for acceleration: The Sirte Declaration and the establishment of the
African Union
In September 1999, the heads of state and government of the OAU met in Sirte (Libya) and de-
cided to convert the OAU into the African Union (AU) and accelerate the integration process laid
out by the Abuja Treaty. The implementation stages should be shortened and the implementation
over external tariffs which makes it politically more difficult (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, 239-240).
17A common market not only includes free movement of goods and a common external tariff it also encompasses free
mobility of production factors as well as legal harmonization. A common market can also have a common currency,
coordinated macroeconomic policies, a common foreign and defense policy, and even its own military (McCarthy,
2006, 164).
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of the Pan-African Parliament, the AMU, and the African Court of Justice should be established
ahead of the timetable of the Abuja treaty. In particular, the Pan-African Parliament was envisaged
to be realized by the year 2000 (African Governance Institute (ed.), 1999, 2-3).
In July 2000, OAU leaders adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU. The economic integration
plans of the AU remained that of its predecessor, i.e., building the AEC through a gradual process
of regional integration. Like the Sirte Declaration, the Constitutive Act called for the accelerated
implementation of the Abuja Treaty. However, both failed to provide a revised timetable and the
means to achieve acceleration (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2000, 1-
19).
2.3.5. The current state of integration
The preceding sections described the evolution of African economic integration plans from the
colonial time to the advent of the AU, stating the aspired ends and means. The following sec-
tion covers the progress actually made so far regarding regional and continental integration and
comparing it with the goals set by the various treaties.
2.3.5.1. Regional integration
The AU’s integration process envisages to achieve continental economic integration via prior re-
gional economic integration in REC. The Abuja Treaty foresaw to create five RECs as regional
country groupings according to geographical location (North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa,
East Africa, and Southern Africa). The reasons for integrating Africa’s economies on a regional
level first instead of outright continental integration are the following. First, the difficulties (polit-
ical, economic, administrative, legal, etc.) of integrating more than 50 countries at one time into a
single entity are far greater than integrating a smaller number of countries. Second, there were a
number of regional groupings in place which already shared certain degrees of economic, political,
and cultural integration and cooperation (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.),
2006, 45-46). However, instead of five there are currently eight RECs (Figure 2.2) recognized by
the AU as pillars of the AEC, namely the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)18
18Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia
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Figure 2.2.: Regional Economic Communities.
Note: Western Sahara is not a sovereign state and most of its territory is occupied by Morocco and de facto belongs
to CEN-SAD and UMA. Island countries (Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles)
only displayed by their major islands.
Source: Own figure, map template by d-maps.com (ed.).
founded in 1998, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)19 estab-
19Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Western Sahara (not an official
member but de facto as most of its territory is occupied by Morocco), Zambia, and Zimbabwe
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lished in 1965, the East African Community (EAC)20 established in 1999, the Economic Com-
munity of Central African States (ECCAS)21 established in 1983, the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS)22 founded in 1975, the Intergovernmental Authority for Develop-
ment (IGAD)23 set up in 1996, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)24 created
in 1980 and the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)25 founded in 1964 (United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ed.), 2012a, xi). One of the major problems of the regional integration
strategy are multiple REC memberships, as Figure 2.2 illustrates. More than half of all AU coun-
tries currently hold at least dual REC membership. Some even participate in three or four RECs.
Besides being an obstacle to efficient regional integration and causing considerable political, legal,
and administrative issues, multiple memberships also raise the question of which REC and regional
monetary union might be the most suitable for the pertained countries; a question which will be
addressed empirically in chapter 4. Adding to the confusion of overlapping RECs are economic
agreements on sub-REC level, such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)26 of which
all members, except Botswana, are also members of the Common Monetary Area CMA27. Simi-
larly, the CFA franc monetary unions WAMU and CAMU are subsets of ECOWAS and ECCAS,
receptively, while all UMA countries are also members of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, which
also includes the non-African nations of the Arabian Peninsula. In 1994, both WAMU and CAMU
expanded their respective sub-regional economic integration by complementing their pre-existing
free trade areas and monetary unions with common external tariff. Henceforth, they are referred
to as West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Central African Economic and
Monetary Union (CAEMU), respectively. Attempts to rationalize regional economic integration
– elimination of multiple memberships and the absorption and mergers of existing (sub-)RECs
to align them with the Abuja Treaty or at least harmonizing their efforts and programs – did not
succeed (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2006, 47-52).
20Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
21Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Republic of Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe
22Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo
23Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda
24Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
25Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco (not a member state of the AU), Tunisia, and Western Sahara (not an official
member but de facto as most of its territory is occupied by Morocco)
26The SACU has its roots in colonial southern Africa, with the first customs union agreement between the British
colony of Cape of Good Hope and Orange Free State Boer Republic in 1889. Currently the SACU encompasses
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland (Southern African Customs Union (ed.), n.d., n.p.).
27The CMA was established 1986 as the successor of the RMA which emerged from the de facto monetary union in
southern Africa, with Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland as founding members. Namibia joined the CMA in
1994. (Harris et al., 2007, 5-8)
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1. Stage 2. Stage
Goals
Sub-Goals
Free-trade area Customs union Free movement 
for persons
Free movement 
for capital
Monetary union
RECs
   CEN-SAD est. 1998  2014 X  X X
   COMESA est. 1965    2014 2025 2018
   EAC est. 1999      2023
   ECCAS est. 1983    X X X
   ECOWAS est. 1975   2015  X 2020
   IGAD est. 1996  X X X X X
   SADC est. 1980   2012 2015 2015 2018
   UMA est. 1964  X X X X X
selected Sub-RECs
   CAEMU est. 1994    2015  
   CMA est. 1986    X  
   SACU est. 1886    X only CMA only CMA
   WAEMU est. 1994      
  - implemented "year"  - envisaged year of completion
  - ongoing implementation X       - not yet started
Until 1999: 
Establish/ 
Strengthen RECs
Until 2007: 
Determine time 
tables for trade 
barrier removal 
on REC level
3. Stage
Until 2017: Gradually establish 
customs unions on REC level
Until 2023: Establish regional monetary unions.
4. Stage
Table 2.1.: Progress of regional integration
Note: Monetary union, free movement for persons and capital on REC level were not officially part of the stages
of Article 6 of the AEC treaty. However, they are defined for the continental level in Articles 43 (free movement of
people), 44 (monetary union) and 45 (free movement of capital) of the AEC treaty. Article 44 also states that the
African Monetary Union is to be created by harmonizing regional monetary unions which is part of the sixth stage
of the AEC treaty which commences 2023, which implicitly sets the latest date for implementing regional monetary
unions also to 2023. Free movement of persons includes visa exemption, freedom of residence, employment, and
establishment for natural and legal persons of member states. Envisaged years of completion which are in the past
were missed and so far no new timetable has been agreed.
Source: African Union Commission (ed.), 2009, 14-120; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.),
2012a, 14-19; African Union Commission (ed.), 2013, 22-84
Table 2.1 summarizes the progress and current state of regional economic integration in com-
parison to the goals set by the Abuja treaty. So far, all RECs, except IGAD, formally completed
stages one and two. Stage three, the establishment of regional customs unions is still ongoing and
has to be completed by 2017. However, progress diverges severely between the RECs. While the
EAC already completed stage three, IGAD and UMA not even initiated its implementation. The
remaining RECs are in various stages of setting up their free trade areas and customs unions with
previously set timetables regularly missed. Moreover, even if free trade and common customs
agreements are formally reached, they often suffer from slow implementation and limited compli-
ance in member states.
On the subject of monetary integration, none of the eight RECs has introduced a common cur-
rency yet. The EAC originally planned its monetary union, with the East African Shilling as
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its currency, to be launched in 2012 which was then shifted to 2023. So far, besides the EAC
only the SADC and the COMESA agreed on a concrete schedule for monetary union in 2018
and ECOWAS by 2020. ECOWAS, of which only the five Anglophone member states (Gambia,
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) and Guinea are not part of the WAEMU, plans to es-
tablish its regional monetary union in two stages. The first stage is to launch a second monetary
union, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), alongside WAEMU, which in the second stage
is to be merged with the WAEMU by 2020. Hence, the monetary unions inherited from the colo-
nial time on sub-REC level, the CFA franc zones and CMA, remain the only monetary unions on
the African continent which also exhibit higher degrees of economic integration, meeting already
all regional integration criteria of Article six of the Abuja treaty. The WAEMU, as a subset of
ECOWAS, also grants free movement for persons. However, some RECs already initiated prelim-
inary steps for monetary unification such as the establishment of common payment and settlement
systems, common clearing houses, and coordinated national monetary and exchange rate policies.
At the same time, they are working towards full convertibility of national currencies, the definition
and surveillance of macroeconomic and fiscal convergence criteria, and development harmonized
statistical, financial and accounting frameworks. Some RECs also established predecessor insti-
tutions of future central banks which coordinate the monetary integration process and national
monetary policies.
The reasons for slow progress in some RECs are manifold. The issue of multiple REC and sub-
REC memberships is one of the more obvious ones. Others are the lack of sufficient financial and
human resources, insufficient funding of the REC institutions, the lack of sufficiently developed
political and administrative infrastructures (corrupt and poorly trained officials, red tape, insuffi-
cient staffing, nepotism), the lack of political will and vision (e.g., UMA objects its official status
as REC), vested interests, ideological differences, and the lack of compensatory mechanisms to
address inequalities in the sharing of the costs and benefits of integration (e.g., tariffs and customs
are a significant source of public revenues). Moreover, internal conflicts – like most recently in
Mali, the secession of South Sudan and its aftermath – are also as much an obstacle to progress
as political conflicts between member states. For instance, UMA is paralyzed for decades owing
to the political differences between Morocco and Algeria regarding the status of Western Sahara.
Morocco even left the OAU/AU because it recognized Western Sahara as a member state and has
not renewed its membership since (African Union Commission (ed.), 2009, 14-120; United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2012a, 14-19; African Union Commission (ed.),
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2013, 22-84).
2.3.5.2. Inter-regional and continental integration
Regional economic integration is still in progress, however, the ultimate goal is to achieve conti-
nental integration. According to the Abuja treaty, the first stage of continental integration – the
merger of all regional free trade areas into a continental one within a period of two years – is envis-
aged to commence in 2018. Besides the fact that currently only half of the eight RECs have fully
established their regional free trade areas and two not even started their implementation, the lack
of inter-REC coordination might become a major obstacle to continental integration as well. Har-
monization of RECs’ integration programs, concerning all relevant areas, would not only avoid
unnecessary effort but would also foster a much faster continental integration. In particular in
the area of monetary integration, homogeneous convergence criteria of all RECs would make the
continental monetary integration (sixth stage of the Abuja treaty ranging from 2023-2028) much
easier since all member states would have a common macroeconomic convergence framework un-
der which they already work during the regional integration phase. However, African leaders have
taken some significant measures to address the issue of inter-REC coordination. The first is the tri-
partite arrangement of COMESA, EAC, and SADC of 2008. The tripartite agreement established
a mechanism for inter-REC cooperation which focuses on the harmonization of REC programs in
the areas of trade and infrastructure development via regular summits of the participating RECs’
leaders, common committees, task forces, and pooling of financial resources in common, ring-
fenced trust accounts. The most significant achievement of the ongoing cooperation of the three
RECs is the agreement to establish a common free trade area. Covering more than 50 percent of the
AU’s population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the tripartite agreement gives a significant
boost to African continental trade integration. It also sparked the adoption (January 2012) of an
AU action plan to accelerate the continental trade integration. The action plan envisages achieving
the continental free trade area two years ahead of the Abuja treaty timetable, i.e., in 2017. Another
significant initiative is the Minimum Integration Program (MIP) which was launched in 2009. It
provides a consensual framework for cooperation and coordination of the stakeholders of African
integration, i.e., the member states, the RECs, and the AU. It aims at increasing inter-REC conver-
gence in selected priority areas in a variable geometry approach28. The MIP’s implementation is
partitioned into three stages, each spanning over four years (Table 2.2). The priority areas, goals,
28The term variable geometry denotes an approach that allows for different integration speeds of member states, RECs,
and sub-RECs. Therefore, slow progress of some member states or regional groupings does not decelerate that of
others (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2012a, 21).
19
2. The History of African Economic and Monetary Integration
Priority area Sub-area
Trade barriers
Gradual reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers in all RECs

Elimination of all tariff barriers and non-
tariff in all RECs

Elimination of all tariff and non-tariff 
barriers at the continental level
X
Rules of origin
Simplification and harmonization of the 
rules of origin

Rules of origin harmonized at the 
regional level

Rules of origin harmonized at the 
continental level
X
Free trade
Signing of partnership agreements 
between RECs

Creation of inter-REC free trade areas: 
(COMESA, SADC, EAC, IGAD) and 
(ECOWAS, ECCAS, CENSAD, UMA)
X
Continental free area until 2017 
according to the AU action plan to 
accelerate the continental trade 
integration
X
Customs
Harmonization of procedures and 
establishment of customs union in all 
RECs

Customs union in both inter-REC free 
trade areas
X
Continental customs union with 
common external tariff
X
persons Complete within all RECs  Partially between RECs X Complete on continental level X
goods Complete within all RECs  Partially between RECs X Complete on continental level X
capital and services Partially within RECs  Partially between RECs X Complete on continental level X
Fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic 
convergence
Convergence of inflation, interest rates 
and public finances within RECs

Convergence of inflation, interest rates 
and public finances between RECs
X
Convergence of inflation, interest rates 
and public finances between RECs
X
Monetary policy
Deepening of actions towards the 
creation of the African Central Bank 
and the African Monetary Fund

Establishment of a monetary union in 
all RECs
X
Establishment of a continental monetary 
union with common currency and 
central bank
X
Financial market 
development
Creation of the Pan African Stock 
exchange
X
Foster development of national and 
regional financial markets
X
Establishment of an
African transferable
stock market
X
  - implemented   - ongoing implementation      X  - not yet started
Free movement
3. Stage
2017-20202013-20162009-2012
Trade
1. Stage 2. Stage
Table 2.2.: Minimum Integration Program: Goals, timetable, and progress
Note: Table includes only priority areas which are of most relevance for monetary integration. The entire MIP also
encompasses the priority areas: peace and security, infrastructure and energy, agriculture, industry, investment, sci-
ence and technology, social and political affairs, and capacity building. A continental free trade area until 2017 is not
part of the MIP but of the 2012 AU action plan to accelerate the continental trade integration.
Source: African Union Commission (ed.), 2010, 24-27; African Union Commission (ed.), n.d., 3-46
instruments, performance indicators, and timetables are defined in the "First action plan for the im-
plementation of the Minimum Integration Programme" whose progress is monitored by the AU.
The MIP ambitiously revises the timetable of the Abuja treaty, antedating particularly continental
integration. Most notably, the AMU is set to be completed by 2020, IGAD is set to join the tripar-
tite free trade area of COMESA, SADC, EAC by 2016 while ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD, and
UMA are set to create their own inter-REC free trade area until 2016. So far, the timetable of the
MIP has not been met owing to the same reasons that hamper regional integration (African Union
Commission (ed.), 2010, 1-27; African Union Commission (ed.), n.d., 3-46; African Union Com-
mission (ed.), 2013, 22-84; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2012a, 21-23).
Since its foundation, the AU continued the institution building its predecessor, the OAU, ini-
tiated. The Assembly of Heads of States and Government is the supreme organ of the AU. The
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Executive Council, composed of ministers or representatives designated by the governments of
member states, is directly subordinated to the Assembly and is responsible for coordination and
harmonization of policies of member states, RECs, UNECA, and AU institutions. Together with
the 2004 established Pan-African Parliament29 they form the legislative branch of the AU. The
African Union Commission (AUC) – comprising of eight commissariats, each with its own port-
folio30 – represents the executive branch of the AU. The judicial powers of the AU are executed by
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights which has been established in 2004, absorbing
the 2003 created African Court of Justice into a single court.
The institutions of the AMU, the African Central Bank (ACB), the African Monetary Fund
(AMF), and the African Investment Bank (AIB) have yet to be established. Currently, the AACB,
as the predecessor organization of the ACB, and the AU are drawing up the protocol for the estab-
lishment of the ACB. The work on the AMF and the AIB is in a somewhat more advanced stage.
The AIB protocol and statute were adopted by the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State
and Government in 2009, endowing the AIB with an initial capital stock of 25 billion US-Dollars.
Owing to the lack of full ratification of member states, neither the AMF nor the AIB have taken
up operations (African Union (ed.), n.d.a, n.p.; African Union Commission (ed.), 2013, 151-153).
2.4. Summary
This chapter commenced with describing the situation during Africa’s colonial era. Economic
and monetary integration was fairly high during that period of time. With decolonization this
imposed integration came to an end. However, African leaders saw the need to re-integrate the
continent economically and politically in order to overcome the legacy of colonialism and to bring
peace and prosperity to Africa’s peoples. The efforts to re-integrate Africa began already during
the early phase decolonization and culminated in the ratification of the Treaty Establishing the
AEC (Abuja Treaty) in 1994. Figure 2.3 summarizes the course of events and planned integration
milestones that are described in detail in this chapter. The Abuja treaty foresees to economically
and monetarily integrate the whole continent in a process of regional integration and ultimately
29The Pan-African Parliament is located in Johannesburg, South Africa. It is supposed to evolve into a parliament
with full legislative powers in the course of African integration. Currently it has merely advisory and consultative
functions.
30The eight portfolios of the AU commission are: Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Trade and Industry, Infrastruc-
ture and Energy, Social Affairs, Rural Economy and Agriculture, Human Resources, Science and Technology, and
Economic Affairs.
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Phase of decolonization and economic and 
monetary disintegration 
1949 
Phase of regional 
integration 
1958 
foundation 
of 
UNECA 
1963 
foundation 
of 
OAU 
1949 1980 
1980 
Lagos 
Plan 
1994 
Treaty 
Establishing 
the African 
Economic 
Community 
(Abuja 
Treaty) 
1999 
Sirte 
Decla-
ration 
1999 
establish 
Regional 
Economic 
Communities
(RECs) 
2028 - 2034 
finalize 
African 
Economic 
Community  
1994 2017 
establish 
regional 
customs 
unions 
2023 
Establish 
regional 
common 
markets 
and 
monetary 
unions 
Phase of 
continental 
integration 
2028 - 2034 
Figure 2.3.: Time line of Africa’s historical and planned economic integration.
Source: Own figure.
continental integration. Regional monetary unions are envisaged to be implemented by 2023 and
continental monetary union between 2028 to 2034. However, so far the ambitious integration plans
were not met by an equally ambitious implementation. Even though some regions perform better
than others, timetables were regularly missed and shifted to the future. This book empirically
assesses Africa’s integration plans from the perspective of the theory of optimum currency areas,
which is introduced in the next chapter.
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Unions
The previous chapter presented the history and current state of African economic and monetary
integration. This chapter lists the theory of costs and benefits of monetary unions to understand
the rationale of African leaders and to lay the theoretical foundation for the empirical analyses of
chapter 4.
3.1. Benefits
One of the primary reasons for economic integration in general is fostering trade among the partic-
ipating nations in order to enhance their economic welfare. This is achieved by removing existing
trade barriers and thereby reducing transaction costs and administrative obstacles which other-
wise would have raised the costs of the exchange of goods or even prevented it entirely. These
static efficiency gains are supplemented by dynamic ones originating from increased competition,
economies of scale, larger incentives for innovation, and greater product variety. In particular less
developed and rather closed economies have great unused potentials which can be unlocked by
economic integration (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, 212-214).
An additional reduction of transaction costs and therefore a boost to trade can be achieved
by complementing the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers with monetary integration.
Having a common currency and a common payments system in transnational trade makes the ex-
change of currencies obsolete. From a macroeconomic point of view, production factors which
in the absence of a monetary union are solely occupied with conducting currency exchanges and
coordinating national payments systems can be relocated towards other productive uses.
Moreover, monetary integration entails potential indirect benefits. Consumers might be able to
make better price comparisons and price predictions when goods are priced in the same currency.
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That should lead to more efficiency of the price mechanism, better integrated markets, and, hence,
more competition, lower prices, smaller price differentials, and ultimately increased allocation ef-
ficiency. Another potential benefit originates from the fact that a currency union eliminates the
risk of unforeseen changes of the exchange rate(s) with the currencies of trading partners. This
potentially fosters transnational trade as well as may lead to increased welfare when risk aversion
is assumed. Indeed, exchange rate variation can result in higher profits and lower prices on the
level of individual customers and companies if the exchange moves in a – from their point of view
- favorable direction. However, this unexpected windfall is met by an equal loss in the books of
the trading partner or in other sectors of the same economy. Moreover, currency appreciations
might in the short run increase the turnover of exporters but also impair their international price
competitiveness (De Grauwe, 2012, 54-62).
The absence of exchange rate uncertainty can also lead to a reduction of risk premiums on
interest rates which reduces problems associated with imperfect and asymmetrically distributed
information like moral hazard and adverse selection. Both phenomena lead to, on average, riskier
investments and, hence, increase the systemic risk of the financial sector (De Grauwe, 2005, 74-
76). From a neoclassical growth theory point of view, lower real interest rates lead to temporary
higher growth rates of macroeconomic output as well as a higher output level in the steady state.
Introducing dynamic economies of scale where the rate of technological change depends on the
stock of capital (endogenous growth) and possibly free dissemination of technological knowledge
may even yield permanently higher growth rate of macroeconomic output. However, these effects
can only take hold if a monetary union does not lead to greater uncertainty, for instance about
macroeconomic output, unemployment, price stability, the sustainability of government debt, and
stability of the financial sector as discussed in the next section (De Grauwe, 2012, 62-67).
The reduction of transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty may also not
only foster the movement of goods but also that of production factors. Investors are more likely
to be willing to invest in other union member states since their returns are more predictable and
relieves them of the costs of exchanging currencies. It also facilitates the creation of bigger and,
thus, more liquid capital markets. The same applies to the labor force since it makes wages and
salaries more comparable, predictable, and stable relative to the home country’s costs of living.
Hence, currency union enables additional deepening of a common market which increases its effi-
ciency.
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Forming a monetary union with a supranational and politically independent central bank might
also lead to more stable prices. This might enable countries which suffered from unstable and
highly volatile prices to avoid the costs associated with that. However, if a country with previ-
ously highly stable prices joins a monetary union, it might end up with a less stable price level
and, hence, has to bear costs (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, 575-576).
Additional benefits of a monetary union can emerge when the common currency is - more often
than the former national currencies - used as a medium of exchange in international transactions
outside the union, i.e., becomes an international reserve currency. One advantage of this is that the
union’s central bank can create more currency as necessary for domestic purposes without creat-
ing inflationary pressure since the surplus is used outside the union. This creates additional central
bank profits, i.e., seigniorage as well as interest payments on reserve accounts and securities which
go to public budgets and reduce the need for levying other taxes. Moreover, having an interna-
tional reserve currency makes it easier and less costly for the governments as well as the private
sector to issue bonds since it creates a more liquid bond market. Foreigners - in particular central
banks - buy these bonds to invest their currency reserves. However, this also entails a moral hazard
risk of excessively using this source of finance and accumulating unsustainable external debt. If
the new common currency gains the status of an international reserve currency, that might also be
beneficial to the domestic financial sector since foreigners may be more willing to invest our issue
debt denoted in that currency while the incentive for domestic residents to invest abroad dwindles.
This might bring additional business to the union’s financial sector and may lead to dynamic ef-
fects such as the accumulation of financial know-how which, in turn, attracts new business. In
addition, if the common currency becomes internationally accepted, a larger share of international
trade can be conducted in the common currency. This reduces the exchange rate uncertainty while
a larger share of borrowing from international creditors might also be conducted in the common
currency instead of foreign currencies (De Grauwe, 2012, 67-71).
Apart from primarily economic considerations one has to bear in mind that a currency might
be seen by people as a symbol of (supra-national) unity. If a common currency is able to create
a spirit of unity among the participating nations, it can induce further integration in other areas
such as political, legal, institutional, cultural, and financial ones. That, in turn, might unlock
further economic efficiency and welfare gains through deeper market integration and increased
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competition (Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, 522-525).
3.2. Costs
Unfortunately, monetary unions do not only generate benefits for their member states but also in-
volve costs. They arise primarily because anti-cyclical national monetary policies are no longer
possible and member countries lose their bilateral nominal exchange rates as a correction mecha-
nism for internal imbalances resulting from diverging national developments (De Grauwe, 2012,
3).
3.2.1. Asymmetric shocks and monetary union
Mundell’s (1961) seminal paper laid the basis for the costs involved in creating a monetary union.
A situation in which monetary union membership incurs considerable costs is when demand shifts
from one member state’s products to those of another member state, leading to equal shifts in
the current accounts of the countries and possibly to current-account imbalances. Demand shifts
might occur if the paces of technological advancement differ, if national business cycles are not
fully synchronized, or if member states are hit by asymmetric shocks1. In the absence of mone-
tary union, i.e., in case of flexible exchange rates between national currencies, the exchange rate
mechanism or active exchange rate policies by national central banks tend to re-balance the current
account via nominal adjustments. Within a monetary union, nominal exchange rate adjustments
are naturally impossible. To equilibrate the current account, wages and prices need to adjust. In
case of short-term nominal rigidities, which would lead to temporary under-utilization of macroe-
conomic production capacities, i.e., unemployment and idle capital, in the countries which cur-
rencies would have depreciated and over-utilization of macroeconomic production capacities and
inflationary pressure in the countries which currencies would have appreciated. Such a situation
is economically and politically undesirable since the use of macroeconomic production capacities
is inefficient and considerable social costs are incurred. Another way to relieve such situations
and rebalance the external accounts is the movement of production factors from the economies
in recession to those in economic boom. Labor (Mundell, 1961, 657-664) and physical capital
1Shocks are unanticipated events that have direct or indirect effects on the endogenous variables of (an) economic
system(s), e.g., output, prices, and capacity utilization. Asymmetric shocks are defined as disturbances that affect
various economic systems (national economies) differently. These shocks can be country-specific, i.e., their effects
are limited to the concerned country’s economy, or common shocks which effects are not limited to one country’s
economy but affect countries differently. In contrast, symmetric shocks are common shocks that have similar effects
on different economic systems (European Commission (ed.), 1990, 141).
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(Ingram, 1973, 23-24) could move from one member country with under-utilization of its capac-
ities to countries with full or over-utilization and thereby relieving idle factors (unemployment)
and deflation/disinflation on the one hand and capacity shortages and inflation on the other hand.
However, since these movements bear considerable (social) costs and take time, they offer no so-
lutions to temporary shocks, only to permanent ones. Mobility and existing cross-member state
diversification of financial capital (Atkeson and Bayoumi, 1993, 303-304) is a veritable way to ad-
just to temporary disturbances as well by distributing income (gains on financial capital) between
member states. The reason is that, financial capital can be moved with low costs and in short time,
in particular in the current digital age. To summarize, the costs of monetary union are higher the
less synchronized national business cycles are, the less flexible nominal wages and prices are, and
the less mobile production factors are (Mundell, 1961, 657-664).
Naturally, the question arises whether asymmetric shocks and dis-synchronized business cycles
are likely phenomena. Moreover, it is necessary to explore whether monetary union membership
itself is a relevant factor in determining the occurrence and likelihood of asymmetric shocks (en-
dogenous monetary unions). The sources of asymmetric shocks are manifold. They are rooted in
the differences in size, structure, and behavior of an economy and the differences in preferences
of its economic agents. Country-specific shocks are an obvious source of asymmetries. They have
their origin in changes in domestic natural, human, and capital resources, for instance as a result of
catastrophes. Or they occur because economic agents change their behaviors or their preferences
alter. These kinds of country-specific shocks remain rather unaffected by monetary integration
although it might be argued that if monetary union deepens the integration of product and factor
markets, behavioral and preferential changes are less likely to be contained within national bor-
ders. Diverging national monetary and fiscal policies may also be sources of asymmetric shocks
although they play somewhat ambiguous roles. They can generate asymmetric shocks but they also
react endogenously in order to cushion shocks as part of counter-cyclical policy responses. The
creation of a monetary union would eliminate national monetary policy as a source of asymmetric
shocks but would limit the country’s capacity to react to a shock since the entire burden would fall
on fiscal policy. However, the leeway of national fiscal policies might also be limited in a monetary
union as discussed in section 3.2.3. This leads to the possibility that asymmetric shocks become
more pronounced and persistent in monetary unions since nominal exchange rate adjustments as
swift counter-reactions are also ruled out. Moreover, policy measures of the common monetary
policy may also be a source of asymmetries if transition channels and the velocity of adjustments
differ between member states. Also, other common shocks like sharp increases in prices of inter-
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nationally traded commodities such as crude oil or changes of the common currencies exchange
rate may be causes of asymmetric shocks. Member countries differ in their economic structures,
behavior, preferences, and initial situations which result in different adjustment mechanisms and
speeds with similar results as country-specific shocks, i.e., internal current account imbalances
and possibly more persistent and volatile business cycle fluctuations. Other factors in determining
the probability of asymmetric reactions to common shocks are the structure, diversification, and
relative sizes of industries - to average out sector-specific shocks - of national economies (Ke-
nen, 1969, 4-60), their degree of market integration or openness (McKinnon, 1963, 717-725), and
the structure of intra-union trade. If product markets are predominantly integrated on an inter-
industry basis, common shocks to a specific sector, e.g., changes in demand for certain products,
increase asymmetric reactions to common shocks if certain industries are only located in one or
few member states. If, however, product market integration and trade is primarily intra-industrial,
sector-specific shocks should spread more evenly across member states. As it was argued in the
previous section, a monetary union is expected to increase the integration of product and factor
markets and, hence, can either mitigate or exacerbate asymmetric reactions to common shocks
(European Commission (ed.), 1990, 140-147).
3.2.2. Monetary union and monetary policy
The size of the costs of a monetary union depends on the ability of national monetary policies
and flexible nominal exchange rates to mitigate shocks and to account for diverging developments.
However, both means of adjustment may suffer from considerable shortcomings which greatly im-
pair their effectiveness and efficiency and therefore may greatly reduce the costs monetary union
membership entails. But a common monetary policy faces specific limitations as well.
In case of asymmetric shocks, national monetary policies could react with counter-cyclical poli-
cies leading to exchange-rate adjustments. In case of permanent shocks, such as a permanent shift
in demand from one country’s goods to that of another, wages and prices need to adjust if the
pertained countries were to return to their initial output or price levels. The reason is that currency
depreciations or appreciations change the price of traded goods. Since these goods are part of
domestic consumption and production input, changes of the nominal exchange rate also alter con-
sumption and input costs. Over time, this possibly leads to wage and price increases in countries
with depreciated currencies and wage and price moderation in countries whose currencies gained
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in external value. Hence, the initial adjustment via the nominal exchange rate would be neutralized
over time as the real exchange rate returns to its initial level. In a monetary-union setting, wages
and prices adjustments over time are the only means to regain the output or price levels prior to
an asymmetric shock. Owing to nominal wage and price rigidities, the adjustment process would
probably be costlier in a monetary union since nominal exchange rate adjustments and counter-
cyclical monetary policies would cushion the impact of adjustment on price levels and capacity
utilization. Thus, unemployment, idle capital, and lost output would be lower in countries hit by
a permanent negative shock while inflation due to over-utilization of production capacities would
be mitigated in countries hit by a permanent positive shock.
Apart from permanent asymmetric shocks, membership in a monetary union also disarms mem-
ber states of independent monetary policies as an important macroeconomic stabilization tool to
counter temporary asymmetric shocks. This also sheds light on the dilemma of a common mon-
etary policy that needs to fit all member states. The central bank sets its policy rate and mini-
mum reserve requirement and decides on open-market operations based on the monetary union’s
(weighted) average macroeconomic situation (inflation, output gap, etc.) and the exchange rate of
the common currency reacts accordingly. A single monetary policy is condemned to inaction or
merely partial reaction in case of asymmetric shocks or diverging business cycle positions of mem-
ber states. It is incapable of mitigating unemployment and lower output in some countries without
exacerbating over-utilization and inflation in other member states. The same applies to the com-
mon external exchange rate. Its value depends on the union’s average interest rate, current-account
balance, and price developments relative to those of non-member economies. The exchange rate
is therefore at best partially capable to serve as a mechanism to counter asymmetric shocks (De
Grauwe, 2012, 30-37). Moreover, since the common interest rate and exchange rate depend on
the union’s average, they could have potentially high distorting effects on interest rate or exchange
rate sensitive sectors such as real estate, banking, investment in real capital as well as import and
export industries in member countries. This problem is particularly pronounced in countries that
differ considerably from the union’s average inflation and output gap. These distortions could
lead to unsustainable booms and asset price bubbles in some member countries while others face
prolonged economic slumps and national current-account imbalances are likely to become more
pronounced and persistent. Hence, common monetary policy might even become a source of
asymmetric developments itself. In addition, on the one hand, various cross-country differences,
as discussed in the following sections, may also lead to asymmetric effects of common monetary
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policies. On the other hand, monetary union eliminates national monetary policies as a potential
origin of asymmetries.
In sum, even if wage and price flexibility in member states is considerably high and production
factors are mobile, they will need more time to correct for permanent asymmetric shocks compared
to independent national monetary policies. If flexibility and mobility is low, wages, prices, and
production factor movements might react too slowly to mitigate temporary asymmetric shocks.
As a consequence, national business cycle periods might become more accentuated and persistent
and the social costs of adjustment are potentially much higher in a monetary union. This also
has a political dimension. More accentuated and persistent output and price level fluctuations and
inability to cushion asymmetric shocks might threaten the acceptance and (political) legitimacy
of the monetary union and its institutions in member countries. Moreover, economically larger
member states are naturally favored in monetary decisions since they have a higher weight in the
union’s average economic situation even if voting rights are equal. This further adds to the issue
of lacking political acceptance (De Grauwe, 2012, 173-190).
3.2.3. Monetary union and fiscal policy
When joining a monetary union, member states transfer their monetary sovereignty to a suprana-
tional central bank. This loss of monetary independence also has considerable repercussions for
national fiscal policies. Even if member states maintain their fiscal sovereignty de jure, monetary-
union membership de facto limits the capacities of governments to decide on national public ex-
penditures. The reason is that national public debts are denominated in the common currency, i.e.,
a currency of which supply the national governments have no control of. That limits their ability
to pursue debt-financed expansive fiscal policies, particularly if they already have an accumulated
high levels of public debt. Hence, monetary union membership lowers the point at which public
debt becomes unsustainable or the point at which it might be considered as such by financial mar-
ket participants and, therefore, forces governments to limit public deficits and debts. That might
have an advantageous restraining effect on public finances in normal times. In the event of asym-
metric economic crises, the ability of national governments to pursue anti-cyclical fiscal policies
– the only national macroeconomic stabilization tool left in a monetary union – might be gravely
limited. Governments might even be forced to pursue pro-cyclical austerity policies, thereby ag-
gravating asymmetric shocks, to maintain financial market trust to avert self-fulfilling prophecies
and national bankruptcy. A possible capital flight from member states that are perceived as having
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unsustainable public finances to member countries regarded as sound further adds to the asymmet-
ric shock, leaving the (over-)indebted countries capital-stripped with high interest rates while the
others enjoy capital influxes and low interest rates.
If a monetary union is not supplemented by an effective mechanism to avoid sovereign defaults,
their higher risk of occurrence raises the level of uncertainty within the monetary union. That,
at least partly, offsets the advantages gained from the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty,
especially if economic agents price in the possibility of a breakup and the return to national cur-
rencies. One such mechanism to make monetary union more robust would be to extend economic
and political integration to public budgets. Countries would not only surrender monetary inde-
pendence but also the major share of fiscal sovereignty. Taxation, debt issuance, public budgets,
and the dispersion of revenues to national and regional budgets would be centrally decided. More-
over, direct transfers to union residents, e.g., a common unemployment insurance, would act as
an insurance against the results of asymmetric shocks while the risks of asymmetric shocks would
be pooled on the supra-national level. Furthermore, the centralized budget and debt would en-
sure that automatic stabilizers and anti-cyclical fiscal policies on national levels are not restrained
by fears of losing the trust of financial markets. Furthermore, national fiscal policies as a possible
source of asymmetries and asymmetric shocks would cease to exist. Obviously, such a fiscal union
would raise the question of political acceptance in the contributing nations and entail a consider-
able moral-hazard risk in receiving countries. Countries have little incentive to pursue sound fiscal
policies. However, the moral hazard problem could be addressed by a centralized budget control
with far reaching enforcement powers vis-a-vis national public budgets. Moreover, a fiscal union
would also decrease the need of adjustments of wages and prices in the private sector. A fiscal
union therefore might be a costly solution to permanent demand shocks if it prolongs necessary
adjustments in member states due to moral hazard. But it also gives countries – in particular ones
with high wage and price rigidities and low factor mobility – the necessary time for adjustments
without creating high adjustment cost (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993, 193; De Grauwe, 2012,
7-18).
3.2.4. Different preferences about inflation and unemployment
Countries or rather their economic agents might differ in their preferences regarding inflation and
unemployment. Assuming that a stable relationship between inflation and unemployment (Phillips
curves) exist in potential member states of a proposed monetary union, their governments and cen-
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tral banks would be able to conduct fiscal and monetary policies as to achieve the inflation and
unemployment rate that best fits the preferences. Forming a monetary union of countries with
different preferences and different Phillips curves would mean that these countries would have to
accept a combination of inflation and unemployment that is not optimal because monetary policy
decisions in a monetary union are made on the basis of the union’s average preferences. Moreover,
if countries were to maintain different inflation and unemployment rates, e.g., using fiscal policy,
the countries with higher inflation rates would continuously lose internal and external competitive-
ness since there are no internal exchange rate adjustments and the external exchange rate depends
on the average inflation and interest rate of the union (De Grauwe, 2007, 13-15).
However, the argument holds true only when stability of the Phillips curves is assumed. Owing
to the effects of changing inflation expectations of economic agents in response to monetary pol-
icy decisions (Kydland and Presscott, 1977, 473-887), Phillips curves are not expected to remain
stable in the long run and, hence, leave central banks without the option of choosing between
different combinations of inflation and unemployment. Nonetheless, there still are a transitory
effects when countries with different initial inflation rates join a monetary union since the Phillips
curve is expected to still be of relevance in the short run. Thus, aligning inflation rates to avoid
changes in competitiveness, as discussed above, still leads to temporarily sub-optimal combina-
tions of inflation and unemployment in member states. Once that transition phase is concluded, all
countries return to their unemployment rates fluctuating around their natural rate with the business
cycle (De Grauwe, 2007, 40-42). The countries with initially higher inflation rates may even gain
welfare since they end up with lower inflation costs while unemployment remains unchanged. If
average union inflation is not reduced to that of the lowest initial inflation rate of all member states
– depending on the politically agreed mandate of the union’s central bank – then countries with
initial inflation below average union inflation lose welfare since they have to permanently accept
higher inflation without gaining permanently lower unemployment (European Commission (ed.),
1990, 92-98).
The existence of short-run Phillips curves is also of importance for optimal monetary policy
responses to shocks. In a setting of nationally independent monetary policies with currencies
linked via flexible exchange rates national central banks might have different optimal responses
to shocks depending on the preferences of inflation and unemployment within their jurisdictions.
As discussed above, the central bank of a monetary union comprising of countries with different
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preferences might only, if at all, be able to respond to asymmetric shocks based on the unions
average preferences, i.e., leading to welfare losses in member states (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006,
359).
3.2.5. Different labor markets institutions and wage setting mechanisms
Differences in national labor markets, i.e., their institutions and the ways wages are set, are a pos-
sible source of diverging developments. In a case of full centralization of wage bargaining, trade
unions have little incentive to make excessive wage claims, i.e., above productivity growth, since
they would entail inflation and, hence, no real wage increase. If wage bargaining is decentralized
with numerous small trade unions, the inflationary effect of their excessive nominal wage claims
remains negligible from the individual labor union’s point of view. Thus, labor unions have an
incentive to make excessive wage claims to achieve real wage increases for their members since
the (inflation) costs are socialized and other unions are likely to act equally. Therefore, nominal
wage increases are likely to be higher in economies with decentralized wage bargaining. Hence,
wage and price increases are likely to differ between monetary union members, leading to current
account imbalances. In case of a common shock, different reactions are likely as well. In contrast
to fully centralized labor unions, decentralized labor unions have no reason to moderate their wage
claims to adjust to the shock owing to the incentive to pursue a free-rider strategy. However, the
more wage bargaining is decentralized the more significant is the outcome of wage negotiations
for the competitiveness of the affected companies and, hence, the employment prospects of union
members. That effect also restrains wage claims, leaving economies with medium sized unions as
the least equipped to deal with common shocks. Therefore, such countries have potentially higher
costs when they join a monetary union (De Grauwe, 2012, 18-20).
However, the way wages are set might not be independent of monetary union membership. La-
bor unions’ decisions on wage claims depend on the reaction of fiscal and monetary policies on
their claim. If excessive wage claims lead to combinations of inflation and unemployment that are
considered sub-optimal by the authorities, they are likely to be countered by monetary and fiscal
policy actions. To the extent that unions anticipate such counteractions, they change their behavior
accordingly. Monetary union centralizes monetary policy and limits the leeway of national fiscal
policies. Thus, trade unions in different member states face the same policy responses. That might
have a harmonizing effect on wage claims. However, considerable differences are likely to remain
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and, hence, the associated costs in terms of diverging wage, price, and employment developments
and impaired shock adjustment mechanisms. That may point to the conclusion that it might be
optimal to centralize wage bargaining on a monetary union level. However, nominal wage growth
should reflect differences in productivity growth to maintain internal and external competitiveness
of member economies. Hence, if productivity grows at different speeds in member states, wage
bargaining should remain on national levels (De Grauwe, 2012, 27-29).
3.2.6. Different legal and financial systems
Legal requirements and regulations have profound ramifications for the functioning of markets. If
the legal systems of member states differ substantially, those differences might be another reason
why member countries diverge economically and respond dissimilar to shocks. For instance, dif-
ferences in financial market regulation may lead to diversity of national financial systems. Some
member state’s financial systems might be more bank-oriented while other member state’s finan-
cial systems rely to a high degree on capital markets. Moreover, in some countries loans interest
rates are usually fixed for the duration of that loan while in other countries loans usually have
floating interest rates. These differences affect how member economies respond to shocks. They
also affect the transmission of the common monetary policy. Capital-market oriented national fi-
nancial markets are likely to be more responsive to the wealth channel2 while their bank oriented
counterparts are probably more sensitive to the bank-lending channel3. This effect leads to asym-
metric reactions and impairs the effectiveness of counter-cyclical monetary policy even if member
states are in the same stage of the business-cycle (De Grauwe, 2012, 20-22).
However, differences in national financial systems are not solely the result of the legal frame-
2The wealth channel, also known as the balance-sheet channel, describes the transmission of monetary policy to the
real economy via its effects on the net worth of (potential) borrowers. Their costs of external finance in comparison
to internal finance decline with increasing net worth because they can provide more collateral and higher equity
ratios and, hence, lower the lender’s risk. Since investment and spending decisions of companies and households
depend, inter alia, on their net financial positions, monetary policy can affect their decisions via its impact on their
net financial position. Interest rate changes alter the amount of interest expenses on outstanding floating-rate loans
and revolving short-term debt which affects the financial positions of borrowers. Moreover, the reverse relationship
of interest rates and the value of assets also affects their prices and, hence, the net worth of their owners (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995, 35-40).
3The bank-lending channel describes the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy via its effects on the
supply and relative price of credit intermediated by banks. For instance, open market operations, changes of the
policy rate, and alterations of minimum reserve requirements affect the refinancing costs of banks and the overall
quantity of credit the banking system is able to create. From the perspective of potential borrowers, this alters
the availability and the price of bank loans relative to other sources of finance such as bond and equity issuance
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, 40-43).
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work in which they operate. Different courses of national monetary policies might also played a
significant role in the past. Inflation paths caused by different monetary policies shaped financial
markets. For instance, high and volatile inflation probably crippled the development of long-term
bond markets since they are sensitive to unexpected inflation and fostered the development of mar-
kets with short maturities. Moreover, in a volatile inflation environment interest rates are likely
to be floating rather than fixed to be able to account for sudden changes in inflation. Countries
with a history of stable and low inflation are likely to have developed the reverse system, i.e.,
more developed long-term debt markets and fixed interest rates. Monetary transmission is largely
dependent on the term and interest-rate structure of debt markets. Changes of the central bank
interest rate affect financing costs much faster if borrowing is primarily short-term and interest
rates are adjustable and vice versa. However, under a common monetary policy regime the differ-
ences described above are likely to disappear over time and, thus, equalize monetary transmission
mechanisms in member states. Hence, common shocks are less likely to lead to asymmetric reac-
tions. Efforts to harmonize legal and regulatory systems also help to reduce asymmetric reactions
to common shocks (De Grauwe, 2012, 29-30).
3.2.7. Different fiscal systems
Public budgets can be financed by three major sources: taxes, monetary financing (seignorage),
and the issuance of sovereign debt. The optimal composition depends on the costs the respective
means of finance incur and is reached when their marginal costs are equal. While monetary fi-
nancing ultimately creates inflation and, hence, inflation-related costs, taxes lead to distortions of
the price mechanism and therefore to inefficiencies. The costs of inflation depend on its degree
as well as on whether it is anticipated or not. The distortionary effects of taxes depend on the
kind of taxes levied as well as on the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax system and authorities.
Hence, if countries with different optimal financing compositions of their public budgets form a
monetary union, they will be forced to apply a new mix of finance which might not be optimal
since the amount of seignorage revenues is decided supranational. This incurs a loss of welfare if
spending is not adjusted. However, changes in the revenue structure incurred by monetary union
membership could also incentivize reforms and harmonization of the tax system to lower its costs
(De Grauwe, 2005, 20-21).
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3.3. Comparison of costs and benefits
Several of the costs and benefits discussed above depend on the degree of product, service, and
factor market integration. Benefits, originating from the elimination of transaction costs, exchange
rate uncertainty, and market fragmentation, are higher the more the (potential) member countries
exchange products, services, and factors (De Grauwe, 2012, 70-71). In contrast, the costs of a
monetary union are likely to decline the more integrated monetary union members are although
there are some factors that might lead to the opposite result.4 The more member states trade goods
and services, the less likely are shocks limited by national borders. However, the structure of trade
(inter- or intra-industrial) and regional distribution of export industries determine the symmetry of
responses to common shocks. Also, if factor markets are more integrated, the necessary adjust-
ments to asymmetric shocks, i.e., factor movements, are much faster concluded. This reduces the
costs incurred by asymmetric shocks. Another reason concerns the effectiveness of the nominal
exchange rate changes in a setting of monetarily independent nations. The effect of terms-of-
trade changes on aggregate demand and aggregate supply as well as the aggregate price level are
much more pronounced in countries where exports and imports represent larger shares of domes-
tic production and consumption. While the net effect of demand and supply changes on domestic
production might not depend on the degree of trade integration, the variability of the aggregate
price level increases with the degree of openness of an economy. To the extent that price level
volatility incurs costs, the systematic use of monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilization
tool will lead to higher costs in more open economies. Hence, monetary union membership is
less costly for more open than for relatively closed economies (McKinnon, 1963, 717-724; De
Grauwe, 2012, 50-53).
To summarize, costs and benefits of a monetary union are dependent on a country’s trade inte-
gration (Figure 3.1). At the intersection point T*, costs and benefits are equal. All countries to the
left of T* are better off being monetarily independent while countries to the right of T* would gain
from monetary union membership. The exact initial location of the costs curve, however, depends
on the degree of factor mobility, price and wage flexibility, and the frequency and severity of asym-
metric shocks. The costs curve is located the more to the left, the less frequently asymmetric shock
4Economic integration, as a result of economies of scale, might lead to less symmetry of shocks and business cycles
if it leads to regional concentration of the production of certain goods. In that case, sector-specific shocks are more
likely to assume macroeconomic proportions for the country in which the sector is concentrated. Thus, the costs of
a monetary union would increase the more countries trade with each other and with the rest of the world (Krugman,
1993).
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Figure 3.1.: Costs and benefits of monetary union as a function of trade integration.
Source: De Grauwe 2012, 73.
occur, the more mobile production factors are and the less rigid prices and wages are. The initial
position of the benefits curve is determined by the initial degree of trade and market integration.
However, as it was argued above, monetary union membership itself is expected to deepen trade
integration and, thus, rendering monetary union membership worthwhile even for countries (not
too far) left of T* as their benefits curve would likely move to the right. Also, the position of the
costs curve is likely to move to the left as membership induced deepening of trade relation, factor
market integration as well as political and legal harmonization lowers the likelihood of asymmetric
shocks and shock responses. Moreover, the shock adsorbing mechanisms (factor mobility, wage
and price flexibility, and fiscal transfers) might be enhanced as well through membership itself,
hence, shifting the costs curve further to the left. Apart from the initial and final positions of the
costs and benefits curves, their slopes and, therefore, the initial and final locations of T* remain
uncertain depending on the effectiveness of exchange rate changes to correct asymmetric shocks.
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The less effective the nominal exchange rate instrument is, the steeper is the slope of the costs
curve and the more to the left is T* located, i.e., the lower is the necessary trade integration at
which monetary union membership renders worthwhile (De Grauwe, 2012, 72-86).
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African Monetary Union
4.1. Empirical research questions
This chapter empirically addresses the following research questions. They arise from the previ-
ously discussed theoretical costs and benefits. The empirical analyses are done on the level of the
eight RECs introduced in Chapter 2 which together form the AEC.
1. How high are intra-African and intra-REC trade?
2. How diversified is African trade?
3. How synchronized are the business cycles of African countries or how common are asym-
metric shocks?
4. Is business cycle synchronicity endogenous?
5. How flexible are prices and wages?
6. Do migration flows mitigate asymmetric shocks?
7. Which regional monetary union is the most suitable one for countries with multiple REC
memberships?
4.2. General remarks on data sources and data aggregation
The major sources of data are the World Bank Development Indicators database for data on
national accounts (GDP, GDP deflator, deflator of total sales) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics for data on trade flows. Both databases provide level
data in annual frequency. Data on migrant stocks is obtained from the United Nations in a ten year
frequency. National accounts data are denominated in national currencies or US-Dollars, trade
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flow data are measured in US-Dollars. Price indices are converted to the common base year of
2005. Incomplete time series from the World Bank Development Indicators database are com-
pleted by chain linking them with data from national sources, the International Financial Statistics
of the International Monetary Fund, or the University of Pennsylvania World Tables. Aggre-
gates of country groups, such as the RECs, are calculated using GDP-weighted sums of countries’
growth rates with time-varying weights as proposed by Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2001). Since
national accounts data are quoted in national currency, this method avoids converting level data
into a common unit of account, such as the US-Dollar, which could considerably distort it owing to
exchange rate movements. However, the weights still need to be calculated using real GDP level
data denoted in a common currency (US-Dollar) which still leaves a distortion of the weights.
Since for aggregation the weights are multiplied with usually relatively small growth rates, the po-
tential error remains fairly small compared to the error an aggregation of level data in US-Dollar
would entail. Country group aggregates always have the full sample rage of 1961-2012. For a few
member states, level data does not date back to 1960 and in the case of Somalia national accounts
data ends in 1990. For Western Sahara and South Sudan are no data available. For aggregation,
the weights of countries with missing data are set to zero for the missing observations.
Even though the bulk of data used in this study is obtained from renowned international insti-
tutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the University of Pennsylvania
World Tables, the quality and reliability of the data may not hold up to the standards of industri-
alized countries’ statistics. The reason is that their data, for the most part, still relies on national
sources or is estimated based on very small and incomplete data sets. In addition, statistical offices
in African countries usually lack the necessary capacities in terms of equipment and manpower
to gather extensive micro-data. Furthermore, they are often not independent institutions and are
therefore subject to political influence (Sandefur and Glassman, 2014). Moreover, the share of
the informal sector1, of very small companies and self-employment, and of subsistence produc-
tion is rather high. Unfortunately, their activities are not or only incompletely recorded by official
statistics (African Development Bank (ed.), 2013).
1Lesser and Moise-Leeman (2009) estimate that the size of Africa’s informal sector to be 43 percent of official GDP
and the African Development Bank (ed.) (2013) estimates it to be about 55 percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa.
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4.3. Descriptive statistics
This section shows some descriptive statistics on key macroeconomic variables, i.e., economic
growth, inflation and per capita income levels. The aim of this is to demonstrate how diverse the
macroeconomic situations of the future member states of the proposed regional monetary unions
are.
4.3.1. Economic growth and per capita income
Figure 4.1 shows average annual GDP growth rates of REC member states before and after the
Abuja treaty went into force in 1994. Except for Zimbabwe, all African nations experienced a
higher macroeconomic output in 2011 than in 1994. Generally, average growth rates seem to have
been higher in the post-1994 period (usually 1994-2012) than in the pre-1994 (usually 1961-1994)
period. Some countries even enjoyed annual growth rates beyond five percent – rates which are
common among emerging market economies. However, the overwhelming majority of African
nations are developing countries where high growth rates are, to some extent, the result of low
GDP levels (figure 4.2).2 Moreover, growth rates are often highly volatile. The high volatility is
possibly the result of the high dependency of many African nations on a small number of export
products, such as raw materials and agricultural products, and of political instability. Also, pos-
itive GDP growth should not hide the fact that living standards grew much slower and in some
countries even declined as population growth outpaced GDP growth (figure 4.2). Compared to
industrial countries, GDP per capita levels are very low in the majority of African countries. Only
a few exceed 1000 US-Dollars (real US-Dollars in year 2000 prices) and incomes are often highly
unequally distributed. For comparison, Germany’s real GDP per capita was 26,183 US-Dollars in
2011.
It should also be noted that the differences in per-capita incomes and growth rates across mem-
bers of the same RECs are often very high. For instance, in SADC and COMESA both the poor-
est (Democratic Republic of Congo) and the richest (Seychelles) African countries are members.
Moreover, SADC and COMESA also combine member states with an average growth rate of real
GDP of about ten percent between 1994 and 2011, such as Angola and Rwanda as well as Zim-
babwe, which suffered negative average growth rates in the same period of time.
2High growth rates are the result of the low base effect. The same absolute growth leads to higher growth rates in
economies with a low GDP than in economies with high GDP levels
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Figure 4.1.: Average GDP growth in REC countries pre- and post-1994.
Note: Arithmetic averages of annual real GDP growth rates. Pre- or post-1994 graph missing for Djibouti, Eritrea,
Libya, and Somalia owing to insufficient data. Sudan excluding South Sudan.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, own figure and calculations.
4.3.2. Inflation
Inflation rates (annual rates of change of the GDP deflator) in Africa are very diverse as well
(Figure 4.3). While some countries managed to maintain fairly stable prices, some countries’ in-
flation rates were very high. Also, the differences between and within RECs are very pronounced.
However, many countries were able to rein in inflation in the post-1994 period compared to the
pre-1994 period.
42
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Seitenränder 0.00
Kopf- und Fußzeile 0.0
Druckbereich um Grafik ziehen
Druckskalierung auf "Blatt auf einer Seite darstellen" einstellen
Seitenlänge kürzen bis passend (225)
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
A
lg
er
ia
L
ib
y
a
M
au
ri
ta
n
ia
M
o
ro
cc
o
T
u
n
is
ia
UMA 
pre-1994
post-1994
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
SADC 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
ECOWAS 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
ECCAS 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
B
u
ru
n
d
i
K
en
y
a
R
w
an
d
a
T
an
za
n
ia
U
g
an
d
a
EAC 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
B
u
ru
n
d
i
C
o
m
o
ro
s
C
o
n
g
o
 (
D
em
.…
D
ji
b
o
u
ti
E
g
y
p
t
E
ri
tr
ea
E
th
io
p
ia
K
en
y
a
L
ib
y
a
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
al
aw
i
M
au
ri
ti
u
s
R
w
an
d
a
S
ey
ch
el
le
s
S
u
d
an
S
w
az
il
an
d
U
g
an
d
a
Z
am
b
ia
Z
im
b
ab
w
e
COMSEA 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
IGAD 
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
B
en
in
B
u
rk
in
a 
F
as
o
C
ap
e 
V
er
d
e
C
en
tr
al
 A
fr
ic
an
 R
ep
.
C
o
m
o
ro
s
C
o
te
 d
'I
v
o
ir
e
D
ji
b
o
u
ti
E
g
y
p
t
E
ri
tr
ea
G
am
b
ia
G
h
an
a
G
u
in
ea
 B
is
sa
u
G
u
in
ea
K
en
y
a
L
ib
er
ia
L
ib
y
a
M
al
i
M
au
ri
ta
n
ia
M
o
ro
cc
o
N
ig
er
N
ig
er
ia
S
ao
 T
o
m
e 
&
 P
ri
n
ci
p
e
S
en
eg
al
S
ie
rr
a 
L
eo
n
e
S
o
m
al
ia
S
u
d
an
T
o
g
o
T
u
n
is
ia
CEN-SAD 
1
1
0
 
1
4
1
 
1
5
5
 
1
7
7
 
1
8
3
 
1
8
8
 
2
0
6
 
2
3
0
 
2
3
0
 
2
3
3
 
2
3
8
 
2
7
2
 
2
7
3
 
2
7
9
 
2
8
6
 
2
9
7
 
3
3
5
 
3
4
8
 
3
7
1
 
3
9
3
 
3
9
4
 
3
9
4
 
3
9
4
 
4
0
3
 
4
0
7
 
4
4
4
 
4
7
4
 
4
7
8
 
5
3
2
 
5
4
8
 
5
6
0
 
5
6
2
 
5
6
6
 
6
1
5
 
6
1
8
 
6
3
0
 
6
6
6
 
1
2
6
6
 
1
8
1
2
 
1
9
0
8
 
1
9
7
7
 
2
0
3
9
 
2
2
5
5
 
2
7
5
8
 
3
0
5
2
 
3
8
2
5
 
4
3
3
4
 
4
3
7
8
 
5
3
7
1
 
8
8
7
5
 
9
2
2
7
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
C
o
n
g
o
 (
D
em
. 
R
ep
.)
B
u
ru
n
d
i
E
ri
tr
ea
N
ig
er
M
al
aw
i
G
u
in
ea
-B
is
sa
u
S
ie
rr
a 
L
eo
n
e
E
th
io
p
ia
E
th
io
p
ia
C
en
tr
al
 A
fr
ic
an
 R
ep
.
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
al
i
T
o
g
o
L
ib
er
ia
B
u
rk
in
a 
F
as
o
C
h
ad
C
o
m
o
ro
s
Z
im
b
ab
w
e
R
w
an
d
a
U
g
an
d
a
B
en
in
B
en
in
G
u
in
ea
G
h
an
a
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e
Z
am
b
ia
T
an
za
n
ia
K
en
y
a
L
es
o
th
o
C
o
te
 d
'I
v
o
ir
e
S
en
eg
al
S
u
d
an
N
ig
er
ia
G
am
b
ia
M
au
ri
ta
n
ia
A
n
g
o
la
C
am
er
o
o
n
R
ep
u
b
li
c 
C
o
n
g
o
S
w
az
il
an
d
M
o
ro
cc
o
E
g
y
p
t
C
ap
e 
V
er
d
e
A
lg
er
ia
N
am
ib
ia
T
u
n
is
ia
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
G
ab
o
n
B
o
ts
w
an
a
M
au
ri
ti
u
s
E
q
u
at
o
ri
al
 G
u
in
ea
S
ey
ch
el
le
s
Real GDP per Capita (2011) in US-Dollar 
Figure 4.2.: Average GDP per capita growth rates and levels in REC countries pre- and post-
1994.
Note: Arithmetic averages of annual real GDP per capita growth rates. GDP per capita in real US-Dollar (base year:
2000). Pre- and/or post-1994 graph missing for Djibouti, Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia owing to insufficient data. Su-
dan excluding South Sudan.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, own figure and calculations.
The different inflation rates reflect to a large part different monetary policy approaches and
success in keeping prices stable (if price stability is even a goal). In some countries, central banks
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Figure 4.3.: Average inflation rates (GDP deflator) in REC countries pre- and post-1994.
Note: Arithmetic averages of annual GDP deflator rate of change. Pre- and/or post-1994 graph missing for Angola,
Congo (Democratic Republic), Djibouti, Eritrea, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia owing to insufficient
data. Graphs out of rage for Angola, Congo (Democratic Republic), Liberia, Swaziland, and Uganda. Sudan exclud-
ing South Sudan.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, own figure and calculations.
are mere departments of the finance ministry and have the primary purpose, besides providing
legal tender, to generate revenue through seignorage. In particular, if tax systems are inefficient,
seignorage is a major source of public finances beside revenue generated from tariffs and customs.
Looking at ECCAS and ECOWAS indicates that an improved monetary policy regime can lead
to significantly lower inflation. Member states that belong to the CFA franc currency unions
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CAEMU and WAEMU have smaller inflation rates than the member states with national monetary
policies such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia. This is not surprising as
CAEMU and WAEMU are governed by independent, supranational central banks with strict rules
concerning monetary financing in order to maintain their fixed exchange rate to the French franc
and since 1999 to the Euro.3
4.3.3. Interim conclusion
Looking only at these few key macroeconomic variables indicates that the planned regional and
ultimately continental monetary union(s) in Africa combine economically heterogeneous coun-
tries. Difference in per capita income and economic growth are very high as are the differences in
inflation rates. The theory of optimum currency areas, however, demands the opposite, i.e., homo-
geneous member states. That points to the conclusion that a monetary union seems currently not
advisable. In particular, the very high deviations in inflation necessitate very pronounced nominal
exchange rate adjustments to keep price competitiveness between the African nations unchanged.
Before introducing a common currency which fixes nominal exchange rates, inflation rates need
to converge to a common and stable rate. If these different inflation rates reflect poor national
monetary policies, the convergence of inflation rates is a desirable goal4. In the following sections
the criteria of the optimum currency area theory are tested empirically to examine whether this
interim conclusion holds true.
4.4. Trade
This empirical section covers trade. As discussed in chapter 3, (the intensity of) trade plays a sig-
nificant role in the determination of benefits and costs. Data are obtained from the IMF Directions
of Trade Statistics as well as the World Bank World Development Indicators.
4.4.1. Openness
Before employing more sophisticated empirical methods, the simple look at the trade statistics
of African countries already renders valuable insights. As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, the degree
of internal trade integration of the African continent as a whole is very limited and varies sig-
nificantly among RECs. In the overwhelming majority of countries, the share of intra-African
3The French finance ministry guarantees the fixed exchange rate to the CFA francs. Moreover, the French finance min-
istry and the French central bank (Banque de France) are involved in the decision making process of the CAEMU’s
and WAEMU’s monetary policy.
4If, however, they reflect different inflation preferences, an equalization of inflation rates would mean a loss of welfare.
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and intra-REC trade5 remains low compared to trade volumes with non-African countries. UMA
and ECCAS exhibit the lowest degree of intra-REC trade integration while that of ECOWAS and
SADC is significantly higher. However, even in the SADC, which include the long-term customs
union members Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Lesotho, internal trade is lower
than 17 percent of GDP. Hence, the initial gains of monetary union in terms of lower transaction
costs, lower exchange rate uncertainty, and market de-fragmentation would be fairly small. The
comparatively high share of international trade might render national currency pegs to a basket of
the currencies of major trade partners more fruitful. Moreover, one major reason of the low intra-
REC and intra-African trade is the still widespread existence of tariffs and customs (African Union
Commission (ed.), 2013, 155-158). Another obstacle to trade are inefficient customs authorities
as the World Bank’s Burden of Customs Procedures Index 6 shows (Figure 4.5). In comparison
to industrialized countries such as Germany, the United States, and the EMU, African countries
reach considerably worse index values, with ECCAS and UMA achieving the worst ratings.
The data presented in this section have a major drawback. The data includes only official mer-
chandise trade. Hence, the internal trade flows calculated here neither include trade of services nor
informal trade across Africa’s long and permeable national border lines. While trade of services
is likely very limited, Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) estimate informal trade to be about equally
as high as the officially reported trade. Hence, looking at official trade only understates potential
benefits of African monetary unions and overstates their costs. Nonetheless, even doubling the
share of intra-REC and intra-African trade would still leave it by far exceeded by international
trade.
5African countries’ intra-REC trade flows are calculated by aggregating bilateral trade flows with the remaining REC
member states. Data on bilateral and multilateral trade flows is obtained from the IMF Directions of Trade Statistics
which cover merchandise trade only. Some countries’ calculations are marginally distorted downwards as bilateral
trade data with very small countries, in particular with the small island countries, is not available. The trade with
the rest of the world is calculated as overall trade less trade with Africa and the trade with the rest of Africa is
calculated as the trade with Africa less the trade with the respective REC.
6The Burden of Customs Procedures Index measures business executives’ perceptions of their country’s efficiency of
customs procedures. The rating ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating greater efficiency. (The World
Bank (ed.), 2015)
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Figure 4.4.: Openness of REC countries.
Note: Openness (upper charts): Sum of nominal exports (free on board) and nominal imports (including costs, insur-
ance, and fright) in percent of nominal GDP (2011). Intra-REC-Trade (lower chart): Arithmetic average (weighted
with trade shares) of member country trade with REC partners in percent of GDP. Scales varying. Graph missing
for Botswana, Djibouti, Eritrea, Lesotho, Libya, Namibia, Somalia, and Swaziland owing to insufficient data. Sudan
excluding South Sudan.
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators, own figure and calculations.
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Figure 4.5.: Burden of Customs Procedures Index
Note: Maximum, minimum, and unweighted arithmetic averages of the World Bank’s Burden of Custom Procedure
Index of 2014 of REC member countries. Index values rage between 1 for extremely inefficient and 7 for extremely
efficient. The Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, and Western Sahara are excluded
from calculations owing to lack of data. Ordering from the top of the chart with the country/region with the best score
to the country/region with the worst score.
Source: World Bank, own figure and calculations.
4.4.2. Export diversification
As described in chapter 3, one source of asymmetric shocks or asymmetric reactions to common
shocks are sector-specific shocks – in particular, when sectors are spread uneven between mone-
tary union member states and trade is primarily inter-industrial. Sector-specific shocks may have
a domestic origin or could come from abroad, for instance from export markets. If demand con-
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ditions for particular export goods change and a member state heavily relies on that good and
possibly on only a few export partners, the shock consequences might assume macroeconomic
proportions. A supranational central bank might be condemned to little or no counter-action if the
shocks only hit one member state while others are unaffected. Therefore, the more diversified the
exports of monetary union member states are, the less vulnerable are they to sector-specific shocks.
A measure of how diversified African economies’ exports are is provided by the Export Di-
versification Index of the IMF (International Monetary Fund (ed.), 2014b). Its basic idea is not
to measure diversification of exports but rather the concentration of exports by quantifying the
inequality between export shares. Thus, higher index values indicate a higher concentration of
exports on only few products and lower values indicate a higher degree of diversification. The
Export Diversification Index is calculated as a Theil index (Theil, 1972). It is the sum of the inten-
sive (within) and extensive (between) sub-indices. They are calculated by following the definitions
and methods of Cadot, Carrere and Strauss-Kahn (2013). At first, dummy variables are created to
define each product as a traditional-traded, a new-traded or a non-traded one. Traditional products
are goods that were exported at the beginning of the observation period (for almost every country
the observation started in 1962 and ended in 2010). Non-traded goods have zero exports for the
entire sample. Thus, for each country and product, the dummy values for traditional and non-
traded goods remain constant across all years of the sample. For each country/year/product group,
products classified as new must have been non-traded in at least the two previous years and then
exported in the two following years. Thus, the dummy values for new products may change over
time. The extensive Theil index Textensive and intensive Theil index Tintensive are calculated for a
given country and year (country and time subscripts are omitted):
Textensive =∑
k
Nk
N
µk
µ
ln
(
µk
µ
)
(4.1)
Tintensive =∑
k
Nk
N
µk
µ
[
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
xi
µk
ln
(
xi
µk
)]
. (4.2)
The index k represents the group (traditional, new, and non-traded), Nk the total number of prod-
ucts exported in group k, µ the average export value of a product in US-Dollars, µk the average
export value of product group k in US-Dollars, µkµ the relative mean of exports in each group and
xi the export value of exports good i in US-Dollar (International Monetary Fund (ed.), 2014c).
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Figure 4.6.: Export Diversification Theil Indices
Note: Maximum, minimum and unweighted arithmetic averages of the IMF trade diversification index values of 2010
of REC member countries. Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Western Sahara, are
excluded from calculations owing to lack of data. Germany, USA and EMU displayed for comparison. Ordering from
the top of the chart with the country/region with the best score to the country/region with the worst score.
Source: International Monetary Fund, own figure and calculations.
The most recent value of the Trade Diversification Index published by the IMF is for 2010.
The values are listed for all RECs and their member states – and, for comparison, the values
for the EMU, Germany, and the United States – in the tables A.2 - A.5 in the appendix. Fig-
ure 4.6 summarizes them by showing the unweighted7 arithmetic averages of the REC member
7Unweighted averages are calculated, because they represent the information on which an average REC member state
has to base its decision on whether or not to join a regional monetary union. A weighted average would represent
the information a collective decision would be based upon. However, every sovereign member state decides on an
individual basis.
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states as well as the minimum and maximum of member state’s index values. The data show that,
in general, African RECs exhibit much higher index values and variation than the industrialized
countries Germany, the United States, and the EMU. Hence, African country’s exports are signifi-
cantly more concentrated on fewer exports goods. Moreover, African countries and regions differ
greatly. But even the EAC, which has the most diversified exports among African RECs, is still
far from index values exhibited by industrialized countries. Hence, the risk for African countries
of falling victim to sector-specific shocks is considerably higher.
The major reasons for the low diversification of African exports are that many African economies
lack a diversified industrial basis and access to world markets for various political and economic
reasons. A considerable part of African economies consists of mere subsistence production with
low value added and the extraction of natural resources. African countries mainly export primary
commodities, such as crude oil, natural gas, ores, minerals, gold, diamonds, as well as unpro-
cessed agricultural products, such as coffee beans, cotton, cocoa, caoutchouc, and tobacco, to
industrialized nations.8 Moreover, African economies are usually heavily reliant on just one or
only very few specific export product(s) which makes them very vulnerable to shocks in their
specific sector(s).
4.4.3. Interim conclusion
The trade data explored in this section point to the result that, at this level of trade integration
between REC member states, a monetary union seems to be of limited benefit as transaction cost
savings are rather small, even taking into account a possible trade increase induced by the mone-
tary union itself. Moreover, the costs of a monetary union are probably very high at these low trade
levels. Furthermore, the generally low degree of export diversification makes African Economies
vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. However, the situation will probably change considerably for
the better when the envisaged free trade areas are fully implemented and operational.
4.5. Synchronicity of business cycles
The degree of synchronization of member states’ business cycles and macroeconomic shocks is
a crucial factor in determining the costs of monetary union membership, i.e., the costs decrease
8The Observatory of Economic Complexity of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology gives very detailed statis-
tics of the composition of exports of African (and other) nations as well as their trading partners (Observatory of
Economic Complexity (ed.)).
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the more synchronized they are (see chapter 3). The following section deploys different empirical
methods to determine how synchronized African economies are and whether there is any evidence
that the economic integration efforts since the Abuja treaty went into force have helped equalizing
national business cycles.
4.5.1. Simple correlations
In order to get an indication of how synchronized the business cycles of REC members are, it is
useful to take a look at the correlation of their real GDP growth rates and inflation rates (GDP de-
flator). These variables serve as observable proxies for the changes in macroeconomic output and
price level in a dynamic aggregated demand - aggregated supply model setting. To get measures of
synchronicity, the correlation coefficients ρ are calculated for every member state of every REC
(equation 4.3) between the real GDP growth rate y or inflation rate of a member state i and an
aggregate of the remaining REC member states −i.
ρ(yit ,y
−i
t ) =
n
∑
t=1
(yit − y¯i)(y−it−k− y¯−i)
2
√
n
∑
t=1
(yit − y¯i)2(y−it − y¯−i)2
(4.3)
Since the calculation of the correlation coefficient includes mean centering of the respective
GDP growth or inflation rates, it provides a measure of synchronicity of fluctuations around the
average rate of change, i.e., a proxy for deviations from the dynamic equilibrium of aggregated
demand and aggregated supply. Moreover, the correlation coefficients are tested for significance
using the Ljung-Box Q-Test (Ljung and Box, 1978) with the Null hypothesis of no significant cor-
relation. A high, positive and significant rho indicates that the pertained member state’s business
cycle is highly synchronized with that of the rest of the REC and the costs of monetary union are
rather low. Since the Abuja treaty went into force in 1994 two correlation coefficients, pre- and
post-1994, are calculated to test if synchronicity has increased since then.
Prior to the calculation of the correlation coefficients the time series of GDP growth and infla-
tion rates are tested for non-stationarity. Because the correlation coefficients of growth rates (their
calculation involves computing the first differences) are calculated, non-stationarity of order one
in the level data is not a problem for statistical inference. If the level data are, however, integrated
of order two9, the growth rates would still be integrated of order one and the calculated correlation
9In the long run, non-stationarity of an order higher than one is very unlikely but could occur for a limited period of
time and, hence, in the samples used here.
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might be spurious. In order to rule out spurious correlation results, the time series of the growth
rates of GDP and the GDP deflator are tested for non-stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Test (Dickey and Fuller 1979, 1981, and Dickey and Said 1984) in three test specifications
– testing for a deterministic trend, a random walk with drift, and a random walk – with the length
of auto-regressive lags determined on the basis of the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz,
1978). However, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test tends to erroneously not rejecting the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity in the presence of structural breaks (Perron, 1989). Therefore, if the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test does not reject non-stationarity, the Zivot-Andrews Test (Zivot and
Andrews, 2002), which tests the null hypothesis of non-stationarity while allowing and testing for
one structural break (in constant, trend or both), is applied as well. The length of autoregressive
lags is also determined on the basis of the Bayesian Information Criterion. For three time series
the null hypothesis could not be rejected in this two-step procedure, namely, the growth rates of
the GDP deflator of Eritrea, Sudan, and Zambia. The tests identify a deterministic trend in all
three series. Since the Zivot-Andrews Test only allows for one structural break, those series might
exhibit more than one break which leads to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore,
for these three series the Lee-Strazicich Test (Lee and Strazicich, 2003), which tests the null hy-
pothesis of trend non-stationarity allowing for two structural breaks, is performed with the length
of autoregressive lags chosen by the general to specific method. For the concerned series, the
Lee-Strazicich Test rejected the null hypothesis and adopted the alternative hypothesis of trend
stationarity with two structural breaks. Therefore, the result of the stationarity tests is that, none
of the time series is significantly identified as non-stationary. Moreover, since the aggregation of
stationary series, leads to another stationary series there is no need to test for non-stationarity in
the REC aggregates as well. Hence, the significance calculated correlation coefficients are not the
spurious result of trending variables.
The detailed results of the correlation analyses are presented in tables A.6 - A.9 in the appendix.
Figure 4.7 summarizes them by displaying the unweighted average of member states’ correlation
coefficients of each REC as well as the rage between the highest and the lowest correlation coef-
ficient exhibited by member countries. The general result is that none of the RECs exhibits a high
degree of synchronicity since all average correlation coefficients remain well below 0.610 while
10The value of a correlation coefficient lies between -1 and +1. A value of -1 indicates a perfectly negative linear
relationship, a value of +1 a perfectly positive linear relationship. In practical empirical work, values above 0.6 are
often considered to indicate a strong positive relationship. However, that value is ultimately arbitrary (Quatember,
2005, 67).
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Figure 4.7.: Average correlation of GDP growth and inflation rates in RECs pre- and post-1994.
Note: Maximum, minimum and unweighted arithmetic averages of correlation coefficients of member countries with
the aggregate of the remaining REC of year-over-year GDP growth and inflation rates (GDP deflator). Somalia, South
Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calcu-
lations of correlation coefficients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end in 2010 because of the Libya war and the
Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own figure and calculations.
the Q-test results are, on average, not significant on a five percent level. However, there are consid-
erable differences between the RECs, between individual member states (some even have negative
correlation), between GDP growth and inflation rate synchronicity, and between the pre- and post-
1994 periods. Of all RECs the ECCAS exhibits the highest degree of inflation rate synchronicity
which is not surprising since six of its ten members are part of the CFA franc zone (CAEMU).
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A similar result might have been expected of the ECOWAS which is among those RECs with the
lowest degree of synchronicity. However, as Nigeria as a non-member state of the CFA zone ac-
counts for about two thirds of GDP, the combined weight of the CFA member states (WAEMU)
is small. Another example of the possibly positive influence of sub-REC groupings is the SADC.
Its correlation coefficients of GDP growth and inflation are high compared to other RECs (but still
low in absolute terms). This is possibly the result of the CMA and the SACU membership of some
of its member states as well as the gravitational force of South Africa which accounts for about
two thirds of the SADC’s aggregate GDP. The SADC also managed to increase its average syn-
chronicity since 1994 while that of individual member states greatly differs. Besides the SADC,
only COMESA and the EAC substantially increased their synchronicity since 1994. In the case
of EAC that is likely the result of its comparatively successful integration policy (see Table 2.1).
Moreover, it is the only REC that narrowed the rage between the highest and lowest correlation
coefficient indicating a relatively equally distributed convergence process of its member states’
economies. As a striking counterexample, UMA’s synchronicity considerably declined, likely as
a result of the stalled regional integration owing to the unresolved political conflicts over the status
of the Western Sahara which caused Morocco’s departure from the OAU/AU11. The remaining
RECs approximately maintained their degree of synchronicity reflecting the little progress made
in regional integration. However, the generally increased range between member states’ corre-
lation coefficients indicates a divergence between member states. This is probably the result of
the fact that only some African countries, as major exporters of primary commodities, became
more integrated in the world economy during the last two decades while other countries were left
behind.
4.5.2. Output gap correlations
The analyses of correlations of GDP growth and inflation rates give a first impression of the syn-
chronicity of economic cycles in African regions. However, they are incapable of showing how
pronounced booms and recessions are and how long national economies need to return to their
usual degrees of capacity utilization. The output gap (equation 4.4), which is defined as the per-
centage difference between actual GDP y and potential GDP y˜, makes such comparisons possible.
gap=
y− y˜
y˜
·100 (4.4)
11To avoid distortions of the correlation coefficients owing to the war in Libya as well as civil conflicts and political
insecurity in some African states in the wake and aftermath of the Arab spring revolutions, the sample periods of
UMA, CEN-SAD, and COMESA end at 2010 instead of 2012.
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The potential GDP is the real output that an economy is capable to produce sustainably12. Its
level is determined by the structure of production, the state of technology, and the available pro-
duction factors13. Its growth rate is driven by the speed of technological advancement and the net
(after depreciation) increase of input factors. The theoretical reasons for the divergence of actual
output from potential production are wage and price rigidities which prevent the immediate clear-
ing of markets and temporary deviations because the economic agents need time to adjust after
random productivity shocks (real business cycles) (European Central Bank (ed.), 2000, 37-38).
The difficulty in calculating output gaps is the statistical measurement of the potential out-
put. Since it is not observable, it can only be estimated. There are various methods proposed in
economic literature to measure the potential GDP which can be divided into two categories: the
production function approach and statistical methods. The former calculates the potential output
by explicitly modeling the supply side of an economy using a macroeconomic production func-
tion and estimates its components, i.e., capital, labor, and the level of technology. The production
function approach has the advantage of supplying a dis-aggregated picture of the potential output
which enables an analysis of its determinants. However, the production function approach suffers
from serious data problems and relies heavily on (necessary) assumptions which makes it very
elaborate and difficult to derive Moreover, errors in components may compound when calculating
the potential output. Statistical methods are much simpler and rest on fewer assumptions. They
apply different statistical techniques to decompose a time series of the output variable into a trend
and cyclical component. While the first represents the underlying long-term development of the
output, i.e., it is an estimate of the potential output, the latter accounts for short-term deviations
from its long-term path. The simplest possible approach would be to fit a linear deterministic
trend trough the time series data of the growth rate of the real output variable. The output gap
then would be the deviation from the trend. That, however, would assume a constant trend growth
rate over time which disregards developments on the supply side of the economy. Testing for and
modeling of structural breaks in the trend is a possible way to overcome this limitation. Since
it is imperative for the linear trend approach to measure the trend growth over at least one full
economic cycle, modeling breaks that occur within a cycle would distort the estimate of the trend
12The potential output describes the level of output that an economy produces when production factors are used at their
normal capacity utilization level. At the normal utilization level, the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of
the use of an input factor.
13The size of the labor force is determined by the labor participation rate, the share of the working age population of
the total population, the usual degree of unemployment, and population growth. The size of the capital stock is
determined by past investments and the rate of depreciation.
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growth rate, before and after the break. This seriously limits the ability of this technique to derive
reliable estimates of the trend path. A more refined method of decomposing time series into its
latent trend and cyclical components are statistical filters. There are several filter techniques com-
monly used in macroeconomic time series analyses. The Christiano-Fitzgerald-Filter (Christiano
and Fitzgerald, 2003, 437-447), the Baxter-King-Filter (Baxter and King, 1999, 576-583), and the
Hodrick-Presscott (HP)-Filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997, 3-7) are among the most frequently
applied (European Central Bank (ed.), 2000, 37-41).
Since for the purpose of this study it is not necessary to analyze the underlying determinants
of the potential output, this study resorts to statistical methods instead of the production function
approach. To avoid the described difficulties of using a linear deterministic trend, filter methods
seem more appropriate. Among the various filters the HP-Filter is chosen since it is the most
commonly used in estimates of the potential output by leading institutions’ research departments
such as the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Moreover, Nilsson and Gyomai
(2011, 13-22) have shown that the HP-Filter is superior to Christiano-Fitzgerald-Filter in iden-
tifying turning points of economic cycles, a feature, which is essential for the determination of
business cycle synchronicity. The HP-Filter was (re-)developed14 by Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
for an empirical study on the business cycles of the United States. The basic intuition is to decom-
pose the logarithm of the time series data of real GDP y into its underlying trend g and cyclical
c components by finding the trend or growth component g which minimizes the sum of squared
deviations of actual output (equation 4.5) from its trend subject to a constraint on the variation of
the growth rate of trend output. In essence, the HP-filtering of a GDP time series delivers a new
time series that is very similar to a symmetric weighted moving average of the original time series,
called the trend component of the GDP. The trend GDP series is an estimate of the potential output
that is used in this study to calculate the output gaps of African countries and country aggregates
according to equation 4.4.15
min
{gt}Tt=−1
{
T
∑
t=1
(yt −gt)2+λ
T
∑
t=1
[(gt −gt−1)− (gt−1−gt−2)]2} (4.5)
14Other authors developed similar filter techniques prior to Hodrick and Presscott. See for instance (Leser, 1961)
15Consider an idealized, macroeconomic output time series that (when plotted) looks like an upward trending sinusoidal
curve. The HP-Filter delivers a new time series that (when plotted) runs exactly through the middle of the amplitudes
of the upward trending sinusoidal curve. The difference between both time series (distances between both graphs)
are the gaps between the actual production and the production potential.
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The first term of equation 4.5, the sum over the squared deviations of the observed values of
y from the permanent trend g, represents the goodness of the fit while the second term penalizes
variability in the trend component series. The positive parameter λ is the weight of the penalty
and, hence, controls the smoothness of the fit. If λ goes to infinity, g approaches a linear trend and
if λ goes to zero, g approaches the observed values of y. Hodrick and Prescott (1997) apply a value
of 1600 for λ , however, the value is ultimately arbitrary and involves assumptions on the typical
length of business cycles. If it is set too low or too high, parts of the actual cyclical component
could mistakenly be estimated as trend component and vice versa. However, Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) found that their results are not very sensitive to changes in λ by altering it to 400 and
6400. Since Hodrick and Prescott (1997) use quarterly data, their proposed value for λ of 1600
is not appropriate for the annual data used here. Ravn and Uhlig (2002) suggest a value of 6.25,
Stamfort (2005) a value of 6.65, Maravall and Rio (2001) a value between 6 and 7 while Baxter
and King (1999) use a value of 10 for annual data. For the following estimations of potential GDP
a λ value of 7 is used which is approximately the average of the values proposed in the literature
and corresponds to a λ of 1600 for quarterly data and to a reference length of an economic cycle
of 9.9 years (Maravall and Rio, 2001, 37-38).
In addition to setting the appropriate value of λ , the HP-Filter suffers from other technical
difficulties. One is the poor reliability of the end of sample estimates because it is lacking the in-
formation of the future path of the underlying series (European Central Bank (ed.), 2000, 40-41).
To deal with this shortcoming, the time series of the real GDP is extended for three years with
forecasted values generated by a univariate autoregressive model with up to two lags that is esti-
mated based on the full sample. Another serious issue are structural breaks in the level or growth
rate of potential output. If not taken into account, the HP-Filter mistakenly treats breaks as cycli-
cal fluctuations and smooths them by adjusting the trend component even before the break occurs,
leading to misleading measures of the cyclical position of the economy (output gap) around the
breakpoint (European Central Bank (ed.), 2000, 41). One possible way to address this problem is
to incorporate structural breaks into the filtering by adopting a piece wise approach, i.e., separate
estimations according to equation 4.5 for the periods before and after a breakpoint and linking
those. However, before breaks can be modeled, it is necessary to firstly identify the type and tim-
ing of structural breaks in the path of potential output. In order to achieve that, one could estimate
simple univariate autoregressive models, possibly incorporating deterministic trends and use tests
for structural breaks in the model, such as the Andrews-Ploberger test for breaks at unknown date
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(Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). However, the structural breaks found by the test cannot differen-
tiate between breaks in the underlying path of the potential output or just extreme cyclical effects
or temporary exogenous shocks which do not alter the potential output. Moreover, simple au-
toregressive models are probably not capable of sufficiently explaining real output which possibly
leads to the miss-identification of structural breaks that are actually normal results of the underly-
ing data-generating process. Therefore, to avoid mis-identifications of structural breaks in the path
of potential output and, hence, distortions of the calculated output gaps, the study refrains from
formally testing for structural breaks. Instead, breaks in potential output are identified manually16
based on historical information of events that affect either the level or the growth rate of potential
output. Such events are primarily internal and external conflicts or changes in legislation which
either rather instantaneously reduce human and physical capital (downward shift in potential out-
put) or slowly over time (lower or negative trend growth rate).
The detailed correlation coefficients for individual countries are presented in tables A.10 - A.13
in the appendix. Figure 4.8 summarizes them by displaying the unweighted average of member
states’ correlation coefficients of each REC as well as the rage between the highest and the lowest
correlation coefficient exhibited by member countries. In terms of business cycle synchronicity,
the results are in line with the outcome of the simple correlation analyses, i.e., synchronicity of
REC member states’ business cycles is rather low and in the majority of countries not significantly
different from zero. Moreover, most RECs were not able to make substantial progress since the
Abuja treaty went into force in 1994. UMA’s synchronicity even slightly declined. A notable
exception is the EAC which ascended from the lowest average correlation of all RECs prior to
1994 to the highest for the post-1994 period, though still below a value which can be considered as
indicating a high and positive correlation. In addition, the output gap analysis confirms another the
result of the simple correlation analysis: in almost all RECs the range between the highest and the
lowest correlation coefficients of REC member states did not decline after 1994, it even increased
considerably in COMESA and ECOWAS, indicating different speeds of progress and even regress
in some member states. Besides allowing the evaluation of synchronicity, the calculation of output
gaps allows to evaluate the severity of business cycle deviations by measuring the amplitudes of
variations. Tables A.10 - A.13 list the differences in standard deviation as well as the minimum and
16Structural breaks are identified by visually checking time series data for considerable changes. They are treated as
structural breaks when historical information suggests that events in that country likely caused changes in potential
output. For instance, when military conflicts lead to a considerable reduction of the labor force because people fled
the country.
59
4. Empirical Evidence on Costs and Benefits of African Monetary Union
Seitenränder 0.00
Kopf- und Fußzeile 0.0
Druckbereich um Grafik ziehen
Druckskalierung auf "Blatt auf einer Seite darstellen" einstellen
Seitenlänge kürzen bis passend (225)
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
UMA 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
IGAD 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
EAC 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
ECCAS 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
ECOWAS 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
SADC 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
COMESA 
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
pre-1994 post-1994
CEN-SAD 
Figure 4.8.: Average correlation of output gaps in RECs pre- and post-1994.
Note: Maximum, minimum and unweighted arithmetic averages of correlation coefficients of member countries’ out-
put gaps with the output gaps of the aggregate of the remaining REC. Somalia, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and
Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calculations of correlation coeffi-
cients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end in 2010 because of the Libya war and the Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own figure and calculations.
maximum of national output gaps and the aggregate of the remaining REC countries. Moreover,
the REC’s averages are calculated as the average absolute values of member states’ differences
in standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. The calculations demonstrate that, in addition to
low synchronicity, deviations of national business cycles in comparison to the remainder of the
REC are fairly severe. On average, during the pre-1994 period, member states usually deviate
60
4.5. Synchronicity of business cycles
about one and a half percentage points from the output gap of its fellow REC partners. However,
in the post-1994 period, the severity of business cycle deviations declined in most RECs, except
for CEN-SAD, ECCAS, and ECOWAS. Here, also the EAC exhibits one of the best performances
and significant progress since the Abuja treaty’s ratification. This is likely to some extend the
result of the comparatively successful regional integration process but maybe also the reflection of
the great moderation17 in industrial countries until 2008 as major trading partners and a general
progress in Africa towards fewer internal and external conflicts and democratization.
4.5.3. Evidence on the endogeneity of business cycle synchronicity
The empirical investigations have shown so far that one of the major preconditions for a bene-
ficial monetary union, a high degree of business cycle synchronicity and similarity of shocks, is
not fulfilled in any REC. However, forming a monetary union might itself have a positive impact
on synchronicity. One of the channels that might foster business cycle synchronicity is through
increased trade (trade channel). As transaction costs decline by using a common currency, trade is
likely to increase. Moreover, it eliminates national monetary policies as a possible source of asym-
metric shocks. It limits the scope for national fiscal policy shocks as countries cannot get indebted
in their own national currency (policy channel). However, since monetary union membership lim-
its fiscal authorities’ capabilities to counter shocks by taking an expansive policy stance as well as
the limitations of monetary policy in case of asymmetric shocks, the net effect of monetary union
membership on synchronization might even be negative.
As a first indicator, the experience of the already existing African monetary unions and sub-
RECs, the CMA, the WAEMU, and the CAEMU can be used to assess whether the net effect is
positive or negative, if there is any at all. Therefore, the same calculation for the correlation of
output gaps, GDP growth and inflation rates is conducted for the three existing African monetary
unions. The detailed results are displayed in tables A.14 and A.15 in the appendix. Figure 4.9
summarizes the results by portraying the average correlation coefficients as well as the minimum
and maximum of correlation coefficients of individual member states for the pre- and post-1994
periods. The results indicate that inflation rates are considerably higher correlated which is to be
expected when having a common monetary policy. However, the development of the real econ-
omy seems not to be significantly higher or lower correlated between monetary union member
17The term Great Moderation denotes a period of historically low volatility in macroeconomic variables, such as GDP
and inflation in developed nations commencing in the mid-1980 and ending with the Great Recession in 2008 and
2009. The term was coined by J. H. Stock M. W. Watson (2002).
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Figure 4.9.: Average correlation of output gaps, GDP growth, and inflation rates in existing
African monetary unions pre- and post-1994.
Note: Maximum, minimum, and unweighted arithmetic averages of correlation coefficients of member countries’
output gaps, GDP growth, and inflation rates with the output gaps, GDP growth, and inflation rates of the aggregate of
the remaining monetary union member states.
Source: Own figure and calculations.
states than between monetarily independent countries of the same REC. Moreover, there is no
clear indication that the differences in business cycle positions are less pronounced. However, the
greater synchronicity of the CMA compared to the CFA zones might speak for a possibly positive
effect of having relinquished internal trade restrictions since the CMA members are also mem-
bers of the same customs union (SACU). However, this might be to some degree the result of
the high economic gravity of South Africa which accounts for over 95 percent of CMA’s GDP.
Until Namibia’s independence in 1990, it was even an integral part of South Africa. CAEMU and
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WAEMU also became customs unions in 1994. However, only WAEMU managed to increase its
business cycle synchronicity since then.
These indistinct results call for a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of monetary union
membership on the degree of business cycle synchronicity, if there is any at all. Therefore, a
panel estimation is run which encompasses 44 African nations18 and the period of 1964 to 2012
partitioned into two periods, pre- and post-1994. It is based on annual data from the World Bank
World Development Indicators database and the International Monetary Funds Directions of Trade
database as described above. The panel model (equation 4.6) regresses bilateral correlation coef-
ficients ρ of two countries’ output gaps on monetary union membership MU to measure the effect
of the policy channel and a set of control variables. Monetary union membership is measured with
two different variables: a dummy variable which assumes a value of one if both countries are part
of the same monetary union and zero otherwise as well as the number of years both countries are in
the same monetary union19. To control for other possible factors, the following variables are added
to the model: the bilateral trade volumes (imports plus exports) in percent of GDP (TradeGDP) to
capture the effect of mutual trade integration (trade channel) on business cycle synchronicity20, the
linear distance between the geographical centers of the two countries Dist in 1000 kilometers21 to
account for common regional shocks such as droughts and spillovers from (civil) wars, a common
language dummy ComLang which assumes the value of one when both countries have the same
official language22 to take possible (non-)existence of language barriers into account as well as
possible still existing ties23 from colonial times among the concerned countries as well as to the
18The nations included are Algeria, Benin, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape-Verde, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauri-
tania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The data set is limited to African countries only
because these are the countries for which inference is made and policy recommendations are derived. Given the
size of the sample, except for a number of country pairs were only insufficient data are available, it comes close to
representing the whole ”population” of all African country pairs. The inclusion other countries would possibly lead
to different estimation results owing to cross-country heterogeneity which might not be fully captured by the de-
ployed panel estimation techniques and control variables. For example, the level of trade integration is much higher
between, for instance, European countries. Also geographical distances are much lower and traffic infrastructure
is more developed. Moreover, the pace of political and economic integration in the European (Monetary) Union is
most likely considerably faster than in the African Union.
19The number of years is calculated as the sum of years before the respective time period in the panel (i.e., pre- or
post-1994) and the average years during the respective time period in the panel.
20The drawback of that approach is that it does not capture third country effects. For instance, when both countries
trade heavily with the same partner but not with each other, the synchronicity is likely to be positively impacted as
well.
21Linear distance data gathered from http://www.luftlinie.org.
22A considerable number of countries have several official languages which all count for the setting the dummy vari-
ables value to one.
23These ties could be of different nature such as bilateral trade agreements but also, inter alia, similarity of political
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former colonizer. Moreover, to control for a possible effect of free trade area agreements, FTA is
added to the regression model as well – measured analogous to the monetary union membership
as a dummy and number of years variable.
ρit = β0+β1MUit +β2FTAit +β3ComLangit +β4Distit +β5TradeGDPit +uit (4.6)
The subscript i represents the country pair and t the time period. The variable u denotes the error
term and β0 the constant term. To further control for the relevance of political stability for business
cycle synchronicity, the Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index PolStabInd from the
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators database is added. The indicator is measured in
units of a standard normal distribution with a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and values
running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values of the index correspond to higher political
stability (World Bank (ed.), 2014). Unfortunately, this indicator is only available for the post-1994
period. Therefore, the post-1994 data of the panel is used for a cross-country regression24 which
incorporates the minimum, average or maximum of the political stability indicator. The regression
equation then takes the following form:
ρi= β0+β1MUi+β2FTAi+β3ComLangi+β4Disti+β5TradeGDPi+β6PolStabIndi+ui. (4.7)
Equation 4.6 is estimated using random effects25 with time-specific effects, country-pair-specific
effects, and both effects as all effects are possible. The estimation results are displayed in Table
4.1. Based on the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion26 SIC (Schwarz, 1978), the random
effects model that allows for country and time specific effects and use the years in monetary union
variable is the superior model.27 The estimation results show that, when allowing for country-
institutions, justice systems, and the organization of their labor markets.
24This approach has the disadvantage of not modeling country specific effects with the possible result of an omitted
variable bias. However, coefficient estimates do not differ much from the panel results, except for the constant term.
25The random effects modeling is chosen because ComLangit and Distit are time-invariant regressors which fixed-
effects models, that uses the variation of one observation objects over time for estimation (within estimator), cannot
handle.
26The SIC criterion is commonly used for model selection. In contrast to the coefficient of determination R2, the SIC
does only indicate that a model is superior to another model if additional contribute significantly to explaining the
variation of the regressand. It does so by penalizing the number of parameters of model. Only if the increase in
the likelihood is substantial enough to outweigh the penalty, the SIC indicates an improvement of a model. There
are other selection criteria commonly used, like the Akaike criterion, but the SIC is stricter (i.e. the penalty for
additional regressors is higher).
27The Breusch-Pagan tests for heterogeneity reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity and therefore poolability with
respect to country and time specific effects. That result seems plausible since, with respect to time specific effects,
the institutional setting changed significantly with the introduction of the African Economic Union in 1994. Re-
garding country specific effects it seems implausible to treat all 44 African nation as homogeneous since they are in
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specific effects, bilateral business-cycle synchronicity significantly increases with every year both
countries share a common currency. However, that effect is very small, i.e., on average, it takes
about 150 years to increase the correlation coefficient by a mere 0.128. The regression results also
demonstrate that trade integration has a high and significantly positive effect on synchronicity29
as has having a common language. As trade flows are expected to rise with monetary integra-
tion, as Rose (2000) confirmed empirically for the EMU, monetary union likely has an indirect
effect on business cycle synchronicity as well. Free trade area agreements do not seem to have
an additional impact on synchronicity apart from their indirect effect via increasing bilateral trade
volumes. Distance and political stability also do not significantly affect the alignment of business
cycles.
very different stages of development and have economic systems ranging from rather centrally planned economies
to ones primarily organized as free-market economies.
28The effect is estimated as linear. When approaching a higher degree of synchronicity the effect is expected to become
non-linear and converges to zero since the value of the dependent variable is limited to the interval of [-1,1].
29The effect is estimated as linear. The effect should become smaller with increasing trade integration. The estimated
coefficient would lead to values of the correlation coefficient out of its interval when becoming too high. However
such values are far out of the value range of the sample.
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4.6. Shock responsiveness of prices
A quick response of prices and wages is imperative for monetary union member states to cope
with asymmetric shocks and differing cyclical positions as nominal exchange rate adjustments are
naturally ruled out. As seen above, African countries do not exhibit a sufficient degree of business
cycle alignment, i.e., asymmetric shocks seem to be fairly common. Considering that empirical
evidence presented above also points to the conclusion that monetary union memberships itself
does not seem to meaningfully increase synchronicity, an African monetary union would be very
costly in terms of lost output, higher unemployment, and worsening of the current accounts for
some countries as other would experience an over-utilization of their resources and higher infla-
tion. However, if prices exhibit a high degree of sensitivity to shocks, the costs of monetary union
membership would be greatly mitigated as their economies would more swiftly return to their
equilibrium growth paths. This section therefore attempts to empirically measure the degree of
that responsiveness.
4.6.1. Excursion: The theory of price and wage rigidity
How responsive prices are to macroeconomic shocks is determined by the degree of price and wage
flexibility on the microeconomic level. In ideal economic models, full price flexibility is often
assumed. In reality, prices are not fully flexible. They exhibit a certain degree of rigidity or sticki-
ness, in particular downwards. One rationale for companies to deviate from the profit-maximizing
prices of their goods and services by not adjusting them instantaneously is that changing prices
is costly (Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977)). Determining the optimal price also
requires gathering and processing information (Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006)) which
takes time and incurs costs. Companies therefore do not change their nominal price instanta-
neously to trace every small alteration of their optimal price. They rather let it vary between a
lower and upper boundary. Within that interval, the deviation of the actual price from the optimal
price is too small to cover the costs of changing prices. The result is that price changes are in-
frequent and large.30 Another reason for price rigidity is that companies often prefer to set prices
ending with a nine or to set round prices (Kashyap, 1995). Hence, prices are often not continuous
and are therefore only changed to the next round number, leading to infrequent and rather large
price changes as well. Moreover, companies might try to avoid setting prices that are viewed by
30This implies, that higher average inflation would lead to more frequent price changes.
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their customers as unjustified (Rotemberg, 2011). This leads to higher rigidity of prices owing to
changes in demand since customers are less willing to accept those in contrast to price alterations
because of changes in costs. Moreover, price regulations are another source of inertia of prices as
companies can adjust prices only after obtaining an administrative approval. Furthermore, slug-
gish price adjustments might also stem from the way economic agents form their expectations. If
they are set backward-looking, prices probably react slowly to shocks that change their optimal
price while forward-looking agents might react more timely if adjustments are appropriate given
the adjustment costs (Dotsey, 2002).
Apart from the various sources of price rigidities, Dhyne et al. (2009) argue that it is important
for monetary policy purposes to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic rigidities. Intrinsic
rigidity describes the phenomenon that prices do not or merely partially adjust even to significant
changes in demand or costs owing to reasons inherent to the price setting process as discussed
above. Prices are denoted as extrinsically rigid when they do not adjust because demand and costs
and therefore the optimal price are fairly stable. While the first is important for the adjustment
after asymmetric shocks the latter, taken by itself, does not pose an obstacle to shock adjustment.
It is, however, difficult to statistically measure both types of rigidities separately.
Aside from prices of goods and services, wages, as the prices of labor input, are a central cost
factor for production and therefore a major driver of prices and inflation. Since wages also exhibit
considerable nominal rigidity, they therefore add to the inertia of macroeconomic price indices.
According to economic theory, the reasons for wage inflexibility are manifold. Taylor (1977) and
Taylor (1980) identify long-term contracts which are only (re-)negotiated (collectively or individ-
ually) on a staggered basis as a significant source of rigid wages. Stiglitz sees another reason in
risk averse workers’ preference for stable real wages over the business cycle and firms offering
that in return for wages below the value of the marginal product leading to an implicit contract
to keep wages stable over the business cycle. Another rationale for companies adjusting nominal
wages, especially downwards, is based on the theory that workers’ productivity depends positively
on their wage (efficiency wages) for several reasons. First of all, the higher wage is, the higher is
the loss when losing the job because of shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Moreover, higher
wages might be perceived by the workers as a gift and therefore induce more effort to return the
favor (Akerlof, 1982). Also, firms offering higher wages than their competitors might be able to
choose from a greater pool of higher quality job applicants and those high potential workers are
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more likely to quit if wages are cut (Weiss, 1980). Also, high-wage employers might pay above
average wages because they decrease the turnover of employees and therefore they save costs of
hiring and training new workers while their workforce acquires more company-specific human
capital (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980). Furthermore, if employers pay wages below what workers per-
ceive as fair, they reduce their efforts accordingly (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). Apart from cutting
wages, another way for companies to slash wage costs would be to dismiss current employees
(insiders) and replace them with unemployed workers (outsiders) for a lower wage. However,
companies might refrain from that because the remaining insiders might be unwilling to cooper-
ate with their new colleagues which greatly weights on productivity (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989).
If prices and wages on the individual firm level change only infrequently, for reasons stated
above, the aggregated price level should exhibit a significant degree of inertia as well as inflation
persistence31. The reason that not only the price level exhibits inertia but also its rate of change,
the inflation rate, is persistent is that growing economies usually exhibit a growing price level and,
hence, a positive average inflation rate. Macroeconomic changes or shocks therefore should lead
to a deviation from the growth path of the price level and, thus, to a deviation from the average
inflation rate Dhyne et al. (2009).32 Such a deviation allows countries to adapt over time to asym-
metric shocks in a monetary union, i.e., restoring competitiveness via the real exchange rate and
bringing aggregate demand and supply back to equilibrium levels. The faster and the stronger the
inflation rate deviates, the faster the country returns to the full utilization of its capacities or, in
case of positive shocks, end the over-utilization of their capacities.
4.6.2. Price responses to severe downturns
In order to empirically address the question of how fast and strong, if at all, countries’ prices react
to macroeconomic shocks, one can take a look at the drop of the inflation rate when an economy
is hit by a negative shock. Negative shocks necessitate downward adjustments of the inflation rate
or even absolute price reductions. To investigate if that is the case, the most severe downturns for
all African countries between 1992 and 2012 are identified, measured as the strongest drop in the
31There are different definitions of inflation persistence in the literature. Batini and Nelson (2002) and Batini (2002)
distinguish three kinds of inflation persistence: 1) positive serial correlation in inflation, 2) lags between systematic
monetary policy actions and their (peak) effect on inflation, and 3) lagged responses of inflation to non-systematic
policy actions (i.e., policy shocks). Willis (2003) defines it as the speed with which inflation returns to baseline
after a shock. They all have in common that it describes some form of inertia of inflation rates.
32That does not exclude the rather seldom cases of zero or even negative average inflation rates.
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output gap (as calculated in section 4.5.2). Then, it is checked whether the inflation rate drops as
well in the same year. The relevant measure of inflation is the inflation of domestic production
prices in contrast to the consumer prices which include prices of imported goods. Therefore, the
inflation rate is measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales, if available, or
otherwise the GDP deflator. The deflator of total sales is the preferred measure as the GDP deflator
has the drawback that the import prices enter its calculation with a negative sign. This distorts the
measure of domestic production prices (Dovern, Jannsen and Scheide, 2009). The deflator of total
sales solves that problem by adding the imports which therefore drop out of the calculation.33
In order to make the contemporary inflation responses ∆π comparable between the countries
which exhibit very different levels of average inflation π¯ and different magnitudes of drops in
their output gap gap, the following measure of the inflation response IR is calculated:
IR=
∆π
|π¯|
∆gap
. (4.8)
IR is positive when inflation decreases in the downturn year and positive when inflation recedes.
Hence, a positive sign indicates a price response that allows countries to cope with asymmetric
shocks as a drop in capacity utilization entails a drop in the inflation rate. The higher a positive
IR is the stronger is the contemporary reaction of prices to shocks. IR could be interpreted as the
change in inflation relative to average inflation per percentage point drop in the output gap.
The detailed results are listed in tables A.16 - A.19. Figure 4.10 summarizes the results by dis-
playing the relative and absolute frequency of the IR values of the REC member states. The results
are sobering. Despite the result that in 46 percent of the REC member states the inflation dropped
in their most severe downturn year, in only 13 percent of the cases, the inflation response was
economically meaningful, resulting in an IR above 0.134. The remaining countries’ inflation rates
even increased; in some cases the surge was very pronounced. Moreover, there are considerable
differences between the various RECs. While in ECCAS and ECOWAS about 70 percent of the
member countries have a positive IR, none of the EAC and IGAD member states exhibits a helpful
price reaction. For comparative reasons, the IR for the European Monetary Union, Germany, and
the United States are calculated as well. All of them had their sharpest drop in capacity utilization
33The deflator of total sales DTS is calculated as the implicit price deflator of nominal GDP Yn plus nominal imports
Imn divided by the real GDP Yr plus real imports Imr times 100: DTS= 100∗ Yn+ImnYr+Imr .
34For example, if a country had an inflation rate of two percent prior to a downturn with a drop in the output gap of one
percentage point, an IR of 0.1 would mean that the inflation rate dropped to 1.8 percent.
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Figure 4.10.: Relative and absolute frequency of IR values in RECs
Note: Left scale: relative frequency in percent. Right scale: absolute frequency in number of countries. The right
scale’s length equals the number of investigated REC member states.
Source: World Bank, own figure and calculations.
in 2009 – the year of the so called Great Recession. All of them experienced a considerable fall
in inflation. In particular, the Eurozone and the United States exhibit IR values that are higher
than those exhibited by almost all African countries with a positive IR (except for Congo (Rep.)
and Lesotho). These results indicates, that monetary union memberships would be very costly for
African countries.
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4.6.3. Evidence from Phillips Curve estimates
Looking at the reaction of inflation in the sharpest downturn of African countries only gives a
snapshot in time as it looks only at one observation and does not mean that countries with negative
or positive IR systematically react to shocks that way. Moreover, the change in the inflation rate
is very likely influenced by other factors as well. Therefore, a broader approach is in order to
determine whether or not African countries’ inflation rates react timely and in a shock-absorbing
direction to positive as well as to negative macroeconomic shocks.
The theoretical and empirical workhorse for describing inflation and its dynamics is the Phillips
Curve in its various variants. In its original contribution, Phillips (1958) described the negative
relationship between the growth rate of nominal wages and the unemployment rate. Later versions
replaced the growth rate of wages with the inflation rate as both are highly correlated. Also, some
later versions used the output gap as a measure of macroeconomic capacity utilization as a costs
push inflation factor instead of the unemployment rate. Moreover, in response to the high infla-
tion and high unemployment phase of the late 1970s and early 1980s, inflation expectations were
integrated into Phillips Curve models. Rational expectations, i.e., expectations formed by eco-
nomic agents in perfect knowledge of the functioning of the economy based on their current set
of information, became the most frequently used way of modeling expectations in theoretical and
empirical Phillips Curve models (King, 2008). However, rational expectations are often criticized
for assuming unrealistically high economic expertise and are therefore a poor description of the
way economic agents form expectations (Evans and Honkapohja, 2004). That critique is supported
by several empirical studies which found no evidence for rational expectations (see for example
Branch (2004)). In order to overcome the problems of using rational expectations, several authors
turned to using real expectations instead. Carroll (2003) suggests the use of households’ expec-
tations as well as forecasts of professional forecasters instead of rational expectations. Fuhrer
(2012) used survey data on households’ inflation expectations to estimate inflation dynamics in
the United States.
In order to investigate the behavior of African countries’ inflation rates π in response to real
macroeconomic shocks, measured by changes in the output gap, two types of the Phillips Curve
are estimated. Inflation is measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales or the
GDP deflator, depending on availability. The first (equation 4.9) is a version of the Phillips Curve
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known as the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (Hornstein, 2008):
πt = β0+β1πt−1+β2E[πt+1]+
2
∑
n=0
β3+ngapt−n+ut . (4.9)
It is called ”hybrid” because it combines versions of the Phillips Curve with purely forward
looking inflation expectations and purely backward-looking inflation expectations. For the for-
ward looking expectations E[πt+1], data of actual forecasts for the following year’s inflation rate
of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook35 are used. The backward-looking expectations are cap-
tured by the autoregressive term πt−1. As a measure of capacity utilization, and therefore the
cost-push inflation, the output gap gap is used. In order to allow for some delay in the reaction of
inflation to changes in capacity utilization, the first and second lag of the output gap are included
as well. ut denotes the nuisance parameter. The second version of the Phillips Curve estimated
is a purely backward-looking model as it leaves out the forward-looking term of equation 4.9.
There are several reasons for estimating this second, more restrictive version of the Phillips Curve.
Firstly, the IMF inflation forecasts have only been done since 2002 which severely limit the num-
ber of observations available to estimate the hybrid model. Secondly, it is unknown whether or
not the IMF forecasts are a good proxy for the real expectations of Africans, if they are forward-
looking at all. And thirdly, the true model of how inflation expectations are formed in African
countries is unknown which calls for model diversity. In particular, considering the likely lower
degree of economic literacy in Africa as well as the lower dependability and predictability of mon-
etary policy compared to many developed countries.
Both versions are estimated as single equations using the Ordinary Least Squares method. In
the empirical literature it is often pointed out that using Ordinary Least Squares probably lead to
biased and inconsistent estimators as the output gap is possibly not an exogenous variable. The
reason is simply that there is an interdependence between inflation and the output gap (at least in
the short-run) as an inflation shock could cause a change in the output gap and vice versa. Using
instrumental variables, Two or Three Stage Least Squares, or the General Method of Moments
offer potential solutions but require suitable instrumental variables. These methods bear the risk
of choosing a weak instrument which might lead to an even larger bias (Nason and Smith (2008)
and Hornstein (2008)). Moreover, all these methods only offer consistent estimators, i.e., they are
35The IMF’s World Economic Outlook is published biannually usually in April and October. For this study, only the
October forecasts are used as they are based on a set of information and indicators for the first half of the year,
which best proxies the average set of information available to economic agents throughout the whole year to form
their inflation expectations.
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only nearly unbiased in large samples. Given the small sample sizes, in particular for the hybrid
Phillips Curve estimations (only up to eleven observations), their estimators are biased as well. In
addition, the Ordinary Least Squares estimators are more robust to mis-specification (Gaab, 2004,
141-142). Given the lack of knowledge of the exact processes that generate inflation in African
countries, mis-specifications cannot be ruled out. For that reasons, the Ordinary Least Squares
method is deployed in awareness of its potentially biased estimators. Another potential bias arises
when estimating the purely backward looking Phillips Curves because they miss inflation expec-
tations as a possibly relevant explaining variable. In order to assess the possible distortion of βˆ3
caused by leaving out the forward-looking term, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)36 is estimated
for the backward-looking model of each country. Fortunately, the VIF seldom exceeds the critical
value of five which indicates that the distortion is usually small.
As the true or best model for every country is unknown, the specifications of each country’s
Phillips Curves are done by a stepwise regression37 algorithm.38 This algorithm leaves out in-
significant regressors and includes only regressors that are significant on at least a ten percent
significance level using the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of
Newey and West (1987). After finishing that algorithm, the selected specification is tested for
structural breaks39 in the constant and slope parameters, for outliers40, and for a deterministic
36The VIF is calculated as VIF = 11−R2 . R
2 denotes the coefficient of determination of an auxiliary regression that
regresses all other explaining variables of equation 4.9 on the forward-looking inflation expectations.
37Stepwise regression is a semi-automated tool used in building and selecting statistical models. It offers a way to
handle the trade-off between parsimony (include only as many variables as necessary to reduce variance) and com-
pleteness (include all, even remotely, relevant, variables to maximize the fit) of a model. Moreover, it is helpful
if (economic) theory only provides a general direction which explanatory variables might be of relevance. For in-
stance, in case of the Phillips curve, economic theory does not provide the appropriate lag structure of the output
gap variable since it depends on the degree of price and inflation persistence. Hence, the explanatory variables
need to be chosen based on statistical criteria. Stepwise regression automates that decision process by including
or excluding significant or insignificant variables at each regression step. Unfortunately, that approach has some
limitations. The most severe is that in a forward selection approach, i.e., building up a model beginning with the
most simple one and successively adding significant variables, the decision of including an additional variable is
taken based on the results of an estimation of a potentially incomplete model, that might suffers from the omitted
variable bias. In a backward selection process, i.e., shrinking a model starting with one that contains all possible
regressors, suffers from the risk of falling victim to the Type I error, i.e., accidentally including an actually insignif-
icant variable. Stepwise regression is also prone to multicollinearity because variables might get (not) accepted to
the model because the are (in)significant because of multicollinearity.
38The model selection algorithm used here combines two approaches. In the forward selection approach, variables are
added to the model sequentially until no variable not yet in the model would, when added, have a t-statistic with a
p-value smaller than 0.1. In the backward selection approach, the starting point is from the full set of regressors.
Variables with the lowest t-statistics are deleted until all remaining variables have a p-value smaller than 0.1. Both
approaches are combined by running the forward selection procedure and then running the backward selection
algorithm at each stage to delete variables which now have too small p-values (Estima (ed.), 2013).
39Levin and Piger (2009) shows that testing for and when found modeling structural breaks in the mean of inflation is
essential to correctly measure inflation persistence. Structural breaks are identified using the Andrews-Ploberger-
Test for structural breaks at unknown point(s) in time (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994).
40Outliers are detected using the measure of Krasker and Welsch (1982).
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trend which (when found) are appropriately modeled using dummy variables and or deterministic
trend series.
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Figure 4.11.: Relative and absolute frequency of ρ values in RECs
Note: Left scale: relative frequency in percent. Right scale: absolute frequency in number of countries. The right
scale’s length equals the number of investigated REC member states.
Source: World Bank, own figure and calculations.
For the purpose of this study, the most interesting parameter is β3 in both versions of the Phillips
Curve. It measures the direction and size of the contemporary response of the inflation rate to
changes of the macroeconomic capacity utilization. A highly positive β3 indicates that the inflation
75
4. Empirical Evidence on Costs and Benefits of African Monetary Union
rate reacts in a way that helps to cope with macroeconomic shocks. For instance, a negative
asymmetric shock would lead to a reduction of the inflation rate of that country which enables it
to (re-)balance its real exchange rate. In order to calculate a comparable measure ρ of the inflation
response of the different African countries with different levels of average inflation, the estimated
β3 parameters are divided by the average inflation π¯ of that country in the sample period:
ρ =
βˆ3
π¯
. (4.10)
The regression detailed results are listed in tables A.20 - A.23 in the appendix. Figure 4.11
displays the absolute and relative distribution of REC member states’ contemporary inflation re-
sponses relative to their average inflation (ρ) of both types of Phillips Curves. The results confirm
the conclusion drawn in the previous investigation of inflation responses to severe downturns. Re-
gardless of the type of Phillips Curve, the values of ρ in all RECs are highly concentrated around
zero, meaning that the vast majority of African countries’ inflation rates exhibit no significant
contemporary reaction to changes of the capacity utilization. Only in very few countries inflation
adapts in a way that supports a timely coping with macroeconomic shocks.41 However, it should
be noted that the validity of the Phillips Curve estimations results seems rather limited as they usu-
ally are not capable to deliver a robust explanation of the processes that generate the usually high
and volatile inflation rates of African economies.42 Structural breaks and outliers are frequent and
parameter values and signs are not always plausible. One possible reason is that, for the hybrid
models, the number of observations is small. Moreover, the IMF forecasts might not be a good
proxy variable for the actual inflation expectations of Africans. And if inflation expectations play
a significant role, they are missing in the backward-looking model. Another possible explanation
is the rather low degree of development of monetary policies and institutions in African countries
which might lead to erratic and counter-productive policy measures. Central banks are usually not
independent and are a mere department of the finance ministry. They usually do not aim at price
stability and macroeconomic stability but rather provide public revenue via the printing press.
Hence, there is hardly any systematic process generating inflation (data) that can be estimated or
separated from the noise.
41Some countries even exhibit inflation reactions that exacerbate shocks, e.g., inflation rises after a negative shock
to output. A possible explanation for these counter-productive reactions are pro-cyclical policy measures such as
lifting price caps, cutting or withdrawing price subsidies or downward adjustments of a fixed exchange rate which
raises prices of imported production inputs.
42For the purpose of validating the method deployed here, the hybrid and backward-looking Phillips Curves were also
estimated for the EMU, Germany, and the United States (Table A.23). The hybrid model seems to work pretty
well for the United States while for Germany and for the EMU the expectations seem to be purely forward looking.
Moreover, all three countries’ parameter estimates show the expected sign and exhibit plausible magnitudes.
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4.6.4. Interim conclusion
The results of the analyses of severe downturns and the Phillips Curve estimations suggest that,
given the little synchronicity of business cycles and high frequency of asymmetric shock in Africa,
adjustments of the pace of the growth of prices and wages are not a channel to cope with them.
This leaves only the movement of production factors as a way to absorb asymmetric shocks in
the proposed regional monetary unions as well as the ultimate continental monetary union. How-
ever, the seemingly little responsiveness of prices and wages to shocks is not carved in stone.
Improving the legal framework, institutions as well as the conduct of economic policy in the pro-
cess of regional integration might lead to a higher responsiveness to shocks in the future as the
responsiveness in the past measured in this study.
4.7. Labor mobility
Besides the reaction of prices and wages to shocks, the degree of mobility of production factors
plays a crucial role in monetary unions as they enable member states to cope with asymmetric
shocks, in particular long-lasting structural shocks, however, at often high social costs43. Since
financial capital is expected to be very mobile in a monetary union, it can swiftly react and help to
support shock adjustment. Real capital and, in particular labor, are usually much more immobile.
Therefore, they can only be part of an adjustment to long-lasting, usually structural, shocks.
Labor mobility in Africa is currently legally restricted. Only ECOWAS has already imple-
mented free movement of member state citizens (Table 2.1). However, legal restrictions need to
be enforced to be binding. The large number and huge length of land borders makes them fairly
permeable. Legal restrictions to labor mobility are therefore not very binding (World Bank (ed.),
2009, 152). To get a first indication on labor mobility, Table 4.2 shows RECs’ migrant stocks in
percent of population by region of origin. Migrant stocks are the results of past migration flows.
Hence, high stocks of migrants are most likely associated with high degrees of labor mobility and
vice versa.44 The statistics demonstrate that in all RECs migrants account only for a small part
43For individuals, moving to another country often means leaving their family, friends, and property behind. Moreover,
large-scale movement of labor leaves the emigration country deprived of its work force and often high qualified
specialists (brain drain). In the immigration country, it potentially leads to increasing scarcity of affordable housing
and increased competition with natives on the labor market. This potentially leads to social conflicts.
44Caveat: Migrant stocks possibly understate the degree of labor mobility because some migrants that immigrate as a
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UMA 1.3 0.1 1.2 5.2
EAC 1.6 0.6 1.0 37.3
ECCAS 1.7 0.8 0.9 48.1
IGAD 1.3 0.3 1.0 22.6
ECOWAS 2.0 1.7 0.3 86.1
SADC 1.5 0.8 0.7 55.5
COMESA 1.2 0.4 0.8 34.0
CEN-SAD 1.7 1.2 0.6 66.1
EMU(12) 11.5 1.9 9.6 16.6
Overall
from remaining 
REC
REC migrant 
quota
from remaining 
World
Table 4.2.: Weighted average of RECs’ member countries’ migrant stock as percent of total pop-
ulation
Note: Country averages weighted by population. The REC migrant quota is the percentage of migrants that immi-
grated from the remaining REC countries.
Source: United Nations: International migrant stocks by destination and origin (2013 revision). Own table and calcu-
lations.
of total population. In comparison to the EMU45 where 11.5 percent of population are migrants,
the African RECs’ migrant stocks rage between just 1.2 and 2.0 percent of total population. How-
ever, looking only at migrants from the remaining REC countries, which is the relevant number
for shock adjustment within the proposed monetary unions, the EMU and the African RECs are
not that far apart any more. ECOWAS, where about 86 percent of migrants originate from within
the REC fares best with 1.7 percent REC migrants compared to 1.9 percent in the EMU. All other
RECs, however, perform substantially worse, in particular UMA where merely 0.1 percent of the
population are REC migrants.
result of asymmetric shocks possibly repatriate or emigrate to other countries as a reaction to another asymmetric
shock.
45The EMU aggregate here encompasses only twelve of its current 19 member states: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. All countries, except
Greece which joined 2001, are founding members of the EMU. They all have a long history, for some dating back
to 1958, of free movement for workers between their national labor markets.
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Looking at migrant stock data points to the result that labor mobility is rather limited. How-
ever, flow data likely gives a better indication whether labor mobility contributed to adjustment
after asymmetric shocks or helps to equalize cyclical differences. Tables A.24 - A.27 display net
migration flows, calculated from the stock data provided by the United Nations, and the cyclical
differences between REC member states and the remaining REC, calculated as the sum of yearly
differences in output gaps in percent, for the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. On average, in
about half the cases (50 percent 1990-2000 and 55 percent 2000-2010) net migration flows con-
tributed to an equalization of cyclical differences. Therefore, a simple look at the data does not
give a clear indication whether or not African migration flows systematically contribute to bolster
cyclical differences as the number of cases where migration exacerbated cyclical differences is
nearly equally high.
|NetMigrit |= β0+β1|∆gapit |+β2(Pop j×Popk)it +β3|∆GDPit |+β4Distit
+β5|∆PolStabit |+β6ComLangit +β7ComBordit +β8Islandit +uit .
(4.11)
To determine whether migration reacts systematically to macroeconomic shocks, a panel regres-
sion approach is deployed (equation 4.11, all variables in logarithms) using migration flow data of
the 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 periods of 324 African country pairs that are in the same REC. The
regression model is an augmented gravity model based on Lewer and Van den Berg (2008) that
uses the product46 of the country of origin’s population Popk and the country of destination’s pop-
ulation Pop j as ”gravitational mass”47 and the linear distance between the geographical centers of
the two countries Distit in 1000 kilometers48 as an indicator of migration costs. |NetMigrit | de-
notes the absolute net migration49 from country j to country k in persons. The absolute difference
in the output gaps |∆gapit | of both countries tests whether or not different stages of j and k in their
business cycles affect the movements of people. The absolute difference in unemployment rates
of both countries is used as an alternative indicator as well.50 To control for other possible reasons
46That implies that both countries have the same coefficient or elasticity.
47The more people there are in a country of origin, the more people are likely to migrate, and the larger the population
in the destination country, the larger is the labor market for immigrants.
48Linear distance data gathered from http://www.luftlinie.org.
49The net migration is calculated as the change in stocks of residents in country j (destination country) that originate
from country k (country of origin) minus the change in stocks of residents in country k (destination country) that
originate from country j (country of origin). This approach only takes into account the movements of nationals of
these two countries. People of third country nationality that move between the two countries are not included. This
drawback is owed to the lack of that data. The only available source of data is the data on international migrant
stocks for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 from the United Nations population division that is used here (United
Nations (ed.), 2013).
50Since absolute values of the regressor and the regressand are used to be able to build a log-linear model, the coefficient
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for movements of people, a set of control variables are incorporated in the regression model, i.e.,
the absolute difference in the political stability and absence of violence index |∆PolStabit |, the
absolute income difference between j and k measured by GDP per capita in international Dollars
|∆GDPit |, and dummy variables for a common language ComLangit , common border ComBordit ,
and if either j or k or both are an island Islandit . The subscript i represents the country pair and t
the time period. The variable uit denotes the error term and β0 the constant term.
The regression results are displayed in Table 4.3. According to the SIC, the random effects
model51 with time specific effects is the superior model. The pooled model is rejected by the
Breusch-Pagan test. The regression results demonstrate that the gravity model works fairly well in
explaining bilateral net migration as the population mass is highly significant with a positive sign
while the distance between countries is highly significant as well with a negative sign. Neighboring
countries exhibit significantly higher migration flows as expected. The same applies to islands.
This seems implausible at first but considering that it is controlled for distance and that people
who need to move from or to islands need to use planes or ships, the positive coefficient tells us
that distance for these people is a lesser barrier than for people moving on the continent. Income
differences, difference in political stability, and a common (official) language do not contribute to
explain migration flows. The, for the purpose of this study, important coefficients show the right
(positive) sign either using the absolute difference in output gaps or in unemployment rates.52
However, only the difference in output gaps is significant and the estimated elasticity is stable
throughout different models. However, the coefficient is rather small as migration only increases
by merely about 0.15 percent when the difference in output gaps widens by 1 percent. Considering
that the average net migration of an African nation with its remaining REC for the entire ten year
period of 2000-2010 over all RECs is about 103000 people, an increase of the output gap difference
from one to two percent would, on average, only lead to an increase in net migration by 15500
people of a country with all its other REC partners. This is almost negligible compared to multi-
million populations of the RECs. Nonetheless, labor movements seem to react in a helpful way to
of the absolute difference in output gaps or unemployment rates only shows whether or not the net migration
increases in absolute terms but not in which direction people move. However, it seems highly unlikely that people
systematically move to the country with the weaker economy or higher unemployment.
51Fixed effect models are not estimated as distance and the dummy variables are time invariant.
52The random effects model with country-pair specific effects using the difference in the unemployment rate as variable
to measure the difference in business cycles exhibits surprising properties. In this model, the estimated coefficients
of all variables, which are very robust throughout the other model specifications, changed significantly and became
insignificant while the coefficient of determination (R2) improved considerably and the SIC deteriorated noticeably.
That is most likely the result of severe multicollinearity between the country-pair specific effects and the difference
in unemployment rate variable.
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long-term or structural asymmetric shocks. Making free movement of people a fundamental right
within the RECs, and later the AEC, might lead to a significantly higher contribution of migration
to the mitigation of asymmetric shocks.
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4.8. Multiple memberships
As explained in chapter 2, many African countries are members in more than one single REC. This
is a great obstacle to regional integration. Moreover, the countries with multiple memberships ulti-
mately need to decide which regional monetary union they want to join. While the membership in
several free trade areas is possible and even desirable, the membership in more than one monetary
union seems absurd. It would make sense for these countries to join the monetary union which
is most beneficial to them or, based on the results of the empirical analyses done in this chapter,
rather the least costly. This section therefore uses the empirical results obtained above to make a
proposal on how the problem of multiple memberships can be resolved.
The decision on which monetary union a country should join is based on only two criteria. The
first criterion is the amount of trade in percent of GDP (Table A.1) which is an indicator for the
benefits of the monetary union.53 The second criterion is the degree of business cycle synchroniza-
tion measured by the correlation of output gaps after 1994 (tables A.10 - A.13) as an indicator for
the costs incurred by a monetary union. As the responses of prices as well as migration flows to
asymmetric shocks play no significant role in any REC, they are not incorporated in the decision.
Moreover, the correlation coefficients are only included in the decision if they are significant on
at least a 10 percent level. In many cases, the correlation coefficients are not statistically different
from zero. The decision is then solely based on the trade criterion. If the correlation is signifi-
cant and both criteria collide and the differences are considerable, e.g., the trade criterion suggests
another monetary union as the synchronicity criterion, the decision is based on the regional inte-
gration progress made so far by the RECs (Table 2.1).
The comparison of both criteria is listed in tables A.28 - A.30. Based on this comparison, a
new partition of African countries into just five monetary unions seems advisable (Figure 4.12).
ECOWAS, which currently is a 100 percent subset of CEN-SAD, would entirely be merged
into CEN-SAD. The same applies to UMA, where currently only Algeria is not a member of
CEN-SAD, which it should join after the dissolution of UMA.54 The analysis also renders that
53The trade criterion naturally favors bigger units, in particular, if they have a significant overlap or if one (almost)
subsumes the other, as it is the case for ECOWAS and CEN-SAD as well as IGAD and COMESA. That disregards
the problem that bigger units might find it harder to negotiate supranational agreements.
54As the political conflict between Morocco and Algeria regarding the Western Sahara conflict is one of the major
obstacles to the progress of UMA, it might be advisable to leave Algeria out of CEN-SAD. Otherwise it might
be advisable to exclude Morocco from CEN-SAD as it has already quit its AU membership because of the AU
recognition of Western Sahara as an independent state which Morocco claims to be an integral part of its territory.
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South Africa
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Figure 4.12.: Reorganized Regional Economic Communities.
Note: Western Sahara is not a sovereign state and most of its territory is occupied by Morocco and de facto belongs
to CEN-SAD. Island countries (Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles) only dis-
played by their major islands.
Source: Own figure, map template by d-maps.com (ed.).
it would make sense to abolish IGAD. All its members are better off (or indifferent) pursuing
monetary union membership in one of the other RECs they are already members of. The abolish-
ing of IGAD also makes the negotiation of the envisaged tripartite free trade area encompassing
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COMESA, EAC, and SADC easier as it erases one group of interest. In addition, the results sug-
gest that the EAC should be continued without Kenya and Burundi which continue their affiliation
with COMESA. Moreover, there is another interesting result: ECCAS would lose Angola and the
Democratic Republic of Congo to SADC leaving member states of the Central African CFA franc
zone CAEMU, which makes ECCAS obsolete as well. This result matches quite well with the five
RECs originally foreseen by the Abuja treaty.
The analysis conducted above has some drawbacks, as it is based on the current multiple mem-
berships in the RECs. Every change of membership of an REC would actually necessitate a re-
calculation of the trade and synchronicity criteria which would result in an iterative process. This
might lead to a different distribution of the proposed REC memberships.55 Moreover, it was not
considered that it might be more beneficial to some countries to join another REC which they are
not members of.56 Apart from that, the analysis was solely based on criteria drawn from the the-
ory of optimum currency areas. Other considerations, such as political feasibility, are disregarded.
Nonetheless, it provides a decision aid for the high number of countries that are faced with the
decision which monetary union they should ultimately join if they are determined to do so.
55Hence, the criteria are only valid if only one member state changes its membership.
56When one would from scratch, it is possible to calculate a matrix with all possible combinations of member states
for a given number of RECs to determine the best possible distribution of memberships.
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5. Central Findings and Comparisons
In chapter 4, the following research questions were asked and successively answered.
1. How high are intra-African and intra-REC trade?
2. How diversified is African trade?
3. How synchronized are the business cycles of African countries or how common are asym-
metric shocks?
4. Is business cycle synchronicity endogenous?
5. How flexible are prices and wages?
6. Do migration flows mitigate asymmetric shocks?
7. Which regional monetary union is the most suitable one for countries with multiple REC
memberships?
This chapter summarizes the findings unearthed in the previous chapter and compares them with
the results of other studies, if there are any at all. It also highlights the particular contribution of
this study to the literature. As a general contribution, to the knowledge of the author, this study
is the only comprehensive empirical study that assess the African Unions monetary integration
plans on regional and continental level. Other studies are merely concentrating on certain regions
or partial aspects of the planned monetary unions and in many cases on the three already existing
monetary unions.
5.1. Intra-African and intra-REC trade is too low
Trade is one of the key variables determining the benefits and costs of monetary unions. The
more the (future) monetary union members trade with each other, the higher are the benefits in
terms of saved transaction costs and the elimination of the exchange rate risk. Moreover, the more
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they trade with each other, the more likely are their business cycles aligned and the less likely are
asymmetric shocks. Hence, the costs of monetary union membership – in terms of lost output –
decrease with rising trade.
The data presented in section 4.4 clearly demonstrate that, with the exception of Zimbabwe, ev-
ery single African country mostly trades with non-African countries. Intra-African and intra-REC
trade is comparatively low, even though there are considerable differences between the various
RECs. The fairly low trade integration of the RECs and Africa as a whole means that the benefits
from a common currency are rather limited while the costs are potentially high. Moreover, African
exports are not very diversified. On the contrary, African countries’ exports are usually special-
ized on very few raw materials and unprocessed agricultural products. This makes sector-specific
shocks that assume macroeconomic proportions more likely.
In economic literature there are a number of earlier studies bemoaning the low degree of intra-
African trade. For instance, the latest Economic Report on Africa, issued by the UNECA, finds
that intra-African trade (2011 data) accounts for merely 13 percent of Africa’s overall exports.
Other regions of the world fare much better. In particular, Europe fares better, where 70.6 percent
of the trade is intra-European trade, followed by Asia with 52.8 percent and North America with
48.3 percent. Only the primarily oil-exporting Middle East fares even worse than Africa with
8.8 percent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), 2015). Bayoumi and Os-
try (1997) investigate the intra-African, intra-CFA, and intra-ECOWAS trade flows between 1981
and 1993. Comparing their results with the calculations of trade shares by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2015, 152-154) demonstrates that internal trade shares
have only improved little since then as intra-African trade amounted to 11.7 percent in the 1970
to 1993 period compared to 13 percent in 2011. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) also recognize the
problem of a potentially large amount of informal trade flows across Africa’s highly permeable
borders that are not covered by the official data which Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) estimate to
about equally high as official trade. Hence, the potential benefits of a monetary union are gravely
underestimated by merely looking at official trade data. However, even taking Foroutan’s and
Pritchett’s estimates of informal trade into account, Bayoumi and Ostry still deem intra-African
trade insufficient for outweighing the costs of a monetary union. This conclusion is shared by the
overwhelming majority of studies for Africa as a whole (see for example Belhadj, Bangake and
Jedlane (2007) and Nnanna (2006)) and for particular RECs (see for example Benassy-Quere and
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Coupet (2005), Foroutan and Pritchett (2011), Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Loureiro, Martins
and Ribeiro (2011), Nnanna (2006), Masson (2008), Masson and Patillo (2001), Ogunkola (2005),
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008)).
Cham (2007) poses a rare exception in the existing literature. He finds that trade in relation to
economic output (openness) in ECOWAS and its sub-RECs WAMZ, and WAEMU is sufficient to
meet the criteria of the optimum currency area theory. He concludes that national monetary poli-
cies in Africa are probably ineffective as a stabilization tool because prices are to a considerable
degree determined on a regional and international level rather than domestically. His conclusion is
based on the comparison of the overall openness of ECOWAS’ member states with that of Euro-
pean countries. He finds that they do not differ much. However, he only measures overall openness
with all trading partners and does not differentiate between intra-REC trade and trade with third
countries. In the opinion of the author, this is a serious error. Moreover, a high degree of openness
does not necessarily mean that monetary policy is ineffective as stated by Cham (2007). On the
contrary, an alteration of the exchange rate is much more felt in an economy that imports and
exports much than in a rather closed economy independent of the fact that the market prices of
import and export goods are determined on an international market (see also De Grauwe (2012,
50-52)).
Longo and Sekkat (2006) empirically investigate the major obstacles which prevent higher intra-
African trade using an expanded gravity model. Beside the obvious reason that trade is impeded
by tariffs, they identify insufficient infrastructures, poor economic policies, and internal political
tensions as additional hurdles to increased internal trade.
5.2. African economies are vulnerable to sector-specific shocks
Beside the magnitude of trade, its composition is also of vital interest for the assessment of the
costs of a monetary union. For the costs to remain low it is advantageous that the exports of
the member states are diversified. The evaluation of the IMF’s data on export diversification in
section 4.4.2 indicates that the exports of African economies are highly concentrated. African
countries are usually specialized in exporting raw materials and unprocessed agricultural prod-
ucts, unfortunately not necessarily the same ones. That raises the likelihood that a country is
hit by a sector-specific shock while the other members of the proposed monetary unions are not,
89
5. Central Findings and Comparisons
leaving that country deprived of the possibility to conduct an anti-cyclical monetary policy and
to devaluate its currency. Taking Nigeria as an example, according to the Observatory of Eco-
nomic Complexity (ed.) data, its exports (2013 data) consist to 90 percent of crude petroleum
and petroleum gas, i.e., Nigeria is very vulnerable to changes in the oil price. The Observatory
of Economic Complexity (ed.) data also show that none of its fellow ECOWAS members is even
nearly as depended on oil and gas as Nigeria. Ghana’s, ECOWAS’ second largest economy, major
export goods are Gold (30 percent) and cocoa beans (27 percent), followed by crude petroleum
with only 19 percent. The situation in UMA is similar. While Algeria and Libya are major oil and
gas exporters, Mauritania’s exports consist to over 70 percent of iron ore, copper ore, and gold.
The problem of the generally low diversification of African countries’ exports is well docu-
mented in the literature (see for instance Nnanna (2006), Kaptouom (2007), and Songwe and
Winkler (2012)). The UNECA’s regularly published reports ”Assessing Regional Integration in
Africa” routinely call attention to the problem of Africa’s little diversified production and trade
(see for example United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2006) and United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2012a)). Nnanna (2006) also points out that the few
goods African countries are specialized in, are usually not complementary. Thus, there is hardly
any common component in a sector-specific shock that would make it less asymmetric for member
states. The reasons for the low diversification are manifold and, of course, there are comparative
advantages involved. However, comparative advantages are not the only explanation. According
to Page (2008), some countries fell victim to the resource curse and in particular the so called
”Dutch disease”1 while others were unable to emancipate themselves from the resource extracting
and monocultural farming their former colonial masters established. A joint study of the United
Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development identified further im-
pediments to diversification of African countries’ sectors and exports: intra-African as well as
international trade barriers, the lack of access of private companies to finance, weak productive
capacities (in particular the lack of a well-trained labor force), and administrative hurdles (United
Nations and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (ed.), 2010).
However, there are arguments for countries with poorly diversified exports to join a monetary
1The term ”Dutch disease” coined by the Economist in 1977 and describes the phenomenon that the large revenue
generated from large scale resource exports causes an increase of the real exchange rate. The high value of the
currency decreases the competitiveness of other domestic sectors which therefore shrink. This makes the country
even more dependent on exporting its resources (The Economist (ed.), 2014).
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union because it can act as a risk-sharing and insurance mechanism (Mundell (1973) and McKin-
non (2004)). Therefore, it would be advantageous for countries that are highly specialized on few
but different goods to join a monetary union if it involves a transfer system that bolsters sector-
specific asymmetric shocks. However, against the backdrop of the European sovereign-debt crisis,
which revealed the limited degree of supranational solidarity in Europe, such a risk-sharing and
transfer system in African RECs with much weaker institutions seems rather unlikely to work in
the foreseeable future. Moreover, such a risk-sharing and transfer mechanism could be imple-
mented independent of a monetary union.
5.3. Business cycles of African countries are not synchronized
Business cycle synchronicity or the absence of asymmetric shocks is one of the central criteria of
the theory of optimum currency areas. For prospective monetary union member states, giving up
their sovereign right of issuing their own national currency and pursuing an independent monetary
policy comes at high costs if their business cycles are not well aligned. Monetary policy can no
longer act as a stabilizer by conducting anti-cyclical policy measures and adjustments of the nomi-
nal exchange rate between the member states are also no longer possible. This study deployed two
approaches to investigate how synchronized business cycles are between African REC member
states and an aggregate of the remaining REC members. Firstly, a correlation analysis of GDP
growth and inflation rates was conducted. Secondly, the correlation of output gaps, calculated us-
ing the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, was examined. Both approaches point to the result that, in general,
the business cycles of the prospective monetary union member states are not sufficiently synchro-
nized, i.e., asymmetric shocks seem to be common. Even though some RECs perform better on
synchronicity than others, none of them reach correlation coefficients that indicate well aligned
economies. However, they seem to have become a little more synchronized since the advent of the
AEC in 1994.
Given its importance, there is a large body of literature on business cycle synchronicity in the
EMU but also in Africa. Unfortunately, not all RECs are covered and the variety of different
empirical approaches makes it difficult to compare their results. Hence, to the knowledge of
the author, this is the first study that calculated a uniform and therefore comparable metric for
business cycle synchronicity for all of Africa’s prospective regional monetary unions. Adams
(2005) differentiates between four empirical approaches that are common in the literature:
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• ”Shocking” studies;
• Correlation and cluster analyses;
• Generalized-purchasing power parity studies;
• Optimum currency area indexes;
The so called ”shocking” studies make use of various versions of Structural Vector Autore-
gression (SVAR) models, first introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989). They often encompass
a system of at least two equations modeling output growth, inflation, and other macroeconomic
variables of an economy (see for example Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)). These models are
estimated for every (prospective) member state and then used to identify structural parameters2 as
well as demand and supply shocks. The correlation of these shocks is then used as an indicator of
business cycle synchronicity. Moreover, this approach allows to asses how similar the countries
respond, in terms of magnitude and speed, after being hit by an external shock in impulse response
analyses3. The approach pursued in this study fits into the second category – the correlation and
cluster analyses. Compared to the first approach, it is a rather simple but robust4 technique. It
allows to asses the synchronicity of shocks as well as their magnitudes, measured as the size of
the output gap. Unfortunately, it is not able to capture and compare shock responses of countries.
However, given that joining a monetary union means a (monetary policy) regime change that very
likely changes the way economies adapt to shocks, the results of impulse response analyses based
on models estimated on pre-unification data are of limited inferential value. Therefore, in the opin-
ion of the author, the first approach does not justify the considerably higher effort. The second
approach also offers the possibility to extend correlation analyses to more than one criterion and
combine them in a cluster analysis to identify country groups with high similarities. For instance,
Artis and Zhang (2001) use six criteria for their cluster analysis of EMU member states: corre-
lation in business cycles, real exchange rate volatility, real interest rate correlation, openness to
trade, inflation differential, and labor market flexibility. Such a cluster analysis goes beyond the
scope of this study. The aim of this study is to empirically evaluate the actually planned regional
2The models are usually estimated as reduced form equation systems, i.e., all endogenous variables depend only on
exogenous variables and residuals. The structural parameters need to be retrieved, in case of over-identified equation
systems by applying theoretical restrictions (identification problem).
3In an impulse response analysis, the equation system is used to simulate how strong and fast it responds to a stan-
dardized, external shock (impulse) to its residuals.
4If controlled for structural breaks, the Hodrick-Prescott Filter delivers very good ex-post estimates of business cycles,
in particular if time series are extended using forecasts generated by simple autoregressive models to mitigate the
boundary value problem (see section 4.5.2).
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monetary unions in Africa, not hypothetical ones a cluster analysis would render. The third ap-
proach uses a cointegration analysis to determine whether (prospective) monetary union members’
real exchange rates share a common trend (called generalized purchasing-power parity), usually
with a dominating anchor country, and how strong that common trend is compared to other ex-
change rate movements. This method was developed by Enders and Hurn (1994). The idea is that
exchange rates react to economic shocks. Hence, if real exchange rates move mainly synchronous,
asymmetric shocks are seldom or prices react quickly and vice versa. However, for that approach
to deliver a reliable measure of business cycle synchronicity, nominal exchange rates need to be
fully flexible. In Africa, about a third of the countries are already members of one of Africa’s three
existing monetary unions, two of them (the CFA zones) with a fixed exchange rate to the Euro. A
number of the other African countries have some form of exchange rate restrictions, such as fixed
exchange rates, pegs, and currency boards (see International Monetary Fund (ed.) (2014a)) for
details). The fourth approach, the calculation of an optimum currency area index, was introduced
by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). The idea of that index is to measure the feasibility and desir-
ability of a monetary union by the degree of nominal exchange rate volatility of its future members.
The more volatile their exchange rates are, the more common are asymmetric shocks and the more
they need a flexible exchange rate to cope with the shocks and, hence, the more costly would a
monetary union be. Technically, they ran a regression analysis that explains the standard deviation
of a country’s nominal exchange rate against the Deutsche Mark by the standard deviation of GDP
growth rate differences (variable that measures business cycle synchronicity), the bilateral trade
volume in percent of both countries’ GDP (measures monetary union benefits), both countries’
average GDP (measures economic size), and the difference in the shares of agricultural, mineral,
and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade (another measure for the asymmetry of shocks
on the grounds that industry-specific shocks will be more symmetric when two countries have a
revealed comparative advantage in the same export sectors). Hence, the approach of Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1997) goes beyond merely measuring the similarity of business cycles as their
approach incorporates also the benefits of monetary union. They then use the regression model
to make in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts for the exchange rate volatility for different time
periods which are the values of the index. The index values are then used to assess how similar
the countries are in a given time period as well as to assess whether countries converge or diverge.
However, in the opinion of the author, their index only presents a correct measure if the regression
is estimated on data of a time period when exchange rates moved freely. That was neither the
case in Europe prior to the Euro’s introduction (the European Exchange Rate Mechanism limited
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exchange rate movements to fluctuate within agreed boundaries) nor is it the case in many African
countries as explained above.
There is a number of studies deploying some form of the four approaches explained above for
some African countries and regions to assess business cycle synchronicity. The most interesting
ones are the correlation analyses (see Table 5.1) that allow not only qualitative but also quan-
titative comparisons with the results of this study. The United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (ed.) (2012b) and Drummond et al. (2015) examine the degree of business cycle syn-
chronicity of EAC member states. Drummond et al. (2015) calculate the correlation coefficients
of GDP growth rates of EAC member states with each other as well as with an aggregate of the
remaining countries for the 1990-2013 period. The United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (ed.) (2012b) study calculates bilateral correlation coefficients of output gaps, obtained
using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, for the 1990-2009 period. Drummond et al. (2015) find low and
even negative correlation coefficients in similar magnitudes as found in this study (see Table A.6).
Moreover, they find that the correlation improved somewhat over time by comparing the correla-
tions of pre- and post-1999 sub-samples, a result that was also found in this study for the pre-1994
and post-1994 period. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2012b) study,
however, finds considerably higher and only positive correlation coefficients than in this study. For
the 1990 to 2009 period, the average of their bilateral correlation coefficients is 0.59 and even 0.72
for the 2001 to 2009 sub-period, i.e., they suggest a high degree of business cycle synchronicity. In
comparison, this study yielded average correlation coefficients of EAC member states of -0.04 for
the pre-1994 and 0.35 for the post-1994 period (see Table A.10). This difference is possibly due
to the different observation periods and the fact that the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (ed.) (2012b) study calculated bilateral correlation coefficients while this study calcu-
lated the correlation between a country’s output gap and that of an aggregate of the other EAC
member states. In the opinion of the author, the latter is the more relevant measure as it better
quantifies how often a common monetary policy is challenged to weigh the macroeconomic needs
of a member country being hit by an asymmetric shock against that of the remaining member
states. Nonetheless, the great and qualitatively important difference between the results still sur-
prises. Harris et al. (2007) calculate the bilateral correlation coefficients of the deviations of real
GDP per capital from its long-run trend of CMA member states (1980-2003 data) as a measure
of business cycle synchronicity. They find mostly negative correlation coefficients between -0.46
and 0.09. Hence, their results indicate that shocks to the CMA member countries are for the most
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part asymmetric. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) investigate the correlation of GDP growth within the
CFA zones, ECOWAS, and SADC using data from the University of Pennsylvania World Tables
(Version 5.5) spanning from 1963 to 1989. Their GDP growth correlations are very low on aver-
age and close to those found in this study for the pre-1994 period (see Table A.6 and Table A.14).
Cham (2007) assesses the co-movement of GDP in the planned monetary union WAMZ and the
existing monetary union WAEMU. He finds correlation coefficients that are, on average, positive
but close to zero, i.e., 0.05 and 0.06, respectively. Thus, his results indicate that business cycles
are not aligned in both areas which is in accordance with the results of this study.
Beside these studies on regional level, there are two studies that investigate continental business
cycle synchronicity: Karras (2006) for 37 African countries and Tapsoba (2010) for 53 African
countries. Karras (2006) calculates the correlation coefficients of every country with an Africa
aggregate for GDP growth rates and two output gap measures, one calculated using the Baxter-
King Filter and one using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, using data for the 1960 to 2000 time period.
Regardless of the measurement technique, the calculated correlation coefficients are low with an
average of about 0.15. This confirms the findings of this study. Tapsoba (2010) arrives at a some-
what smaller correlation coefficient for all 53 African countries for the 1965 to 2004 period of
about 0.04. He compares this number with the average correlation coefficient of CFA monetary
union member states which is barely higher with a value of 0.07. Also, both correlation coef-
ficients are not statistically significantly different from zero. He also computed the correlation
coefficients for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (0.4) and
EMU member states (0.56) which are disproportionately higher, reflecting their high degree of
economic integration. The results of Tapsoba (2010) for the EMU are confirmed by (Frenkel and
Nickel, 2005) who deployed an approach similar to this study for eleven EMU countries5 using
quarterly GDP and inflation (GDP deflator) data from 1993-2001. They calculated the correla-
tion coefficients for each member state with the EMU aggregate.6 Their results indicate a high
synchronization of the EMU member countries in the run-up and introduction phase of the Euro.
Except for Portugal and Greece, which have correlation coefficients statistically not different from
zero, all other member states exhibit a statistically significant correlation coefficient of their GDP
growth rates with that of the EMU aggregate over or close to 0.6. Hence, from the perspective
5Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
6The method of Frenkel and Nickel (2005) has the drawback of neglecting that the EMU aggregate already contains
the member state itself. That leads to an upward distortion of the correlation coefficient, in particular for large
countries.
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of the similarity of shocks, the EMU countries were far better prepared for monetary union at the
time of its introduction than African economies are currently.
The results (see Table 5.1) of studies using some of the other approaches, which are introduced
above, overwhelmingly support the central finding of this and other studies that use correlation
analysis, i.e., that business cycles in Africa and its regions are not synchronous. ”Shocking” stud-
ies are done for the EAC by Buigut and Valev (2005) and Kishor and Ssozi (2009), for ECOWAS
by Chuku (2012) and Houssa (2008), for WAMZ by Harvey and Chushing (2015), for SADC by
Buigut and Valev (2006), and Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), for the CFA zones by Fielding and
Shields (2000), and Zhao and Kim (2009), and for UMA by Abdallah and Bouchaddakh (2009).
Cointegration and generalized-purchasing power parity studies are done by Buigut (2011), the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2012b), and Mkenda (2001) for the EAC.
While Buigut (2011) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2012b) find no
cointegration in the EAC countries’ real exchange rate and, hence, no evidence for business cycle
synchronicity, Mkenda (2001) finds cointegration for the 1981 to 1998 period. Adams (2005) cal-
culated an optimum currency area index for Africa using data from 1981 to 2003. He finds that, in
comparison to the results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) done for the EMU countries prior
to the Euro’s introduction, Africa performs poorly. However, Africa’s performance improved over
time.
All in all, this study contributed to the, so far rather patchwork, literature by conducting the first
correlation analyses of GDP growth, inflation, and output gaps for all African RECs. That allows
assessing the AU’s regional integration strategy as a whole and makes comparisons between the
regions and their progress possible. The results of this study’s analyses are overwhelmingly in
line with the results of prior research which generally concludes that synchronization of business
cycles is insufficient. That result can be regarded as robust since it is shared by very different
empirical approaches.
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5.4. African inflation rates seldom adapt timely after shocks
If prices were fully flexible, asymmetric shocks would not pose a problem to monetary unions.
They would adapt instantaneously to re-equilibrate member state’s real exchange rates and economies
as a whole. However, in reality there are a number of reasons why prices are not fully flexible (see
section 4.6.1). Hence, the more inflexible prices are, the more costly is a monetary union for its
member states.
Owing to its importance for the costs of monetary unions, there is a vast body of literature on
price setting behavior and inflation persistence7 in the Euro Area and its member states. Many
studies use high-frequency (usually monthly) dis-aggregated data, such as sub-indexes of price in-
dexes, sectoral, and even company level data, to measure how frequent and to which extent prices
change (see for example Angeloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli (2006), Dhyne et al. (2009), Fabi-
ani et al. (2005), and Le Bihan and Matheron (2011)). Other studies use quarterly producer and
consumer price index data to determine the degree of inflation persistence (see for example An-
geloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli (2006), Dhyne et al. (2009), and Marques (2004)). Altissimo,
Ehrmann and Smets (2006) give a detailed overview and summary of the research done on price
flexibility and inflation persistence in the Euro Area by the Inflation Persistence Network, a re-
search group of the Euro Area’s central banks. Their empirical evidence suggests that the degree
of inflation persistence in the EMU is moderate but that prices in the Euro Area are stickier than
in the United States. In addition, there is significant heterogeneity regarding the degree of price
flexibility between sectors.
A major problem for determining the degree of price rigidity in African Economies is the lack
of high-frequency microeconomic data with a sufficiently long data history, which would allow
the measurement of the frequency and magnitude of price changes, with the notable exception
of South Africa. Only a few other African countries commenced on publishing monthly dis-
aggregated sub-indexes of their consumer price indexes in recent years. To the knowledge of the
author, sectoral or even individual company level data is completely unavailable. Thus, that leaves
7Inflation persistence is the dynamic pendant to the static concept of price rigidity. In growing economies with con-
tinuously rising price levels it is sufficient that the rate of change of prices, i.e., inflation, adapts to macroeconomic
shocks to, over time, re-equilibrate member state’s real exchange rates and economies as a whole. Imagine a mon-
etary union consisting of two member states at full utilization of their capacities (output gaps equal zero), their
inflation rate is on target, and their real exchange rate is at its equilibrium level. If an asymmetric shock occurs,
where one country gets hit by a negative shock leading to a negative output gap while the other country remains
unaffected. If the affected country’s inflation rate decreases while the other country’s inflation remains on target,
the real exchange rate would return to its equilibrium value over time.
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only low frequency (annual) macroeconomic price index data for analyses. This study uses these
data and deploys two approaches to measure the price or rather inflation reactions in African coun-
tries. In the first approach, the inflation reaction to the severest downturn of a country’s economy,
defined as the most severe drop of the output gap, are analyzed. In the second approach, two types
of Phillips Curves, one with hybrid and one with backward-looking inflation expectations, were
estimated for every African country. Both approaches also address a shortcoming of many studies
done for Europe and other regions. They often merely measure the frequency and magnitude of
price changes or the degree of inflation persistence and, hence, measure only the necessary condi-
tion that prices and inflation adjust timely after asymmetric shocks. However, they often stop short
of investigating whether prices or inflation actually react to shocks or did so in the past. While
the estimation of various versions of the Phillips curve is very common in the literature, the first
approach, to the knowledge of the author, is, despite its simplicity, novel. Moreover, normalizing
the reaction coefficients by dividing them by the average inflation rate to make them comparable
was not found in the literature. The empirical results of both approaches suggest that inflation
in African countries seldom reacts timely and in a helpful direction to macroeconomic shocks,
measured as changes in the output gap. Given the low degree of business cycles synchronization,
monetary unions in Africa would be very costly. However, it needs to be noted that the perfor-
mance of the estimated Phillips Curves in explaining African inflation rates is rather poor. In a
number of cases, they produced implausible coefficient estimates (unexpected signs) and almost
always required the modeling of structural breaks and outliers. In contrast, the Phillips Curves
estimated for comparative purposes for the EMU, Germany, and the United States perform com-
paratively well. They usually exhibit the expected positive reaction of inflation to changes in the
output gap, which is in line with the findings in the literature. Taking, for example, the estimated
equation for the EMU Smets (2003) estimated a coefficient of 0.18 in a hybrid Phillips Curve
model using annual data from 1977-1997 compared to 0.12 estimated in this study using annual
data ranging from 1996 to 2014.
There is a number of studies that made use of the aggregated, low frequency data for African
countries as well. Du Plessis and Burger (2006) estimate several New Keynesian Phillips Curves
for South Africa using Non-linear Generalized Methods of Moments8 and assuming forward-
looking rational expectations. They find significantly positive coefficients for the output gap9 in
8As instrumental variables they use five lags of inflation, and two lags each of the log employment share, unit labor
costs, de-trended output, and the long-short bond yield spread.
9Du Plessis and Burger (2006) use the deviation of the labor income share from its long-run average as a measure of
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their Hybrid Phillips Curve estimates, however, considerably smaller than in this study. This might
be the result of different samples as they use data ranging from 1975 to 2003 compared to data
from 2002 to 2012 in this study. Moreover, they find evidence that some of their estimated models
suffer from weak-instrument problems, i.e., the parameters are biased. They also find that their
estimated models are not robust across different sub-samples which is in line with the structural
breaks (break in constant in 2003), outliers (1980, 1981, 2003, and 2009), and negative deter-
ministic trend found in this study. Nell (2006) also finds instabilities in his South African Philips
Curve estimates as well as a deterministic dis-inflationary trend between 1986 and 2001. He also
finds that the relationship between inflation and the output gap is positive but not linear. It is
rather piece-wise linear with a usually steeper slope for positive (upswing/boom) than for nega-
tive (downturn/recession) output gaps or changes in the output gap. In any case, his coefficient
estimates for the output gap are smaller than in this study’s hybrid model, which is possibly the
result of different samples as Nell’s sample ends in 2001. Maana, Maturo and Kisinguh (2006)
estimate a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve for Kenya with different specifications. They
assume rational forward looking expectations and they use the Generalized Methods of Moments
to estimate their models based on monthly data ranging from 1997 to 2005. In all their specifi-
cations they estimated significantly positive coefficients for the output gap between 0.2 and 0.4,
i.e., Kenyan inflation reacts fairly strongly and timely to changes in capacity utilization. The hy-
brid Phillips Curve estimated in this study, however, could not find a significant effect. Here, as
well, might the different sample periods play a role. They overlap only for the 2002 to 2005 pe-
riod. Moreover, Maana, Maturo and Kisinguh (2006) use consumer price data instead of the, in
the opinion of the author, more relevant domestic producer price data such as the GDP or total
sales deflator. Consumer price data are likely to be distorted by exchange-rate movements as they
contain prices of imported goods. Barnichon and Peiris (2008) estimate a hybrid Phillips Curve
for a panel consisting of 19 sub-Saharan African countries10 and annual data ranging from 1960
to 2003. They use consumer price data and control for country heterogeneity by including the
difference in rainfall, in capital stock, and a war index. Country-specific intercepts ensure that dif-
ferent average inflation levels are accounted for. They find that the output gap plays an important
role in sub-Saharan inflation dynamics with significantly positive coefficients in six out of eight
specifications ranging between 0.23 and 0.33. However, they did not include the output gap as a
contemporary variable which is the more relevant variable for timely adjustments after a shock but
the output gap.
10Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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only as a one year lagged variable, i.e., they tested only for inflation responses to changes in ca-
pacity utilization one year after the changes occurred. This study’s approach left the lag structure
of zero up to three lags open to be selected based on statistical significance. Some of the countries
included in the panel of Barnichon and Peiris (2008) exhibit similar coefficients for the first lag,
i.e., Kenya (0.25), Mali (0.37), Niger (0.21), and Sierra Leone (0.36). On average, however, the
coefficients of the 19 countries of the panel of Barnichon and Peiris (2008) estimated in this study
are close to zero.
All in all, the results of this study regarding the responsiveness of inflation to changes in ca-
pacity utilization (real shocks) are partly in line with the literature. Some studies measure higher
responsiveness for some countries or regions while others measure less. Possible explanations for
the differences are different sample periods and different measures of inflation (consumer vs. do-
mestic producer prices). Also, in the literature, there are often assumed rational forward-looking
expectations while this study uses actual forecasts as a proxy for actual inflation expectations. In
addition, this study deploys simple Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the Phillips Curves while
the most other studies deploy the Generalized Methods of Moments. Both methods are prone
to biased estimates as the output gap is likely an endogenous variable. Moreover, most of the
literature confirms the result of this study that estimated Phillips Curves for Africa are unstable
and suffer from structural breaks. Hence, empirical evidence on inflation responsiveness in Africa
is mixed and of rather limited reliability. Regardless of that, it should be noted that all studies
naturally measure inflation responsiveness in the past and it does not need to stay that way once
African monetary unions are formed. Arpaia et al. (2015) find that real wages in EMU countries
became more responsive to asymmetric shocks after the Euro’s introduction. Altissimo, Ehrmann
and Smets (2006) emphasize that price rigidity and the way companies set prices possibly de-
pend on the monetary regime. They find evidence that after the introduction of the Euro price
rigidity in the Euro Area countries decreased. This result is in accordance with the results of Mat-
saseng (2008). He finds that the price flexibility within the CMA is high while it is low in the
other SADC countries with independent monetary policies. Moreover, Rangasamy (2009), using
univariate autoregressive regression models to explain South Africa’s inflation rates11, finds that
South Africa’s inflation persistence declined considerably after an inflation targeting strategy was
adopted by South Africa’s central bank.12 Angeloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli (2006), however,
11The sum of the autoregressive coefficients serves as a measure of inflation persistence. The closer it is to one, the
more persistent is inflation as it, to a large part, depends only on its history or lagged values.
12In the Phillips Curve estimate of this study there was found, and modeled, a significant break in South Africa’s
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find no evidence that the price setting behavior and inflation dynamics in six EMU member states
have changed significantly after the Euro’s introduction.
5.5. Migration flows react to shocks but are too small to fully
compensate asymmetric shocks
As argued above, African business cycles are not well aligned and their economies often suffer
from asymmetric shocks. Moreover, prices and wages usually do not react timely to cushion these
asymmetric shocks. There is another mechanism to offset asymmetric shocks, namely labor mobil-
ity. Ideally, idle workers move freely and quickly from one country suffering from unemployment
to another where labor is scarce.
To the knowledge of the author, this study is the first that investigates whether migration flows
in Africa systematically react to cyclical differences while controlling for other migration fac-
tors such as population mass, distance, income differences, and differences in political stability.
The statistical model was estimated using a newly created panel data set that includes almost all
African countries’ migration flows to their fellow REC partner countries. The estimation results
show that migration flows indeed increase when cyclical differences widen. Hence, migration does
contribute to adjust after asymmetric shocks. But the contribution is negligible. Moreover, owing
to the low frequency of migration data, the effect was estimated based on net migration flows in
a ten year time period. Therefore, one cannot determine whether or not migration flows react
swiftly to shocks. The reasons for the low amount of migration in Africa are manifold. Beside
language barriers, xenophobia, and ethnic reservations13, one of the major reasons for the limited
migration in Africa stated in the literature are legal restrictions to labor mobility (see for example
Adepoju (2001), Cham (2007), Nnanna (2006), and the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (ed.) (2012a)). The RECs are, however, in the process of establishing full labor mobil-
ity rights (see Table 2.1). So far, only ECOWAS and its sub-REC WAEMU were able to achieve
that. If the freedom of movement, residence, and establishment is fully implemented in all RECs,
that would certainly give a boost to internal labor migration flows. Thus, looking at the past and
current migration numbers likely understates the migration that will occur once the integration
average inflation in 2003. However, there is no significant break in the autoregressive parameter which would
support the findings of Rangasamy (2009) of declined inflation persistence.
13One of the most striking examples of xenophobia in Africa and the lack of a common African or at least regional
identity is the violence in South Africa against migrants from its northern neighbors (Valji, 2003). The same is true
for the recent rekindling of the longstanding conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in East Africa.
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on labor markets is concluded. Adepoju (2001) points out that there are considerable numbers of
undocumented migrants that are probably not fully included in the official statistics used in this
study which further understates the contribution of migration to shock adjustments.
As there are no studies on African migration in response to economic shocks there are some
for other geographical regions. Monras (2015) finds anti-cyclical internal migration flows within
the United States and Arpaia et al. (2015) find that migration flows within the European Union
react significantly to differences in the unemployment rate with coefficient estimates similar to
those of this study (see Table 4.3). Moreover, Arpaia et al. (2015) find that migration in the Eu-
ropean Union absorbs about a quarter of an asymmetric shock within a year and half of the shock
within five years. Jauer et al. (2014) also calculate a shock absorption rate of up to 25 percent
within a year studying asymmetric labor market shocks in the Euro Area. However, they find that
the major share of that migration comes from non-Euro Area countries, i.e., the EMU’s internal
labor mobility is rather limited. Dao, Furceri and Loungani (2014) and Beyer and Smets (2015)
find even higher absorption rates for the United States, 54 and 43 percent, respectively. In ad-
dition, Arpaia et al. (2015) find that labor mobility in European countries significantly increased
after joining the European Union’s common market and that migration movements in response to
shocks have doubled since the introduction of the Euro. This gives hope for a similar effect in
Africa’s RECs. However, they do not explain whether the European monetary unification made
more movements necessary, because of the lack of national monetary policies to cope with asym-
metric shocks or because labor mobility increased as an endogenous effect.
5.6. African monetary unions are not sufficiently endogenous to
make monetary union worthwhile anytime soon
Throughout this study it was emphasized that the current degree to which African countries and
regions fulfill the criteria of optimum currency areas cannot be seen as fixed and possibly im-
proves endogenously through monetary union membership itself. Hence, countries that do not
fulfill the criteria ex ante might do so ex post. One of the channels that might foster business-cycle
synchronicity is increased trade (trade channel). As transaction costs decline by using a common
currency, trade is likely to increase14. This, in turn, increases the interdependence of the mone-
14Rose and Stanley (2005) run meta-regression analyses of 34 studies on the effect of monetary union membership
on trade. Their results show that, on average, bilateral trade increases by 30 up to 90 percent trough a common
currency. Fielding and Shields (2005) find effects of similar magnitude in a study using data from 1981 to 2000 for
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tary union members’ economies. Another channel might be that national monetary policies are no
longer a source of asymmetric shocks themselves. Monetary union might also lead to increased
policy coordination between the member states, in particular, as it limits the scope for national
fiscal policies that might be sources of asymmetric shocks as well (policy channel).
This study applied a panel regression approach that investigates both channels. It made use of
the long time ”natural experiments” of the three existing African monetary unions, whose member
states act as the treatment group, while the monetarily independent African countries assume the
role of the control group. Technically, bilateral correlation coefficients of REC member states’
output gaps were regressed on a set of variables, including bilateral trade in percent of GDP to test
for the trade channel and two other variables that test for an additional monetary union effect on
synchronicity of business cycles15. The regression results (Table 4.1) indicate that both channels
have significantly positive effects on business cycle synchronicity. While the effect brought about
by the trade channel is strong, the effect of the policy channel is very small. On average, an in-
crease in the countries’ correlation coefficient of 0.1 takes about 150 years of common monetary
union membership.
Frankel and Rose (1998) were among the first to empirically investigate the trade effect using
data for 20 industrialized countries for a 20 year period. They regress bilateral correlation coeffi-
cients of a number of variables of economic activity, e.g., real GDP, employment, unemployment,
industrial production, and output gaps on bilateral trade in percent of GDP (openness) or percent
of total trade as well as a set of control variables. Their estimated coefficients for openness range
from 0.03 to 0.077 which coincide quite well with the estimated coefficients of this study which
range from 0.06 to 0.078.16 They also tested for an additional effect of countries whose exchange
rates are fixed by using a dummy variable. Their estimates demonstrate that the effect is usually
not significant and unstable across the different measures of economic activity. That result is also
in coherence with the results of this study that found no significant effect of monetary union mem-
bership on business cycle synchronicity when using a dummy variable. By contrast, Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1997), investigating the process of European integration, find a symbiotic relation-
19 African countries, including the CFA countries as treatment group. However, the effect declined over time.
15One variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value of one if both countries belong to the same monetary union.
The other variable is the number of years both countries are in the same monetary union.
16The results also provide evidence against the view that increased trade might lead to more specialization and regional
concentration that leads to less synchronized business cycles owing to more pronounced effects of sector-specific
shocks (see for example Krugman (1993). At least, that effect seems to be dominated by the effects of increased
trade integration that lead to more synchronicity.
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ship between economic and monetary integration.
To the knowledge of the author, this study is the first one that investigated both the trade and the
policy channel for African REC member states’ business cycle synchronicity within RECs using
an entirely new data set. Moreover, it is the only study that investigated the policy channel using
not only a dummy variable but also the number of years in monetary union as a test variable.
However, there is a number of prior studies on some African regions that investigated the trade
effect deploying the technique developed by Frankel and Rose (1998). Belhadj, Bangake and
Jedlane (2007) find no evidence for a positive effect of trade on business cycle synchronicity in
UMA using data for the 1980 to 2003 time period. Eggoh and Belhadj (2015), however, find a
positive trade effect for UMA with coefficient estimates ranging from 0.04 to 0.09 which is in
line with the results of Frankel and Rose (1998) and the results of this study. Tapsoba (2010)
uses a very rich data set encompassing 53 African countries with data from 1965 - 2004. He,
deploying the approach of Frankel and Rose (1998), finds a significantly positive trade effect but
no additional effect of monetary union beyond the trade effect using a dummy. Buigut and Valev
(2005) confirm the results of the studies that use the Frankel and Rose (1998) approach. They find,
using a SVAR approach for the EAC member states, that countries with higher trade integration
generally exhibit a higher similarity of the shocks. Carmignani (2009) compares the degree of
business cycle synchronization between CAEMU countries over four overlapping time periods
(1960-1980, 1970-1990, 1980-2000, 1987-2007). He interprets the result that synchronicity has
only marginally increased over time as an indication that there are little endogenous effects in that
monetary union. That result is in line with the result of this study that business cycle synchronicity
beyond the trade effect develops only very slowly over time. Masson (2008) points out that, even
if the trade effect is as high as that of Frankel and Rose (1998), owing to the low level of intra-
African and intra-REC trade, the effect is still insufficient to justify monetary union in retrospect.
Tapsoba (2010) makes the point that official trade data used for the estimations likely understates
the trade effect, but even when taking (estimates of) that into account, it is still insufficient for
African monetary union to be self-validating.
5.7. Regional integration blocks need to be reorganized
The problem of overlapping memberships is often stated in the literature as one of the major rea-
sons for the slow progress of regional integration and regularly missed timetables (see for example
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the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.) (2006), the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ed.) (2012a), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(ed.) (2013)). Doubling of efforts, conflicting regulations, and different rules of origin hamper
in particular the establishment and functioning of free trade areas and customs unions. More-
over, countries with multiple REC membership ultimately need to decide which regional monetary
union they want to join. In order to address this problem, COMESA, EAC, and SADC launched
an initiative with the goal to form a free trade area that encompasses all of their member states.
Even thought the problem is often stated there are only but a few attempts in the literature to
systematically address it. For instance, the UNECA dedicates an entire issue of its regularly pub-
lished reports ”Assessing Regional Integration in Africa” to the problem of multiple memberships
in which criteria for a rational reorganization are derived. Yet it stops short of delivering a con-
crete proposal how REC should be reorganized. Instead, it merely outlays five different scenarios
of reorganized RECs based on different criteria without deciding which is the most sensible and
explicitly leaving it to politics to decide (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ed.),
2006).
Buigut (2006) uses different cluster analysis techniques not only to resolve the overlapping
memberships of COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states but even allowing for a complete
regrouping.17 In his cluster analysis he uses a set of variables that indicate real and nominal con-
vergence, including correlations of supply and demand shocks with major trading partners (the
European Union and South Africa), trade volumes, public finances, and the inflation rate. He con-
siders three scenarios, one without an anchor currency, one with the South African Rand as anchor
currency, and one with the Euro as anchor currency. The scenario without an anchor currency
seems the most appropriate one as there are no plans to use an anchor currency in the future mon-
etary unions. Also, this scenario can be compared to the results of this study. Buigut’s analysis
yields that the entire region is not suitable as a single monetary union. Instead, he finds that the
optimum number of currency unions is four, i.e., it should be added one. In particular, the EAC
countries Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania should form a monetary union joined by the cur-
rent SADC-only member Lesotho. Moreover, Burundi, Malawi, and Zambia should build an own
17The possibility that another REC as the one(s) a country is already part of might be more suitable is not explored in
this study. This study’s purpose is to evaluate the actual monetary integration plans of the AU. Moreover, a complete
reorganization of RECs is considered to be hardly politically feasible and would slow down the process of integra-
tion even further. Therefore, it seems more rational merely assigning the countries with multiple memberships to
the most suitable REC, i.e., the least costly one, they are already part of.
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currency block as well as Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan; except for
Mozambique currently all COMESA members. The last suggested currency block encompasses
Botswana, Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, and Swaziland; except for
Egypt currently all SADC members. The results are partially in line with the results of this study.
In particular, the group around South Africa (except for Egypt) is also suggested in this study.
Also, both studies conclude that the EAC should be kept even though in a slightly different com-
position. The differences in the results are mainly rooted in the fact that Buigut (2006) allows the
possibility of entirely new compositions of currency unions while this study is limited to solving
the problem of overlapping memberships.
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) perform similar cluster analyses using similar variables as
Buigut (2006) in an attempt to find optimal monetary union arrangements in ECOWAS, its ex-
isting and planned monetary sub-unions WAEMU and WAMZ as well as CAEMU. They also do
not limit their cluster algorithms to merely sorting out multiple memberships. Moreover, they do
not take the membership of all ECOWAS members in CEN-SAD into account. They find con-
siderable dissimilarities in the economic characteristics of the examined countries. In particular,
ECOWAS’s largest member states Nigeria and Ghana appear to be economic singletons and are
therefore better of as monetarily independent nations. Hence, the results cast serious doubt on the
sensibility of the planned establishment of WAMZ, letting alone its ultimate merger with WAEMU
to create an ECOWAS wide monetary union. On the contrary, by taking the CAEMU countries
into analysis as well, they find that the prospected WAMZ member states even better match with
the CAEMU countries.
The approaches of Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) as well as Buigut (2006) went beyond the
question of resolving overlapping memberships as they searched for optimal clustering of coun-
tries in some parts of Africa regardless of the current REC membership situation. Moreover, even
though both studies used seven variables to find appropriate clusters, they failed to include one of
the key conditions of the theory of optimum currency areas: the synchronicity of member states’
business cycles. Instead, they used the synchronicity of countries’ business cycles with a common
trading partner (South Africa and the European Union) as an indicator, even thought the theory of
optimum currency areas demands synchronicity within the union, not with a third country. This
study is the only one, to the knowledge of the author, that proposes a concrete solution to the multi-
ple membership problems of all RECs based on empirically operationalized concepts of the theory
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of optimum currency areas. This study’s proposal includes the abolition of ECOWAS, IGAD, and
UMA reducing the number of regional monetary unions to five. Moreover, ECCAS would shrink
to a size that it encompasses only CAEMU countries which also solves the problem of a sub-REC.
The detailed reorganization proposal is depicted in Figure 4.12.
Foroutan and Pritchett (2011) and Masson and Patillo (2004) propose another way to implement
regional monetary unions that avoids the problem of multiple REC memberships. They propose to
use the existing monetary unions, i.e., the two CFA zones (CAEMU and WAEMU) and the CMA
as a starting point, and successively expand them based on compliance with convergence criteria
(Masson and Patillo, 2004) and mutual advantageousness (Foroutan and Pritchett, 2011). Ulti-
mately, that process would lead to a continental monetary union as well. However, their proposals
pose the question of France’s future role. France currently acts as anchor of stability in the two
CFA zones as it guarantees their fixed exchange rate and convertibility to the Euro. It is hardly
conceivable that France is willing to extend that guarantee to a growing number of member states
and that these new members would even accept France’s involvement in their monetary affairs.
5.8. Other factors not contemplated in this study
This study is purely limited to economic considerations provided by the theory of optimum cur-
rency areas. Whether or not African monetary union(s) are beneficial to the potential member
states might also depend on a number of other economic and non-economic factors that need to be
considered. This section gives a short overview of such factors discussed in the literature.
One idea is that the process of monetary integration and deliberate macroeconomic convergence
might add incentives and momentum to deeper economic and political integration, harmonization,
and economic reform which bears fruit beyond the advantages directly linked to monetary union.
That is not a novel idea as it was already part of the discussion prior to monetary unification in Eu-
rope (see for example the European Commission (ed.) (1990)). Guillaume and Stasavage (2000)
see monetary unification as a way to overcome the lack of credibility from which many national
central banks in Africa suffer because they are not politically independent. A supranational central
bank would naturally be more independent of single national governments. If African monetary
unions were successful in creating supranational central banks, that credibly commit to price sta-
bility, this would help bringing inflation rates and inflation volatility down and increase financial
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stability.18 Masson and Patillo (2003) discuss the possibility that a monetary union lead to more
sound fiscal policies during the process of macroeconomic convergence to fulfill convergence cri-
teria. Also, after the creation of a monetary union, as already discussed in section 3.2.3, monetary
union membership limits the scope for budget deficits and public debt as it is denominated in a
currency of which the government has no immediate control of. However, the prospect of a bail-
out by other monetary union members in case of over-indebtedness might even lead to more fiscal
profligacy. Page (2003) discusses whether monetary union might not only help to bring monetary
and fiscal policy in order but African countries’ weak institutions and poor policy performance in
general, e.g., civil conflicts, corruption, kleptocracy, absence of rule of law, poor infrastructure,
and low investment. The channels through which monetary union might translate into generally
better policy performance are supranational institutions that monitor and, if necessary, correct na-
tional policies.
The results of a comparative study between member states of the two CFA monetary unions and
other African countries by Devarajan and de Melo (1987) seem to support the view. CFA mem-
ber states in general outperformed their monetarily independent African peers in terms of fiscal
soundness, price stability, and economic growth between 1960 and 1982. However, the CFA mon-
etary unions have another and likely decisive feature that explains their relative success, their fixed
exchange rate to the French franc, and, since 1999, to the Euro which is guaranteed by France.19
That guarantee is an anchor of stability. Moreover, France has a say in the CFA’s monetary pol-
icy decisions. Dissolving the CFA zones in favor of an ECOWAS and ECCAS monetary union
would certainly mean the loss of that stability anchor. France will hardly be willing to guarantee
the exchange rates of the new and considerably enlarged currencies unions, in particular, as they
include, by African standards, the economic heavy weights Angola and Nigeria – former British
and Portuguese colonies.
All in all, the success of monetary union as a driver for improved policies and development
depends on whether the RECs are able to create credible and strong supranational institutions and
18Foroutan and Pritchett (2011) develop and calibrate a model in which they weigh the benefits from more credible
monetary policy against the costs of originating from asymmetric shocks. They find that for most countries the
costs outweigh the benefits but for some countries monetary union would be beneficial. However, their approach
implicitly assumes that monetary union is the only way for the countries to successfully create a credible central
bank committed to price stability. There might be ways of national reforms that achieve the same while avoiding
the costs of a monetary union.
19Loureiro, Martins and Ribeiro (2011) calculate the correlation of output gaps of both CFA zones WAEMU, CAEMU
with those of the EMU and show that they are not well aligned. Hence, the fixed exchange rate, which severely
limits the scope for anti-cyclical monetary policy, possibly comes at high costs for the countries of the CFA zones.
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rules. However, it is hard to consider how a set of weak national institutions will be able to create
strong supranational ones. In order to overcome that problem and to profit from its macroeconomic
stability, Cobham and Robson (1994) propose to peg Africa’s new common currencies to the Euro
as stability anchor. The goal is to emulate the success of the CFA zones as well as that of other
European countries that imported credibility from Germany via the Exchange Rate Mechanism of
the European Monetary System prior to the Euro’s introduction.
110
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Based on the empirical findings unearthed in this study, there can only be one conclusion: Africa
and its RECs are not ready for regional monetary unions let alone continental monetary union. The
benefits are limited as intra-REC and intra-African trade is low. It is by far surpassed by trade with
the remaining world. Moreover, costs are probably fairly high given the low degree of business
cycle synchronization and the high frequency of asymmetric shocks which are not bolstered by
swift reactions of prices and migration flows.
It is more important for African leaders to focus on improving peace, political stability, eco-
nomic liberalization, de-bureaucratization, the promotion of export diversification, the removal of
national borders for trade and production factors, and creating a common political environment
and legal framework to allow their economies to thrive and to converge. Regional and ultimately
continental monetary union should be the last step in a long process of an ever deepening economic
and political integration, in particular, as monetary union once introduced is not easily reversible.
Introducing a monetary union prematurely might itself become an obstacle to economic and polit-
ical integration in Africa as it would convert asymmetric shocks, which could have been absorbed
by flexible exchange rates, into divisive political issues. Economic and political unity can pave the
way for monetary unity, not vice versa (Friendman, 1997).
African leaders should also learn from the experience of the EMU. Given the grave macroeco-
nomic divergence between member states and the ensuing divisive political disputes between them,
it can be argued that the EMU was introduced prematurely. After the Euro’s introduction and prior
to the Great Recession of 2009, several member states enjoyed booms and high employment, e.g.,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, while Germany suffered from a protracted economic weakness (”sick
man of Europe”). After the Great Recession, the situation reversed. In both periods, the European
Central Bank was unable to address the asynchronous business cycles of the member states with
its common monetary policy. Considering that the EMU’s member economies were much more
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converged prior to the Euro’s introduction than Africa’s regions are currently, monetary unions
in Africa appear highly inadvisable in the near future. If African leaders are determined to press
on with monetary integration, they should at least avoid creating a monetary union that lacks the
necessary institutions to deal with asymmetric shocks. The EMU created some of such institutions
as a lesson from its crisis, e.g., the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the banking union.
The optimal institutional setting for monetary is, however, still subject of ongoing research and
discussions between the member states of the EMU. African leaders should closely follow this
discussions.
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UMA EAC ECCAS IGAD ECOWAS SADC COMESA CEN-SAD Africa Rest of World
Algeria 1.15 - - - - - - - 1.51 59.31
Angola - - 0.04 - - 2.49 - - 2.75 70.85
Benin - - - - 8.51 - - 9.10 10.64 38.18
Botswana - - - - - - - - - -
Burkina Faso - - - - 7.59 - - 8.08 9.17 38.18
Burundi - 4.82 0.10 - - - 6.33 7.79 23.42
Cameroon - - 1.50 - - - - - 6.94 39.51
Cape Verde - - - - 0.53 - - 0.91 0.93 52.51
Central African Republic - - 3.67 - - - - 1.59 4.75 39.51
Chad - - 1.66 - - - - 1.25 2.53 50.89
Comoros - - - - - - 3.77 2.36 5.73 32.44
Congo (Dem Rep.) - - 0.51 - - 21.37 16.68 - 25.91 47.50
Congo (Rep.) - - 0.99 - - - - - 2.99 108.80
Cote d'Ivore - - - - 16.93 - - 18.35 22.87 50.89
Djibouti - - - 33.41 - - 11.00 44.11 35.86 43.08
Egypt - - - - - - 1.04 1.30 2.28 35.66
Equatorial Guinea - - 0.05 - - - - - 1.72 103.36
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia - - - 1.31 - - 1.59 - 1.95 32.96
Gabon - - 1.46 - - - - - 2.97 71.11
Gambia - - - - 14.16 - - 17.70 18.93 29.18
Ghana - - - - 7.51 - - 8.11 9.77 50.36
Guinea - - - - 4.68 - - 6.61 9.05 73.86
Guinea-Bissau - - - - 12.43 - - 13.76 13.60 53.43
Kenya - 5.49 - 3.08 - - 7.48 2.76 11.72 50.17
Lesotho - - - - - - - - - -
Liberia - - - - 16.94 - - 23.61 29.28 67.63
Libya 2.44 - - - - - 2.11 3.88 2.81 69.44
Madagascar - - - - - 4.36 2.19 - 5.04 40.85
Malawi - - - - - 16.13 7.01 - 17.91 41.10
Mali - - - - 7.55 - - 8.47 15.71 18.87
Mauritania 3.37 - - - - - - 12.33 15.47 116.63
Mauritius - - - - - 7.33 3.14 - 8.26 56.88
Morocco 1.83 - - - - - - 2.07 2.89 62.71
Mozambique - - - - - 31.63 - - 32.68 45.75
Namibia - - - - - - - - - -
Niger - - - - 5.74 - - 9.75 6.38 24.16
Nigeria - - - - 2.14 - - 2.38 4.56 61.64
Rwanda - 10.78 - - - - 11.80 - 13.12 22.82
Sao Tome & Principe - - 2.77 - - - - 0.38 3.50 52.58
Senegal - - - - 10.85 - - 12.25 13.92 39.81
Seychelles - - - - - 10.88 6.95 - 13.17 91.47
Sierra Leone - - - - 3.90 - - 4.44 11.08 57.25
Somalia - - - - - - - - - -
South Africa - - - - - 3.71 - - 5.68 48.83
Sudan - - - 0.71 - - 1.68 1.16 2.56 28.74
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - -
Tanzania - 3.61 - - - 4.64 - - 8.78 48.56
Togo - - - - 15.38 - - 15.87 24.02 47.77
Tunisia 2.29 - - - - - - 3.48 4.27 39.06
Uganda - 7.01 - 5.25 - - 7.53 - 10.38 27.40
Zambia - - - - - 28.04 13.59 - 28.91 43.26
Zimbabwe - - - - - 45.44 7.87 - 46.12 25.30
Table A.1.: Openness of African countries
Note: Openness: Sum of nominal exports (free on board) and nominal imports (including costs, insurance, fright) in
percent of nominal GDP (2011). Numbers missing for Botswana, Eritrea, Lesotho, Namibia, Somalia, and Swaziland
owing to insufficient data. Sudan excluding South Sudan.
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators, own table and calculations.
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Burden of Customs 
Procedures Index
Export Diversification 
Index
UMA
Algeria 2.80 5.38
Libya 2.60 5.96
Mauritania 3.00 4.88
Morocco 4.30 2.89
Tunisia 3.40 2.63
Ø 3.22 4.35
EAC
Burundi 2.90 4.03
Kenya 3.60 2.52
Rwanda 5.20 4.04
Tanzania 3.20 2.56
Uganda 3.80 2.34
Ø 3.74 3.10
ECCAS
Angola 1.80 6.34
Burundi 2.90 4.03
Central African Republic - 4.51
Cameroon 3.60 4.09
Chad 2.10 5.56
Congo (Dem. Rep.) - 4.34
Equatorial Guinea - 5.73
Gabon 3.50 5.53
Congo (Rep.) - 5.77
Sao Tome & Principe - 3.54
Ø 2.78 4.94
IGAD
Djibouti - 4.02
Eritrea - 3.06
Ethiopia 2.90 3.93
Kenya 3.60 2.52
Sudan - 5.98
Uganda 3.80 2.34
Ø 3.43 3.64
Table A.2.: Burden of customs procedure index and trade diversification index I: UMA, EAC,
ECCAS, and IGAD
Note: The index values of the Burden of customs procedure index rage between 1 for extremely inefficient and 7 for
extremely efficient. Higher values of the export diversion index indicate a higher concentration of exports on only few
products and lower values a higher degree of diversification of export goods.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own figure and calculations.
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Burden of Customs 
Procedures Index
Export Diversification 
Index
ECOWAS
Benin 3.00 3.78
Burkina Faso 3.60 4.00
Cape Verde 3.20 4.22
Cote d'Ivoire 3.30 3.85
Ghana 3.40 4.13
Guinea 3.30 4.24
Gambia 4.60 3.48
Guinea-Bissau - 4.86
Liberia 3.90 4.60
Mali 3.20 3.87
Niger - 5.37
Nigeria 3.00 5.78
Senegal 4.30 2.97
Sierra Leone 3.40 3.31
Togo - 3.49
Ø 3.52 4.13
SADC
Angola 1.80 6.34
Botswana 4.20
-
Congo (Dem. Rep.) - 4.34
Lesotho 3.40
-
Madagascar 3.40 3.35
Malawi 3.80 4.43
Mauritius 4.70 3.02
Mozambique 3.50 4.13
Namibia 4.10
-
Seychelles 3.80 4.54
South Africa 4.10 2.23
Swaziland 3.50
-
Tanzania 3.20 2.56
Zambia 4.20 4.64
Zimbabwe 3.00 3.15
Ø 3.62 3.88
Table A.3.: Burden of customs procedure index and trade diversification index II: ECOWAS and
SADC
Note: The index values of the Burden of customs procedure index rage between 1 for extremely inefficient and 7 for
extremely efficient. Higher values of the export diversion index indicate a higher concentration of exports on only few
products and lower values a higher degree of diversification of export goods.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own figure and calculations.
XVI
Burden of Customs 
Procedures Index
Export Diversification 
Index
COMESA
Burundi 2.90 4.03
Comoros
-
4.17
Congo (Dem. Rep.)
-
4.34
Djibouti
-
4.02
Egypt 3.80 2.32
Eritrea - 3.06
Ethiopia 2.90 3.93
Kenya 3.60 2.52
Libya 2.60 5.96
Madagascar 3.40 3.35
Malawi 3.80 4.43
Mauritius 4.70 3.02
Rwanda 5.20 4.04
Seychelles 3.80 4.54
Sudan - 5.98
Swaziland 3.50 -
Uganda 3.80 2.34
Zambia 4.20 4.64
Zimbabwe 3.00 3.15
Ø 3.66 3.88
CEN-SAD
Benin 3.00 3.78
Burkina Faso 3.60 4.00
Cape Verde 3.20 4.22
Central African Republic - 4.51
Comoros - 4.17
Cote d'Ivore 3.30 3.85
Chad 2.10 5.56
Djibouti - 4.02
Egypt 3.80 2.32
Eritrea - 3.06
Gambia 4.60 3.48
Ghana 3.40 4.13
Guinea 3.30 4.24
Table A.4.: Burden of customs procedure index and trade diversification index III: COMESA and
CEN-SAD
Note: The index values of the Burden of customs procedure index rage between 1 for extremely inefficient and 7 for
extremely efficient. Higher values of the export diversion index indicate a higher concentration of exports on only few
products and lower values a higher degree of diversification of export goods.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own figure and calculations.
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Burden of Customs 
Procedures Index
Export Diversification 
Index
CEN-SAD
Guinea-Bissau - 4.86
Kenya 3.60 2.52
Liberia 3.90 4.60
Libya 2.60 5.96
Mali 3.20 3.87
Mauritania 3.00 4.88
Morocco 4.30 2.89
Niger - 5.37
Nigeria 3.00 5.78
Sao Tome and Principe - 3.54
Senegal 4.30 2.97
Sierra Leone 3.40 3.31
Sudan - 5.98
Togo - 3.49
Tunisia 3.40 2.63
Ø 3.42 4.07
Other
European Monetary Union 4.94 1.94
Germany 4.70 1.63
USA 4.80 1.48
Table A.5.: Burden of customs procedure index and trade diversification index IV: CEN-SAD
(continued)
Note: The index values of the Burden of customs procedure index rage between 1 for extremely inefficient and 7 for
extremely efficient. Higher values of the export diversion index indicate a higher concentration of exports on only few
products and lower values a higher degree of diversification of export goods.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own figure and calculations.
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UMA ↘
Algeria 0.35 (0.05) 0.36 (0.05) 0.16 (0.47) 0.38 (0.10)
Libya 0.43 (0.02) 0.26 (0.15) 0.22 (0.34) 0.30 (0.18)
Mauritania 0.29 (0.10) 0.41 (0.02) 0.29 (0.20) 0.30 (0.19)
Morocco 0.35 (0.05) 0.47 (0.01) 0.03 (0.90) -0.19 (0.42)
Tunisia 0.30 (0.10) 0.47 (0.01) 0.43 (0.06) 0.07 (0.77)
Ø 0.34 (0.06) 0.39 (0.05) 0.23 (0.40) 0.17 (0.33)
EAC ↗
Burundi -0.11 (0.53) 0.04 (0.80) 0.33 (0.13) 0.09 (0.68)
Kenya 0.19 (0.30) 0.25 (0.17) 0.33 (0.13) 0.43 (0.05)
Rwanda 0.12 (0.52) -0.16 (0.38) 0.27 (0.21) 0.41 (0.06)
Tanzania 0.31 (0.08) 0.60 (0.00) 0.54 (0.01) 0.47 (0.03)
Uganda -0.18 (0.32) 0.39 (0.03) 0.27 (0.22) 0.08 (0.72)
Ø 0.06 (0.35) 0.22 (0.28) 0.35 (0.14) 0.30 (0.31)
ECCAS →
Angola 0.27 (0.10) 0.87 (0.00) 0.19 (0.39) 0.31 (0.16)
Burundi 0.20 (0.22) -0.01 (0.97) 0.42 (0.05) -0.17 (0.43)
Cameroon 0.00 (0.98) 0.18 (0.28) 0.22 (0.32) 0.74 (0.00)
Central African 
Republic
0.15 (0.35) 0.23 (0.16) 0.00 (1.00) 0.85 (0.00)
Chad 0.17 (0.31) 0.62 (0.00) 0.21 (0.34) 0.76 (0.00)
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.53 (0.00) 0.90 (0.00) 0.46 (0.04) 0.29 (0.19)
Equatorial 
Guinea
-0.13 (0.42) 0.56 (0.00) -0.20 (0.35) 0.44 (0.04)
Gabon -0.08 (0.64) 0.33 (0.04) 0.13 (0.54) 0.60 (0.01)
Congo (Rep.) 0.18 (0.28) 0.46 (0.01) 0.08 (0.70) 0.39 (0.07)
Sao Tome & 
Principe
-0.07 (0.69) 0.57 (0.00) 0.16 (0.45) 0.72 (0.00)
Ø 0.12 (0.40) 0.47 (0.15) 0.17 (0.42) 0.49 (0.09)
IGAD →
Djibouti 0.10 (0.53) -0.16 (0.33) 0.04 (0.84) 0.55 (0.01)
Eritrea -0.29 (0.18) -0.22 (0.30)
Ethiopia 0.25 (0.12) 0.36 (0.03) 0.23 (0.29) 0.01 (0.98)
Kenya -0.06 (0.74) 0.58 (0.00) 0.34 (0.12) 0.34 (0.12)
Sudan -0.18 (0.27) 0.40 (0.01) 0.01 (0.95) 0.22 (0.32)
Uganda 0.10 (0.56) 0.17 (0.30) 0.42 (0.05) 0.20 (0.35)
Ø 0.04 (0.44) 0.27 (0.14) 0.13 (0.41) 0.18 (0.35)
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
GDP GDP deflator GDP GDP deflator
Table A.6.: Simple correlations I: UMA, EAC, ECCAS, and IGAD
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. Somalia, South
Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calcula-
tions of correlation coefficients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the
Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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ECOWAS →
Benin 0.02 (0.90) 0.27 (0.10) -0.21 (0.33) 0.53 (0.02)
Burkina Faso -0.06 (0.71) 0.12 (0.45) 0.23 (0.29) 0.26 (0.23)
Cape Verde -0.10 (0.55) 0.14 (0.39) -0.51 (0.02) -0.38 (0.08)
Cote d'Ivore 0.21 (0.20) 0.13 (0.43) -0.15 (0.49) 0.35 (0.11)
Gambia -0.03 (0.83) 0.04 (0.80) 0.34 (0.12) 0.16 (0.46)
Ghana 0.23 (0.16) 0.10 (0.53) 0.44 (0.04) 0.42 (0.06)
Guinea -0.19 (0.26) 0.12 (0.47) -0.51 (0.02) -0.12 (0.59)
Guinea-Bissau -0.35 (0.03) 0.48 (0.00) 0.02 (0.91) 0.18 (0.41)
Liberia 0.10 (0.55) 0.31 (0.06) -0.30 (0.17) -0.32 (0.15)
Mali 0.08 (0.65) -0.21 (0.21) -0.17 (0.45) 0.65 (0.00)
Niger 0.20 (0.23) 0.11 (0.50) -0.12 (0.59) 0.37 (0.09)
Nigeria 0.26 (0.12) 0.18 (0.27) 0.01 (0.96) 0.11 (0.61)
Senegal 0.02 (0.92) 0.11 (0.49) 0.32 (0.14) 0.42 (0.06)
Sierra Leone 0.18 (0.26) 0.37 (0.03) 0.23 (0.29) 0.18 (0.42)
Togo 0.08 (0.64) 0.21 (0.20) -0.15 (0.49) 0.32 (0.14)
Ø 0.04 (0.47) 0.17 (0.33) -0.03 (0.35) 0.21 (0.23)
SADC →
Angola 0.22 (0.17) 0.87 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) 0.31 (0.16)
Botswana 0.09 (0.57) 0.09 (0.60) 0.32 (0.15) 0.21 (0.33)
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.46 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00) 0.42 (0.06) 0.28 (0.20)
Lesotho 0.12 (0.45) 0.03 (0.86) 0.18 (0.40) 0.02 (0.91)
Madagascar 0.17 (0.31) 0.60 (0.00) 0.24 (0.27) 0.69 (0.00)
Malawi 0.08 (0.63) 0.42 (0.01) 0.07 (0.75) 0.22 (0.31)
Mauritius -0.24 (0.15) -0.05 (0.77) 0.08 (0.71) 0.16 (0.46)
Mozambique 0.41 (0.01) 0.26 (0.12) -0.08 (0.73) 0.76 (0.00)
Namibia 0.47 (0.00) 0.21 (0.21) 0.48 (0.03) 0.34 (0.12)
Seychelles -0.04 (0.79) -0.16 (0.33) 0.36 (0.10) -0.23 (0.29)
South Africa 0.56 (0.00) 0.02 (0.92) 0.66 (0.00) 0.38 (0.08)
Swaziland 0.24 (0.15) 0.00 (0.98) 0.26 (0.23) 0.18 (0.42)
Tanzania 0.38 (0.02) 0.26 (0.11) 0.43 (0.05) 0.64 (0.00)
Zambia 0.39 (0.02) 0.33 (0.04) 0.30 (0.16) 0.85 (0.00)
Zimbabwe 0.35 (0.03) -0.19 (0.24) -0.38 (0.08) -0.14 (0.52)
Ø 0.24 (0.22) 0.23 (0.35) 0.27 (0.25) 0.31 (0.25)
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
GDP GDP deflator GDP GDP deflator
Table A.7.: Simple correlations II: ECOWAS and SADC
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. Somalia, South
Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calcula-
tions of correlation coefficients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the
Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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COMESA ↗
Burundi 0.07 (0.67) 0.00 (0.99) 0.22 (0.34) -0.20 (0.39)
Comoros 0.11 (0.51) -0.01 (0.97) 0.05 (0.83) 0.51 (0.03)
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.13 (0.42) 0.28 (0.09) 0.48 (0.04) 0.50 (0.03)
Djibouti 0.04 (0.83) -0.05 (0.76) 0.45 (0.05) 0.38 (0.10)
Egypt 0.18 (0.28) 0.06 (0.72) 0.50 (0.03) 0.05 (0.81)
Eritrea -0.46 (0.05) -0.11 (0.62)
Ethiopia 0.02 (0.92) 0.06 (0.73) 0.53 (0.02) -0.14 (0.55)
Kenya 0.14 (0.39) 0.30 (0.06) 0.52 (0.02) 0.23 (0.31)
Libya 0.24 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) 0.33 (0.15) -0.09 (0.69)
Madagascar 0.30 (0.07) 0.59 (0.00) 0.45 (0.05) 0.62 (0.01)
Malawi 0.18 (0.28) 0.39 (0.02) 0.37 (0.11) 0.02 (0.93)
Mauritius -0.14 (0.41) -0.05 (0.77) 0.18 (0.44) 0.11 (0.64)
Rwanda 0.19 (0.24) 0.06 (0.70) 0.17 (0.45) 0.15 (0.52)
Seychelles 0.30 (0.07) -0.16 (0.32) 0.41 (0.07) -0.15 (0.52)
Sudan 0.03 (0.87) 0.74 (0.00) 0.40 (0.08) 0.82 (0.00)
Swaziland -0.27 (0.10) 0.00 (1.00) 0.28 (0.22) 0.15 (0.52)
Uganda 0.15 (0.37) -0.03 (0.84) 0.18 (0.43) 0.03 (0.91)
Zambia 0.23 (0.17) 0.31 (0.06) 0.62 (0.01) 0.85 (0.00)
Zimbabwe -0.13 (0.44) -0.19 (0.24) -0.34 (0.14) -0.16 (0.48)
Ø 0.10 (0.40) 0.13 (0.51) 0.28 (0.19) 0.19 (0.43)
CEN-SAD →
Benin -0.05 (0.76) 0.32 (0.05) -0.38 (0.09) 0.65 (0.00)
Burkina Faso 0.10 (0.54) 0.10 (0.54) 0.27 (0.23) 0.32 (0.16)
Cape Verde -0.19 (0.24) 0.06 (0.72) -0.20 (0.39) -0.44 (0.05)
Central African 
Republic
0.29 (0.08) -0.06 (0.70) -0.42 (0.07) 0.57 (0.01)
Comoros -0.13 (0.43) 0.00 (0.98) -0.18 (0.43) 0.31 (0.18)
Cote d'Ivore 0.38 (0.02) 0.31 (0.06) -0.18 (0.44) 0.50 (0.03)
Chad 0.04 (0.80) -0.02 (0.91) 0.23 (0.31) 0.61 (0.01)
Djibouti 0.03 (0.84) 0.21 (0.20) 0.49 (0.03) 0.44 (0.05)
Egypt 0.26 (0.11) 0.60 (0.00) 0.16 (0.48) 0.10 (0.67)
Eritrea -0.35 (0.13) -0.19 (0.40)
Gambia 0.14 (0.38) 0.12 (0.45) 0.37 (0.10) 0.14 (0.54)
Ghana -0.05 (0.78) 0.12 (0.47) 0.59 (0.01) 0.28 (0.22)
Guinea -0.18 (0.29) 0.15 (0.36) -0.54 (0.02) -0.06 (0.80)
↗ → ↘
GDP GDP deflator GDP GDP deflator
- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
Table A.8.: Simple correlations III: COMESA and CEN-SAD
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. Somalia, South
Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calcula-
tions of correlation coefficients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the
Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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CEN-SAD →
Guinea-Bissau -0.26 (0.12) 0.45 (0.01) 0.04 (0.85) 0.16 (0.48)
Kenya 0.12 (0.48) 0.61 (0.00) 0.49 (0.03) 0.31 (0.17)
Liberia 0.25 (0.13) 0.43 (0.01) -0.31 (0.18) -0.33 (0.15)
Libya 0.35 (0.03) 0.09 (0.60) 0.56 (0.01) 0.20 (0.39)
Mali 0.13 (0.43) -0.21 (0.21) -0.02 (0.94) 0.76 (0.00)
Mauritania 0.31 (0.06) 0.32 (0.05) 0.33 (0.15) 0.20 (0.37)
Morocco 0.38 (0.02) 0.32 (0.05) 0.02 (0.92) 0.03 (0.90)
Niger 0.27 (0.10) 0.19 (0.24) -0.02 (0.92) 0.46 (0.04)
Nigeria 0.36 (0.03) 0.37 (0.02) 0.51 (0.03) 0.46 (0.04)
Sao Tome and 
Principe
0.46 (0.01) 0.35 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) 0.62 (0.01)
Senegal 0.11 (0.52) 0.20 (0.23) 0.23 (0.31) 0.56 (0.01)
Sierra Leone 0.20 (0.23) 0.39 (0.02) 0.18 (0.44) 0.06 (0.80)
Sudan 0.04 (0.81) 0.43 (0.01) 0.21 (0.35) 0.54 (0.02)
Togo 0.22 (0.18) 0.35 (0.03) -0.07 (0.75) 0.49 (0.03)
Tunisia 0.20 (0.22) 0.38 (0.02) 0.54 (0.02) 0.05 (0.82)
Ø 0.14 (0.32) 0.24 (0.26) 0.11 (0.31) 0.28 (0.26)
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
GDP GDP deflator GDP GDP deflator
Table A.9.: Simple correlations IV: CEN-SAD (continued)
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. Somalia, South
Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to 1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calcula-
tions of correlation coefficients for UMA, COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the
Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
UMA →
Algeria 0.33 (0.07) -2.16 4.24 -3.28 0.21 (0.37) -0.22 1.06 0.18
Libya 0.52 (0.00) 4.05 -4.70 7.47 0.27 (0.24) 1.50 -4.76 1.57
Mauritania 0.05 (0.76) -0.30 1.18 -0.46 0.30 (0.19) 2.36 -1.85 6.79
Morocco 0.33 (0.07) -0.90 5.35 -0.90 0.04 (0.85) 0.98 -2.37 2.14
Tunisia 0.03 (0.86) -0.92 3.61 1.49 0.27 (0.24) 0.01 0.16 0.46
Ø 0.25 (0.35) 1.67 3.82 2.72 0.22 (0.38) 1.01 2.04 2.23
EAC ↗
Burundi -0.29 (0.11) 1.69 -2.59 3.81 -0.16 (0.47) 0.21 -0.79 0.62
Kenya 0.02 (0.91) 2.07 -9.75 4.57 0.38 (0.08) 0.18 -0.94 2.01
Rwanda 0.12 (0.51) 3.19 -3.76 1.85 0.55 (0.01) 4.16 -0.99 2.92
Tanzania 0.22 (0.22) -0.48 2.21 -0.65 0.53 (0.02) -0.67 0.63 -1.17
Uganda -0.26 (0.14) 0.58 -0.80 1.41 0.43 (0.05) 0.38 -0.77 1.25
Ø -0.04 (0.38) 1.60 3.82 2.46 0.35 (0.13) 1.12 0.82 1.59
ECCAS →
Angola 0.12 (0.45) -0.10 1.40 -2.14 0.08 (0.71) 2.21 -2.88 5.48
Burundi -0.04 (0.86) 1.38 -1.85 4.68 -0.11 (0.61) -0.41 -0.34 -2.11
Cameroon -0.14 (0.38) 1.15 -2.11 1.24 0.36 (0.10) -0.37 -0.45 -1.67
Central African 
Republic
0.16 (0.34) 0.14 -0.79 0.78 0.24 (0.26) -0.23 0.92 -0.77
Chad 0.10 (0.55) 0.74 -1.56 1.40 -0.14 (0.52) -1.09 4.73 -1.94
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.32 (0.05) 0.95 -5.26 1.42 -0.11 (0.61) 2.85 2.69 10.60
Equatorial 
Guinea
0.35 (0.03) 0.18 -1.29 2.43 0.14 (0.53) 6.33 -11.44 8.47
Gabon -0.05 (0.77) 4.99 -7.42 23.62 0.47 (0.03) 0.18 0.88 1.74
Congo (Rep.) 0.09 (0.57) 1.75 -1.81 6.00 -0.04 (0.86) -0.40 0.93 -1.82
Sao Tome & 
Principe
-0.24 (0.15) 1.44 -2.70 6.48 -0.17 (0.45) -1.26 2.43 -2.78
Ø 0.07 (0.42) 1.28 2.62 5.02 0.07 (0.47) 1.53 2.77 3.74
IGAD ↗
Djibouti 0.21 (0.21) 0.43 -0.04 0.97 0.14 (0.53) -0.88 1.44 -1.40
Eritrea -0.20 (0.36) 1.93 -4.10 4.13
Ethiopia 0.42 (0.01) 1.41 -6.99 2.36 0.35 (0.11) 1.23 -4.87 1.47
Kenya -0.11 (0.48) 0.68 -3.62 1.16 0.46 (0.03) -0.39 0.23 -0.06
Sudan -0.05 (0.75) 1.69 -2.06 5.32 0.17 (0.43) 1.37 -5.81 1.25
Uganda 0.15 (0.36) 0.45 0.11 2.07 0.48 (0.03) -0.20 0.28 -0.21
Ø 0.12 (0.36) 1.50 2.26 2.58 0.23 (0.25) 1.00 2.79 1.42
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in: Difference to Remaining REC in:
Output Gap
Table A.10.: Output gap correlations I: UMA, EAC, ECCAS, and IGAD
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. REC’s average
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are calculated as the arithmetic average of absolute values of mem-
ber states’ differences to the remaining REC aggregate. Somalia, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to
1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calculations of correlation coefficients for UMA,
COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
ECOWAS →
Benin 0.10 (0.55) -1.16 5.75 -1.73 -0.19 (0.39) -0.44 1.91 -0.51
Burkina Faso -0.17 (0.30) -1.51 6.18 -2.73 0.53 (0.02) 0.59 -0.24 0.84
Cape Verde -0.18 (0.28) 0.59 0.68 4.00 -0.41 (0.06) 0.29 0.31 0.65
Cote d'Ivore 0.22 (0.19) -0.69 6.88 0.94 0.18 (0.42) 1.25 -2.56 1.76
Gambia -0.04 (0.81) -0.90 5.18 -1.16 0.22 (0.32) 1.14 -0.53 2.82
Ghana 0.41 (0.01) -0.52 4.89 1.71 0.23 (0.29) 0.39 0.20 1.95
Guinea -0.37 (0.03) -1.44 4.54 -2.32 -0.13 (0.56) -0.34 1.58 0.09
Guinea-Bissau -0.36 (0.03) 1.86 -2.03 6.67 -0.05 (0.82) 5.17 -9.73 15.09
Liberia 0.12 (0.45) 4.67 -10.93 19.10 -0.12 (0.59) 14.18 -25.54 28.83
Mali 0.02 (0.89) 0.08 2.91 1.43 -0.18 (0.41) 0.39 0.37 0.75
Niger 0.37 (0.02) 0.82 -1.78 1.48 -0.07 (0.73) 1.97 -3.04 4.35
Nigeria 0.30 (0.07) 4.03 -15.37 6.08 0.21 (0.33) 0.39 -1.59 1.02
Senegal 0.01 (0.95) -1.21 6.67 -0.38 0.48 (0.03) 0.00 0.24 0.16
Sierra Leone 0.29 (0.08) -0.61 3.70 2.89 0.01 (0.98) 2.69 -8.93 3.53
Togo 0.11 (0.50) 0.59 -4.45 0.94 0.67 (0.00) 1.56 -1.19 7.03
Ø 0.06 (0.34) 1.38 5.46 3.57 0.09 (0.40) 2.05 3.86 4.63
SADC →
Angola 0.25 (0.12) 0.64 -1.11 -0.75 0.68 (0.00) 2.94 -4.38 6.57
Botswana 0.24 (0.14) 1.47 -2.03 5.33 0.51 (0.02) 1.40 -5.00 1.78
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.26 (0.12) 1.59 -8.29 2.33 -0.22 (0.32) 3.97 -0.79 12.44
Lesotho 0.00 (0.99) 3.05 -8.52 7.42 0.06 (0.77) -0.31 -0.57 -1.21
Madagascar 0.11 (0.50) 0.69 -0.90 3.28 0.33 (0.13) 1.88 -7.18 3.94
Malawi -0.07 (0.68) 2.16 -8.03 3.30 0.19 (0.39) 2.03 -9.26 -0.05
Mauritius -0.24 (0.14) 1.78 -3.87 4.00 0.06 (0.78) -0.18 0.03 -0.36
Mozambique 0.44 (0.01) 1.67 -4.78 2.64 -0.08 (0.73) 0.26 -1.94 -0.02
Namibia 0.33 (0.05) 0.53 -1.76 0.52 0.45 (0.04) 0.33 -1.59 0.06
Seychelles -0.05 (0.76) 1.96 -3.96 6.67 0.48 (0.03) 2.49 -6.65 4.03
South Africa 0.60 (0.00) -0.20 1.80 0.45 0.71 (0.00) -0.67 1.76 -1.05
Swaziland 0.51 (0.00) 2.12 -3.12 5.38 0.42 (0.05) -0.29 -1.06 -1.75
Tanzania 0.32 (0.05) 0.73 -3.29 2.30 0.38 (0.09) -0.81 0.06 -2.34
Zambia 0.31 (0.06) 1.53 -3.49 5.98 0.26 (0.23) 0.39 -3.61 -0.13
Zimbabwe 0.48 (0.00) 2.46 -5.26 3.78 -0.05 (0.83) 3.26 -10.44 3.62
Ø 0.23 (0.24) 1.50 4.01 3.61 0.28 (0.29) 1.42 3.62 2.62
↗ → ↘
pre 1994 post 1994
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
Table A.11.: Output gap correlations II: ECOWAS and SADC
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. REC’s average
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are calculated as the arithmetic average of absolute values of mem-
ber states’ differences to the remaining REC aggregate. Somalia, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to
1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calculations of correlation coefficients for UMA,
COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
COMESA ↗
Burundi 0.11 (0.52) 1.64 -4.10 4.74 -0.28 (0.22) 0.14 -0.08 0.43
Comoros -0.26 (0.11) 0.35 -1.14 2.09 -0.17 (0.47) -0.10 -0.51 -0.57
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
-0.10 (0.55) 0.94 -6.26 2.17 -0.37 (0.10) 4.13 -0.67 13.55
Djibouti 0.10 (0.55) 0.51 -2.41 1.48 0.11 (0.63) -0.54 1.00 -0.59
Egypt 0.38 (0.02) -0.15 -1.18 0.45 0.42 (0.06) -0.22 0.66 -0.75
Eritrea -0.43 (0.06) 2.24 -4.53 4.86
Ethiopia -0.11 (0.51) 1.17 -7.22 2.61 0.37 (0.10) 1.68 -5.52 2.55
Kenya -0.08 (0.63) 1.27 -6.94 3.20 0.51 (0.03) 0.20 -0.23 1.25
Libya 0.09 (0.57) 4.95 -9.26 9.19 0.15 (0.50) 1.39 -5.32 1.80
Madagascar 0.23 (0.16) 0.21 0.16 2.98 0.58 (0.01) 2.25 -7.16 5.00
Malawi -0.01 (0.95) 1.71 -7.05 3.09 0.40 (0.08) 2.38 -9.13 1.04
Mauritius -0.10 (0.55) 1.33 -2.85 3.69 0.31 (0.18) 0.04 0.20 0.73
Rwanda 0.14 (0.38) 3.10 -16.69 6.92 0.29 (0.21) 4.11 -18.69 2.49
Seychelles 0.29 (0.08) 1.52 -2.97 6.47 0.55 (0.02) 2.89 -6.47 5.15
Sudan -0.02 (0.92) 1.87 -4.02 5.10 0.61 (0.01) 0.72 -0.59 2.69
Swaziland -0.25 (0.12) 1.66 -2.11 5.15 0.81 (0.00) -0.26 -0.56 -0.65
Uganda 0.07 (0.67) 0.48 -2.37 1.83 0.27 (0.24) 0.21 -0.41 0.88
Zambia 0.02 (0.88) 1.00 -2.48 5.47 0.40 (0.08) 0.49 -3.44 0.98
Zimbabwe -0.29 (0.08) 1.87 -3.94 3.13 -0.10 (0.66) 3.43 -10.17 4.76
Ø 0.01 (0.46) 1.58 4.45 3.84 0.23 (0.19) 1.44 3.97 2.67
CEN-SAD →
Benin -0.02 (0.91) 0.10 0.59 1.29 -0.23 (0.31) -0.20 1.21 0.35
Burkina Faso 0.01 (0.94) -0.23 1.01 0.22 0.54 (0.02) 0.79 -0.91 1.75
Cape Verde -0.31 (0.06) 1.81 -4.32 6.86 0.05 (0.82) 0.60 -0.33 1.50
Central African 
Republic
0.26 (0.12) 0.22 -0.98 0.56 -0.25 (0.28) 1.35 -1.93 2.86
Comoros -0.41 (0.01) 0.03 0.79 1.85 -0.32 (0.17) 0.14 0.06 0.35
Cote d'Ivore 0.31 (0.06) 0.82 0.53 3.70 0.43 (0.06) 1.23 -2.29 2.80
Chad 0.34 (0.04) 0.79 -1.58 1.35 0.05 (0.82) 0.39 1.65 2.08
Djibouti 0.06 (0.73) 0.19 -0.52 1.23 0.13 (0.58) -0.30 1.57 0.33
Egypt 0.63 (0.00) -0.34 0.82 0.43 0.01 (0.97) 0.11 0.85 0.91
Eritrea -0.23 (0.32) 2.49 -3.96 5.78
Gambia 0.21 (0.19) 0.32 0.18 1.70 0.27 (0.25) 1.37 -1.16 3.63
Ghana 0.10 (0.53) 0.79 -0.38 4.59 0.06 (0.78) 0.09 -0.55 -0.16
Guinea -0.29 (0.08) -0.18 -0.61 0.64 -0.19 (0.41) -0.08 0.89 0.94
↗ → ↘
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
pre 1994 post 1994
Table A.12.: Output gap correlations III: COMESA and CEN-SAD
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. REC’s average
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are calculated as the arithmetic average of absolute values of mem-
ber states’ differences to the remaining REC aggregate. Somalia, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to
1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calculations of correlation coefficients for UMA,
COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the Arab spring revolutions.
Source: Own table.
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Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
CEN-SAD →
Guinea-Bissau -0.15 (0.37) 3.09 -7.07 9.56 -0.08 (0.74) 5.74 -10.37 15.93
Kenya -0.12 (0.48) 0.99 -5.44 2.96 0.43 (0.06) 0.44 0.35 2.20
Liberia 0.09 (0.58) 5.91 -16.01 22.01 0.00 (0.99) 15.29 -26.26 29.70
Libya 0.30 (0.07) 3.89 -6.34 7.06 0.51 (0.03) 1.72 -5.37 2.53
Mali 0.15 (0.36) 1.37 -2.33 4.42 -0.03 (0.88) 0.61 -0.33 1.67
Mauritania 0.28 (0.09) 1.33 -6.68 4.70 0.31 (0.17) 2.57 -2.07 7.08
Morocco 0.38 (0.02) 0.32 -0.12 0.71 0.01 (0.98) 1.23 -2.84 2.64
Niger 0.33 (0.05) 2.09 -7.08 4.34 0.09 (0.68) 2.01 -3.71 5.24
Nigeria 0.28 (0.08) 3.63 -13.53 6.61 0.33 (0.15) 0.58 -2.18 1.31
Sao Tome and 
Principe
0.46 (0.01) 1.46 -2.90 6.24 0.12 (0.61) 0.21 -0.34 0.80
Senegal 0.10 (0.56) 0.16 0.94 2.73 0.39 (0.09) 0.31 -0.41 1.04
Sierra Leone 0.18 (0.28) 0.63 -1.35 5.79 -0.14 (0.54) 2.87 -9.61 3.90
Sudan -0.02 (0.88) 1.55 -1.96 4.82 0.36 (0.12) 0.92 -0.03 3.64
Togo 0.11 (0.50) 1.84 -9.52 3.97 0.54 (0.02) 1.93 -1.82 7.87
Tunisia -0.11 (0.49) -0.26 2.56 2.90 0.71 (0.00) 0.29 -0.05 0.91
Ø 0.12 (0.31) 1.37 3.45 4.15 0.14 (0.42) 1.64 2.97 3.92
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
Table A.13.: Output gap correlations IV: CEN-SAD (continued)
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining REC. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. REC’s average
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are calculated as the arithmetic average of absolute values of mem-
ber states’ differences to the remaining REC aggregate. Somalia, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Eritrea (prior to
1994) are excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data. Calculations of correlation coefficients for UMA,
COMESA, and CEN-SAD end with 2010 because of the Libya war and the Arab spring revolutions.
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CAEMU →
Cameroon -0.15 (0.36) 0.44 (0.01) 0.22 (0.31) 0.58 (0.01)
Central African 
Republic
0.31 (0.06) 0.44 (0.01) -0.19 (0.37) 0.52 (0.02)
Chad 0.09 (0.58) 0.61 (0.00) 0.45 (0.04) 0.58 (0.01)
Equatorial Guinea -0.08 (0.61) 0.50 (0.00) 0.07 (0.74) 0.87 (0.00)
Gabon -0.14 (0.39) 0.56 (0.00) -0.05 (0.83) 0.93 (0.00)
Congo (Rep.) 0.27 (0.11) 0.61 (0.00) -0.11 (0.61) 0.87 (0.00)
Ø 0.05 (0.35) 0.53 (0.00) 0.07 (0.48) 0.72 (0.01)
CMA ↗
Lesotho 0.09 (0.57) 0.65 (0.00) 0.17 (0.45) 0.54 (0.01)
Namibia 0.43 (0.01) 0.73 (0.00) 0.54 (0.01) 0.41 (0.06)
South Africa 0.41 (0.01) 0.80 (0.00) 0.59 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02)
Swaziland 0.19 (0.25) 0.08 (0.63) 0.30 (0.16) 0.40 (0.07)
Ø 0.28 (0.21) 0.57 (0.16) 0.40 (0.16) 0.46 (0.04)
WAEMU ↗
Benin -0.17 (0.31) 0.78 (0.00) 0.37 (0.09) 0.97 (0.00)
Burkina Faso 0.14 (0.39) 0.66 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.74 (0.00)
Côte d'Ivore
0.26 (0.12) 0.88 (0.00) 0.39 (0.07) 0.98 (0.00)
Guinea Bissau 0.10 (0.55) -0.33 (0.04) -0.11 (0.61) 0.06 (0.77)
Mali 0.05 (0.76) 0.31 (0.06) -0.07 (0.76) 0.81 (0.00)
Niger 0.24 (0.14) 0.70 (0.00) 0.26 (0.24) 0.85 (0.00)
Senegal 0.27 (0.11) 0.83 (0.00) 0.13 (0.54) 0.98 (0.00)
Togo 0.02 (0.89) 0.71 (0.00) 0.18 (0.42) 0.88 (0.00)
Ø 0.11 (0.41) 0.57 (0.01) 0.22 (0.34) 0.78 (0.10)
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
GDP GDP deflator GDP GDP deflator
Table A.14.: Simple correlations: existing African monetary unions
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining monetary union. P-values of Q-test in parentheses.
Source: Own table.
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Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
 Minimum Maximum
CAEMU →
Cameroon -0.32 (0.06) -1.54 1.85 -11.63 0.25 (0.26) -1.74 2.31 -4.47
Central African 
Republic
0.30 (0.07) -0.46 0.65 -5.22 -0.13 (0.56) 0.13 -0.67 0.05
Chad 0.32 (0.05) 0.20 -0.41 -4.27 -0.09 (0.69) -0.43 2.54 0.39
Equatorial 
Guinea
0.24 (0.14) -0.39 -0.12 -3.27 0.26 (0.23) 7.24 -13.85 9.61
Gabon -0.11 (0.52) 5.20 -7.58 23.21 0.36 (0.10) 0.57 -1.60 2.36
Congo (Rep.) 0.14 (0.38) 1.09 -0.08 -0.20 -0.05 (0.82) -0.11 -0.10 -0.93
Ø 0.10 (0.20) 1.48 1.78 7.97 0.10 (0.44) 1.70 3.51 2.97
CMA ↗
Lesotho -0.07 (0.66) 2.98 -9.02 6.79 0.13 (0.55) -0.21 -0.41 -0.88
Namibia 0.28 (0.09) 0.45 -2.19 -0.12 0.51 (0.02) 0.43 -1.48 0.41
South Africa 0.38 (0.02) -0.31 2.63 -0.05 0.57 (0.01) 0.04 0.47 0.56
Swaziland 0.49 (0.00) 2.05 -3.63 4.76 0.29 (0.19) -0.21 -0.74 -1.41
Ø 0.27 (0.19) 1.45 4.37 2.93 0.37 (0.19) 0.22 0.77 0.81
WAEMU ↗
Benin -0.19 (0.13) 0.38 -1.61 0.05 0.23 (0.00) -0.78 2.38 -1.18
Burkina Faso 0.25 (0.25) 0.11 -1.45 -0.87 0.70 (0.29) 0.34 0.08 0.45
Côte d'Ivore 0.43 (0.01) 1.75 -1.69 5.32 0.66 (0.00) 1.47 -3.39 2.43
Guinea-Bissau 0.17 (0.30) 3.49 -9.33 8.71 -0.11 (0.61) 4.89 -9.37 14.50
Mali 0.11 (0.51) 1.70 -3.95 3.79 0.09 (0.68) 0.03 0.72 0.20
Niger 0.39 (0.02) 2.51 -9.34 3.72 0.34 (0.12) 1.74 -2.51 3.88
Senegal 0.29 (0.08) 0.45 -1.11 -1.11 0.29 (0.18) -0.44 0.84 0.84
Togo 0.03 (0.88) 2.17 -11.85 -11.85 0.58 (0.01) 1.30 -0.81 -0.81
Ø 0.18 (0.27) 1.57 5.04 4.42 0.35 (0.24) 1.37 2.51 4.97
↗ → ↘- Synchronicity increased - Synchronicity unchanged - Synchronicity declined
pre 1994 post 1994
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
Output Gap
Difference to Remaining REC in:
Table A.15.: Output gap correlations: existing African monetary unions
Note: Correlation of country with aggregate of remaining monetary union. P-values of Q-test in parentheses. REC’s
average standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are calculated as the arithmetic average of absolute values of
member states’ differences to the remaining REC aggregate.
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gap ∆ gap ∆ π IR
UMA
Algeria -0.95 -2.45 -8.07 0.28
Libya -7.09 -4.33 20.06 -0.29
Mauritania -2.56 -6.89 8.28 -0.15
Morocco -5.33 -9.03 4.11 -0.07
Tunisia -1.70 -2.69 -1.16 0.06
Ø -0.03
EAC
Burundi -1.52 -3.36 10.92 -0.36
Kenya 0.11 -2.89 7.80 -0.29
Rwanda -20.43 -19.56 21.97 -0.10
Tanzania 0.18 -1.79 5.52 -0.11
Uganda -2.43 -2.85 18.07 -0.07
Ø -0.18
ECCAS
Angola 2.19 -6.48 -19.81 0.08
Burundi -1.52 -3.36 10.92 -0.36
Cameroon -3.56 -2.03 -3.52 0.24
Central African Republic -2.93 -6.63 -13.44 0.26
Chad -8.82 -17.58 4.75 -0.06
Congo (Dem. Rep.) -1.04 -7.35 -12.25 0.00
Equatorial Guinea -16.47 -25.84 -6.92 0.02
Gabon -2.34 -8.78 31.89 -0.42
Congo (Rep.) -2.94 -6.01 -29.55 0.72
Sao Tome & Principe -2.58 -2.60 -1.03 0.03
Ø 0.05
IGAD
Djibouti -1.29 -3.74 1.00 -0.05
Eritrea -6.22 -10.01 5.51 -0.04
Ethiopia -7.30 -8.29 16.39 -0.38
Kenya 0.11 -2.89 7.80 -0.29
Sudan -8.91 -7.68 3.36 -0.02
Uganda -2.43 -2.85 18.07 -0.07
Ø -0.14
1993
year
2003
1994
1992
1992
2002
2003
2008
2002
1997
1995
2006
1999
2007
2007
1996
1993
2003
2009
1994
1992
1993
2008
2003
2008
2011
Table A.16.: Contemporary inflation response to severest downturn since 1992 I: UMA, EAC,
ECCAS, and IGAD
Note: Right column displays the contemporary change in inflation relative to the average inflation rate relative to the
size of the change in the output gap. Inflation measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales.
Owing to lack of data, the inflation of Algeria, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi, Sao Tome
and Principe, Seychelles, and Tunisia is measured as the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator.
Source: World Bank, own table and calculations.
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gap ∆ gap ∆ π IR
ECOWAS
Benin -1.07 -2.36 42.68 -2.96
Burkina Faso -1.27 -3.87 -4.96 0.25
Cape Verde -0.04 -1.92 -1.37 0.17
Cote d'Ivore -5.59 -7.51 -3.75 0.08
Gambia -3.16 -7.63 -1.66 0.02
Ghana -2.75 -3.47 -2.97 0.03
Guinea -0.82 -2.61 -7.30 0.21
Guinea-Bissau -12.63 -29.40 -26.06 0.03
Liberia -11.16 -41.70 8.93 -0.06
Mali -2.60 -2.00 25.27 -1.56
Niger -5.97 -9.41 -3.52 0.07
Nigeria -4.13 -3.59 40.22 -0.55
Senegal -2.64 -3.60 -0.29 0.01
Sierra Leone -7.00 -16.38 -30.14 0.05
Togo -15.19 -16.42 -6.47 0.08
Ø -0.28
SADC
Angola 2.19 -6.48 -19.81 -0.08
Botswana -6.59 -11.20 -1.03 -0.01
Congo (Dem. Rep.) -1.04 -7.35 -12.25 0.00
Lesotho -2.09 -2.30 -24.64 -1.01
Madagascar -8.69 -15.45 7.63 0.04
Malawi -10.79 -13.97 -2.00 -0.01
Mauritius -1.23 -2.49 0.47 0.02
Mozambique -5.26 -8.61 -15.55 -0.04
Namibia -2.48 -6.12 -0.65 -0.01
Seychelles -4.27 -6.66 2.33 0.05
South Africa -1.66 -4.18 -8.97 -0.20
Swaziland -2.58 -2.83 15.29 0.51
Tanzania -20.43 -19.56 21.97 -0.07
Zambia -1.04 -7.35 -12.25 0.00
Zimbabwe -11.98 -16.19 5.75 0.28
Ø -0.04
1994
2000
2009
2011
2011
2009
year
2002
1992
1993
2009
2009
2009
1998
2003
1994
2010
2002
2008
1993
2003
2009
2012
1994
2003
2003
1999
2002
1994
2005
1992
Table A.17.: Contemporary inflation response to severest downturn since 1992 II: ECOWAS and
SADC
Note: Right column displays the contemporary change in inflation relative to the average inflation rate relative to the
size of the change in the output gap. Inflation measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales.
Owing to lack of data, the inflation of Algeria, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi, Sao Tome
and Principe, Seychelles, and Tunisia is measured as the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator.
Source: World Bank, own table and calculations.
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COMESA
Burundi -1.52 -3.36 10.92 -0.36
Comoros -2.19 -6.19 6.58 -0.18
Congo (Dem. Rep.) -1.04 -7.35 -12.25 0.00
Djibouti -1.29 -3.74 1.00 -0.05
Egypt -0.07 -1.97 0.88 -0.05
Eritrea -6.22 -10.01 5.51 -0.04
Ethiopia -7.30 -8.29 16.39 -0.38
Kenya 0.11 -2.89 7.80 -0.29
Libya -7.09 -4.33 20.06 -0.29
Madagascar -8.69 -15.45 7.63 -0.04
Malawi -10.79 -13.97 -2.00 0.01
Mauritius -1.23 -2.49 0.47 -0.02
Rwanda -20.43 -19.56 21.97 -0.10
Seychelles -4.27 -6.66 2.33 -0.05
Sudan -8.91 -7.68 3.36 -0.02
Swaziland -2.58 -2.83 15.29 -0.51
Uganda -2.43 -2.85 18.07 -0.07
Zambia -1.04 -7.35 -12.25 0.00
Zimbabwe -11.98 -16.19 5.75 -0.28
Ø -0.14
CEN-SAD
Benin -1.07 -2.36 42.68 -2.96
Burkina Faso -1.27 -3.87 -4.96 0.25
Cape Verde -0.04 -1.92 -1.37 0.17
Central African Republic -2.93 -6.63 -13.44 0.26
Comoros -2.19 -6.19 6.58 -0.18
Cote d'Ivore -5.59 -7.51 -3.75 0.08
Chad -8.82 -17.58 4.75 -0.06
Djibouti -1.29 -3.74 1.00 -0.05
Egypt -0.07 -1.97 0.88 -0.05
Eritrea -6.22 -10.01 5.51 -0.04
Gambia -3.16 -7.63 -1.66 0.02
Ghana -2.75 -3.47 -2.97 0.03
Guinea -0.82 -2.61 -7.30 0.21
2003
2008
2002
2002
1994
2003
1994
2003
1993
2011
2008
2003
2008
1994
2000
2005
1994
2003
2011
2012
1992
2011
2008
2011
2009
2009
2009
1996
1994
2011
1993
1993
Table A.18.: Contemporary inflation response to severest downturn since 1992 III: COMESA
and CEN-SAD
Note: Right column displays the contemporary change in inflation relative to the average inflation rate relative to the
size of the change in the output gap. Inflation measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales.
Owing to lack of data, the inflation of Algeria, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi, Sao Tome
and Principe, Seychelles, and Tunisia is measured as the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator.
Source: World Bank, own table and calculations.
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gap ∆ gap ∆ π IR
CEN-SAD
Guinea-Bissau -12.63 -29.40 -26.06 0.03
Kenya 0.11 -2.89 7.80 -0.29
Liberia -11.16 -41.70 8.93 -0.06
Libya -7.09 -4.33 20.06 -0.29
Mali -2.60 -2.00 25.27 -1.56
Mauritania -2.56 -6.89 8.28 -0.15
Morocco -5.33 -9.03 4.11 -0.07
Niger -5.97 -9.41 -3.52 0.07
Nigeria -4.13 -3.59 40.22 -0.55
Sao Tome and Principe -2.58 -2.60 -1.03 0.03
Senegal -2.64 -3.60 -0.29 0.01
Sierra Leone -7.00 -16.38 -30.14 0.05
Sudan -8.91 -7.68 3.36 -0.02
Togo -15.19 -16.42 -6.47 0.08
Tunisia -1.70 -2.69 -1.16 0.06
Ø -0.18
Other
European Monetary Union -2.58 -4.78 -3.61 0.49
Germany -3.92 -6.51 -1.90 0.11
USA -2.48 -3.38 -4.00 0.31
2009
2009
2009
year
1992
2011
1993
2002
1997
1995
2010
2002
2007
2002
1998
2008
2003
2002
1994
Table A.19.: Contemporary inflation response to severest downturn since 1992 IV: CEN-SAD
(continued)
Note: Right column displays the contemporary change in inflation relative to the average inflation rate relative to the
size of the change in the output gap. Inflation measured as the annual rate of change of the deflator of total sales.
Owing to lack of data, the inflation of Algeria, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi, Sao Tome
and Principe, Seychelles, and Tunisia is measured as the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator.
Source: World Bank, own table and calculations.
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UMA
Algeria -4.49 -1820  0.12 -2041 X
Libya 13.15 -3608 X -0.79 -279 
Mauritania -1.82 -126  -1.58 -2605 
Morocco -4.49 3490 X 0.33 2425 
Tunisia -0.28 2064 X 5.48 2500 
Ø 0.41 - 40% 0.71 - 80%
EAC
Burundi -1.53 548556 X -0.64 -499371 
Rwanda -29.17 -290973  1.07 -77268 X
Tanzania 0.65 -475753 X 1.28 550187 
Kenya -0.24 -307269  -0.97 49896 X
Uganda -0.31 525439 X -0.10 -23444 
Ø -6.12 - 40% 0.13 - 60%
ECCAS
Angola 10.31 -185271 X 2.11 -138457 X
Burundi 0.71 14553  -1.08 -111470 
Cameroon -4.14 31844 X 1.99 -9327 X
Central African 
Republic
1.28 -169 X -1.66 40398 X
Chad 0.76 -13416 X -10.81 -9647 
Congo (Rep.) 1.85 -134616 X 2.93 -84059 X
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
0.75 300781  2.54 336790 
Equatorial 
Guinea
-18.77 17339 X 5.21 28894 
Gabon 8.76 -34271 X -8.67 -58557 
Sao Tome & 
Principe
1.52 3226  -1.14 5435 X
Ø 0.30 - 30% -0.86 - 50%
IGAD
Djibouti 6.16 3944  -1.67 -873 
Eritrea 3.53 304074  -8.07 -277141 
Ethiopia -0.96 -715718  -0.91 -47682 
Kenya 3.46 -288258 X -3.54 39432 X
Sudan -3.72 485116 X 2.97 346035 
Uganda 2.19 210842  -2.98 -59771 
Ø 1.78 - 67% -2.37 - 83%
1990-2000
Cyclical 
Difference
2000-2010
Net migration Contribution
Cyclical 
Difference
Net 
migration
Contribution
Table A.24.: Cyclical differences and net migration I: UMA, EAC, ECCAS, and IGAD
Note: Cyclical differences are calculated as the sum of yearly deviations in output gaps in percent between the re-
spective country and the remaining REC. Net migration in persons. Somalia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara are
excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data.
Source: World Bank, United Nations, own table and calculations.
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COMESA
Burundi -3.27 183711 X -2.683006348 -93469

Comoros -4.58 1937 X -2.125073857 1479 X
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
-4.02 125538 X -0.297135711 161133 X
Djibouti 2.06 4331  -2.789294854 -368 
Egypt -2.38 17209 X 0.48063922 -11533 X
Eritrea 1.42 302811  -9.241760121 -277036 
Ethiopia -4.67 -716335  -1.903965872 -46999 
Kenya -1.98 -288368  -3.956214986 29350 X
Libya 13.06 20598  -2.007123601 -5511 
Madagascar -1.32 2265 X -0.345573506 585 X
Malawi 5.52 -34542 X -5.059348035 -22160

Mauritius -2.51 -1111  -0.45855883 -252 
Rwanda -30.68 -500576  -2.613665923 13442 X
Seychelles 4.21 -1039 X -3.125612729 -177

Sudan -7.22 446228 X -0.64731237 336493 X
Swaziland 5.67 -376 X -0.850044751 -71

Uganda -2.27 443155 X -3.749618186 -135700

Zambia -4.99 46388 X -3.927192539 39739 X
Zimbabwe -0.74 -51824  -11.29066485 11055 X
Ø -2.04 - 42% -2.98 - 53%
CEN-SAD
Benin -2.56 12280 X 0.53 14318 
Burkina Faso -4.37 220205 X -3.44 -1791 
Cape Verde -5.86 -1590  1.57 -1998 X
Central African 
Republic
-3.50 -2642  -2.99 41255 X
Comoros -4.67 2428 X -0.28 1618 X
Cote d'Ivore -1.63 -289987  -1.48 166466 X
Chad -4.01 -111039  -11.88 -101870 
Djibouti 1.97 387  -0.94 505 X
Egypt -2.04 24448 X 3.00 -8168 X
Eritrea 1.60 366533  -7.37 -278760 
Gambia -2.60 -72014  5.41 19610 
Ghana -3.41 -8248  -6.66 -94708 
Guinea -3.56 -451905  -1.67 341952 X
Cyclical 
Difference
Cyclical 
Difference
Contribution
1990-2000
Contribution
2000-2010
Net 
migration
Net migration
Table A.25.: Cyclical differences and net migration II: ECOWAS and SADC
Note: Cyclical differences are calculated as the sum of yearly deviations in output gaps in percent between the re-
spective country and the remaining REC. Net migration in persons. Somalia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara are
excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data.
Source: World Bank, United Nations, own table and calculations.
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COMESA
Burundi -3.27 183711 X -2.683006348 -93469

Comoros -4.58 1937 X -2.125073857 1479 X
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.)
-4.02 125538 X -0.297135711 161133 X
Djibouti 2.06 4331  -2.789294854 -368 
Egypt -2.38 17209 X 0.48063922 -11533 X
Eritrea 1.42 302811  -9.241760121 -277036 
Ethiopia -4.67 -716335  -1.903965872 -46999 
Kenya -1.98 -288368  -3.956214986 29350 X
Libya 13.06 20598  -2.007123601 -5511 
Madagascar -1.32 2265 X -0.345573506 585 X
Malawi 5.52 -34542 X -5.059348035 -22160

Mauritius -2.51 -1111  -0.45855883 -252 
Rwanda -30.68 -500576  -2.613665923 13442 X
Seychelles 4.21 -1039 X -3.125612729 -177

Sudan -7.22 446228 X -0.64731237 336493 X
Swaziland 5.67 -376 X -0.850044751 -71

Uganda -2.27 443155 X -3.749618186 -135700

Zambia -4.99 46388 X -3.927192539 39739 X
Zimbabwe -0.74 -51824  -11.29066485 11055 X
Ø -2.04 - 42% -2.98 - 53%
CEN-SAD
Benin -2.56 12280 X 0.53 14318 
Burkina Faso -4.37 220205 X -3.44 -1791 
Cape Verde -5.86 -1590  1.57 -1998 X
Central African 
Republic
-3.50 -2642  -2.99 41255 X
Comoros -4.67 2428 X -0.28 1618 X
Cote d'Ivore -1.63 -289987  -1.48 166466 X
Chad -4.01 -111039  -11.88 -101870 
Djibouti 1.97 387  -0.94 505 X
Egypt -2.04 24448 X 3.00 -8168 X
Eritrea 1.60 366533  -7.37 -278760 
Gambia -2.60 -72014  5.41 19610 
Ghana -3.41 -8248  -6.66 -94708 
Guinea -3.56 -451905  -1.67 341952 X
Cyclical 
Difference
Cyclical 
Difference
Contribution
1990-2000
Contribution
2000-2010
Net 
migration
Net migration
Table A.26.: Cyclical differences and net migration III: COMESA and CEN-SAD
Note: Cyclical differences are calculated as the sum of yearly deviations in output gaps in percent between the re-
spective country and the remaining REC. Net migration in persons. Somalia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara are
excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data.
Source: World Bank, United Nations, own table and calculations.
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CEN-SAD
Guinea-Bissau -6.61 -18  0.52 3393 
Kenya -2.01 -11887  -2.13 1360 X
Liberia -48.45 -100649  10.64 -48362 X
Libya 11.74 18500  -0.84 -9596 
Mali -6.31 63830 X 1.23 -35403 X
Mauritania -2.02 5498 X -3.05 -22419 
Morocco -4.15 2204 X -1.64 1825 X
Niger -5.23 53020 X -2.44 41782 X
Nigeria 3.41 -165984 X -3.67 -234763 
Sao Tome and 
Principe
-3.20 1224 X -2.49 -2524 
Senegal -4.20 52626 X -0.18 8287 X
Sierra Leone 1.38 604329  -2.55 -291898 
Sudan -7.10 -266595  1.18 380363 
Togo 0.01 53591  -6.43 107662 X
Tunisia -0.46 1455 X 3.86 1864 
Ø -3.85 - 57% -1.22 - 50%
1990-2000
Contribution
Cyclical 
Difference
Cyclical 
Difference
Contribution
Net 
migration
Net migration
2000-2010
Table A.27.: Cyclical differences and net migration IV: CEN-SAD (continued)
Note: Cyclical differences are calculated as the sum of yearly deviations in output gaps in percent between the re-
spective country and the remaining REC. Net migration in persons. Somalia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara are
excluded from calculations owing to insufficient data.
Source: World Bank, United Nations, own table and calculations.
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Recommended REC Trade with remaining REC in percent of GDP
ECCAS 0.04 0.08 (0.71)
SADC  2.49 0.68 (0.00)
CEN-SAD  9.10 -0.23 (0.31)
ECOWAS 8.51 -0.19 (0.39)
CEN-SAD  8.08 0.54 (0.02)
ECOWAS 7.59 0.53 (0.02)
COMESA  6.33 -0.28 (0.22)
EAC 4.82 -0.16 (0.47)
ECCAS 0.10 -0.11 (0.61)
CEN-SAD  0.93 0.05 (0.82)
ECOWAS 0.53 -0.41 (0.06)
CEN-SAD 1.59 -0.25 (0.28)
ECCAS  3.67 0.24 (0.26)
CEN-SAD 1.25 0.05 (0.82)
ECCAS  1.66 -0.14 (0.52)
CEN-SAD 2.36 -0.32 (0.17)
COMESA  3.77 -0.17 (0.47)
COMESA 16.68 -0.37 (0.10)
ECCAS 0.51 -0.11 (0.61)
SADC  21.37 -0.22 (0.32)
CEN-SAD  18.35 0.43 (0.06)
ECOWAS 16.93 0.18 (0.42)
CEN-SAD  44.11 0.13 (0.58)
COMESA 11.00 0.11 (0.63)
IGAD 33.41 0.14 (0.53)
CEN-SAD 1.30 0.01 (0.97)
COMESA  1.04 0.42 (0.06)
CEN-SAD  - -0.23 (0.32)
COMESA - -0.43 (0.06)
IGAD  - -0.20 (0.36)
COMESA  1.59 0.37 (0.10)
IGAD 1.31 0.35 (0.11)
Ethiopia
Egypt
Eritrea
Cote d'Ivore
Output gap correlation post 1994 (p-value of Q-test)Country/REC
Angola
Chad
Central African 
Republic
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cape Verde
Comoros
Congo (Dem. Rep.)
Djibouti
Table A.28.: Multiple REC memberships: Trade and synchronicity comparison
Note: REC recommendation based on trade in percent of GDP and output gap correlation and marked with a green
tick (more than one tick per country suggests indecision). If both criteria do not suggest the same REC, the recom-
mendation is based on trade if correlation coefficients are insignificant. Trade data of Eritrea and Swaziland not avail-
able.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own table and calculations.
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Recommended REC Trade with remaining REC in percent of GDP
CEN-SAD  17.70 0.27 (0.25)
ECOWAS 14.16 0.22 (0.32)
CEN-SAD  8.11 0.06 (0.78)
ECOWAS 7.51 0.23 (0.29)
CEN-SAD  6.61 -0.19 (0.41)
ECOWAS 4.68 -0.13 (0.56)
CEN-SAD  13.76 -0.08 (0.74)
ECOWAS 12.43 -0.05 (0.82)
CEN-SAD 2.76 0.43 (0.06)
COMESA  7.48 0.51 (0.03)
EAC 5.49 0.38 (0.08)
IGAD 3.08 0.46 (0.03)
CEN-SAD  23.61 0.00 (0.99)
ECOWAS 16.94 -0.12 (0.59)
CEN-SAD  3.88 0.51 (0.03)
COMESA 2.11 0.15 (0.50)
UMA 2.44 0.27 (0.24)
COMESA  2.19 0.58 (0.01)
SADC  4.36 0.33 (0.13)
COMESA  7.01 0.40 (0.08)
SADC  16.13 0.19 (0.39)
CEN-SAD  8.47 -0.03 (0.88)
ECOWAS 7.55 -0.18 (0.41)
CEN-SAD  12.33 0.31 (0.17)
UMA 3.37 0.30 (0.19)
COMESA 3.14 0.31 (0.18)
SADC  7.33 0.06 (0.78)
CEN-SAD  2.07 0.01 (0.98)
UMA 1.83 0.04 (0.85)
CEN-SAD  9.75 0.09 (0.68)
ECOWAS 5.74 -0.07 (0.73)
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Morocco
Niger
Mauritania
Libya
Madagascar
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Country/REC Output gap correlation post 1994 (p-value of Q-test)
Table A.29.: Multiple REC memberships: Trade and synchronicity comparison (continued)
Note: REC recommendation based on trade in percent of GDP and output gap correlation and marked with a green
tick (more than one tick per country suggests indecision). If both criteria do not suggest the same REC, the recom-
mendation is based on trade if correlation coefficients are insignificant. Trade data of Eritrea and Swaziland not avail-
able.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own table and calculations.
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Recommended REC Trade with remaining REC in percent of GDP
CEN-SAD  2.38 0.33 (0.15)
ECOWAS 2.14 0.21 (0.33)
COMESA 11.80 0.29 (0.21)
EAC  10.78 0.55 (0.01)
CEN-SAD 0.38 0.12 (0.61)
ECCAS  2.77 -0.17 (0.45)
CEN-SAD  12.25 0.39 (0.09)
ECOWAS  10.85 0.48 (0.03)
COMESA 6.95 0.55 (0.02)
SADC  10.88 0.48 (0.03)
CEN-SAD  4.44 -0.14 (0.54)
ECOWAS 3.90 0.01 (0.98)
CEN-SAD  - - -
IGAD  - - -
CEN-SAD 1.16 0.36 (0.12)
COMESA  1.68 0.61 (0.01)
IGAD 0.71 0.17 (0.43)
COMESA  - 0.81 (0.00)
SADC - 0.42 (0.05)
EAC  3.61 0.53 (0.02)
SADC  4.64 0.38 (0.09)
CEN-SAD  15.87 0.54 (0.02)
ECOWAS  15.38 0.67 (0.00)
CEN-SAD  3.48 0.71 (0.00)
UMA 3.58 0.27 (0.24)
COMESA 7.53 0.27 (0.24)
EAC  7.01 0.43 (0.05)
IGAD  5.25 0.48 (0.03)
COMESA  13.59 0.40 (0.08)
SADC  28.04 0.26 (0.23)
COMESA 7.87 -0.10 (0.66)
SADC  45.44 -0.05 (0.83)
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Somalia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome & 
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Country/REC Output gap correlation post 1994 (p-value of Q-test)
Table A.30.: Multiple REC memberships: Trade and synchronicity comparison (continued)
Note: REC recommendation based on trade in percent of GDP and output gap correlation and marked with a green
tick (more than one tick per country suggests indecision). If both criteria do not suggest the same REC, the recom-
mendation is based on trade if correlation coefficients are insignificant. Trade data of Eritrea and Swaziland not avail-
able.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, own table and calculations.
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